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How does a novel artifact become a mainstream device? Three case studies on 
the transition from muscle to motor power indicate that the transfer of practices from 
old to new technologies facilitates technological change and diffusion. Case One 
examines the horseless carriage industry in the United States during the first decade of 
the twentieth century. To understand manufacturers’ efforts to generate consumer 
demand, this study reflects upon printed advertisements, manuals, and social 
commentaries prior to mass production of the automobile.  
Case Two examines motorization in a highly resistant environment—the post-
WWI US Cavalry. Cavalry service and drill regulations manuals serve as the basis for 
understanding the centrality of the horse to the cavalry’s fighting strategy and the 
cavalryman’s identity as a combatant. The Cavalry Journal, an internal military 
publication, provides evidence of the role military horse culture played in impeding—
and eventually facilitating—motorization. Mechanisms employed to maintain equine 
traditions gave birth to the jeep. The use of the jeep under battlefield conditions 
replicated cavalry-style maneuvers and fighting principles. Similar to the cavalryman 
and his warhorse, the American GI and his jeep became inseparable. 
Case Three addresses the domestication of the jeep in the Philippines, where 
successful motorization was again attributable to horse culture. Photographs, 
paintings, and observations from travelers, including the Philippine Commission 
Report of 1900–1901, and contemporary accounts and reflections of local scholars supplemented with phone interviews conducted in the Ilocano and Tagalog (Filipino) 
dialects prove useful sources for understanding the influence of horse legacy on 
motorization.  
Results show that in each case the shift from muscle to motor power required a 
forced likeness between the motorcar and the horse. Automotive ubiquity did not 
occur simply because cars became much cleaner, more efficient, and more affordable 
than horses. In each case, the motorcar relied upon society’s long-standing working 
relationship with the horse in order to be understood and accepted. When cars began to 
be perceived as functioning like horses, rapid diffusion ensued as socioeconomic and 
cultural practices built around the horse were transferred to the motorcar.  
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1 
Introduction 
Why would a 2005 form of public mass transport in the Philippines carry 
equine symbolism similar to that depicted in a 1905 American cartoon illustration? 
What links the symbolic expression of a horse from a hundred years ago with a 
Philippine vehicle of the present? One does not really think of the horse when driving 
an automobile. In fact, this association seems remote from modern-day sensibilities.  
This study revisits a time when this association was immediate and palpable. 
This dissertation examines the introduction of the motorcar in three different settings 
during three different periods. It shows how a novel technological artifact—the 
motorcar—depended upon the material and conceptual resources of the technology it 
sought to replace—the horse.   
At the turn of the century, the idea of a machine with a horselike quality—the 
ability to be self-propelling—seemed preposterous to the average person. What might 
seem ludicrous to us in the modern period is the idea of the automobile, a 
sophisticated technology, relying upon the antiquated horse for its survival. Yet, there 
was a time, in many places, when such was the case. We having largely forgotten our 
past, and our early-twentieth-century predecessors looking to an unknown future, may 
share a similar sense of puzzlement—how could the motorcar be related to the horse?  
The horse has become a rarity in most aspects of our modern life. We tend to 
associate the horse with important but nevertheless nonessential events, such as 
special occasions and ceremonies. On the fringes of society, we find the horse in 
sports for the wealthy—polo matches, fox hunting, show jumping, and other equine  
2 
events. In these outer reaches we also find other equine activities, such as betting on 
horse races, participated in by the less affluent. 
In everyday life, however, we do not think of the horse. The horse does not 
come to mind when we drive a car. The idea of using a horse to carry out our daily 
work routines and errands seems absurd. Today most people do not even know how to 
ride a horse. The horse in the midst of large superhighways, with their careening 
automobiles and trucks, is an anomaly. Yet it was just a hundred years ago that the 
opposite was true.  
At the turn of the twentieth century, the introduction of the motorcar
1 to public 
roads frequented by horse-drawn carriages caused great public alarm, not only in 
rural
2 but also in urban areas. This new contraption—a vehicle with no horse—was 
considered deviant and dangerous.
3 One horseless carriage owner was arrested for 
driving his vehicle to the entrance of Central Park.
4 George Basalla argues that people 
often do not know what to do with new technology.
5 Just as we have trouble today 
envisioning a world without automobiles, people a hundred years ago probably could 
not envision a world without horses. As late as World War II, a colonel declared most 
emphatically that the military horse was irreplaceable: “A machine has no life; horses 
have—that is the radical difference.”
6  
A technological artifact that is indispensable today, such as the automobile in 
the US, was not considered as such when it was first introduced. Charles E. Duryea, 
                                                 
1 According to the Merriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 11
th Edition, the word “motorcar,” meaning 
“automobile,” dates from about 1890. 
2 For discussions on the anti-car crusade, see Ronald Kline, Consumers in the Country: Technology and 
Social Change in Rural America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2000), esp. chapter 2. 
Also, Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch, “Users as Agents of Technological Change: The Social 
Construction of the Automobile in the Rural United States,” Technology and Culture 37 (1996), 768–
773. 
3 Charles E. Duryea, “As It Was in the Beginning,” The Automobile, January 7, 1909, 47. 
4 R. H. Thurston, “The Automobile or Horseless Carriage,” Collier’s, April 28, 1900, 9. 
5 George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 139. 
6 Colonel H. S. Stewart, “Mechanization and Motorization: The Final Chapter Has Not Been Written,” 
The Cavalry Journal 49, no. 217 (January–February 1940): 41.   
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the automotive pioneer who built the first American car in 1893, observed that people 
“decry rather than ask for”
7 technological innovations. Yet, the standard explanation 
for automotive ubiquity follows a general economic rationalist approach: cars 
ultimately replaced horses because they were much more affordable, more efficient, 
and cleaner. But is it simply common sense, albeit following on the heels of initial 
shock, that ultimately accounts for the widespread diffusion of the automobile? Why 
did people shun what should have been perceived as a far superior method of 
transport, not to mention a potential panacea to filthy streets and all sorts of diseases?  
To understand what transpires during the early stages of a large-scale 
technological change and diffusion, I selected motorization as an area of study. I use 
three cases in automotive history to explore the transition from muscle to motor 
power. I use a multiple case design for the purpose of theoretical replication.
8 Each 
case highlights a particular perspective: the manufacturer, the user, and a combination 
of both. The motorcar began as a peripheral device and eventually became widely 
diffused in all three cases. My primary goal is to identify various motivating factors in 
mass adoption. 
Organization of the Dissertation  
In Chapter One, I review the dominant literature in technology studies and the 
history of technology related to automobiling. I identify some gaps in the current use 
of artifacts, social groups, gender, and price as explanatory devices in understanding 
diffusion. I look at the notion of practices—routines and processes used to carry out 
work and social obligations—as a potential unit of analysis to bridge some of these 
gaps.  
                                                 
7 Charles E. Duryea, “As It Was in the Beginning,” The Automobile, January 7, 1909, 47. 
8 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
1994), 46.  
4 
Chapter Two covers the first case of the three-part study. I closely examine the 
marginality of the motorcar during the first decade of the twentieth century and 
discuss how mainstream status was eventually achieved. I focus on the efforts of US 
manufacturers to effect this change through the use of advertisements.  
Advertising of this time arguably serves as a mouthpiece for automotive 
manufacturers
9 and hence provides evidence of the persuasive measures used to 
generate mass demand. Manufacturers’ manuals and written publications are also 
included. Consumer magazines provide materials for popular culture, while trade 
magazines cover general matters related to automobiling.  
Chapter Three, the second case study, focuses on how diffusion was achieved 
in a context particularly hostile to motorization—the United States Cavalry after 
WWI. Similar to the first case, the motorcar was peripheral to the cavalry world, but 
unlike the first case, the aversion to the motorcar was not simply a reaction to its 
novelty, but was a reflection of the centrality of the horse to cavalry life. Motorization 
represented the demise of the horse—and the consequent dismantling of the cavalry’s 
identity and core principles.  
The 1914 Cavalry Service Regulations and the 1916 Cavalry Drill Regulations 
manuals provide evidence of the extent to which the horse culture was entrenched in 
the cavalry. The Cavalry Journal, an internal military publication, provides evidence 
of the various coping mechanisms employed to maintain the equine tradition, which, 
ironically, led to the conceptualization of the jeep. This case also examines how the 
jeep was used in actual battlefield conditions from group and individual levels of 
analysis. 
                                                 
9 Pamela Walker Laird, “The Car Without A Single Weakness: Early Automobile Advertising,” 
Technology and Culture, 37, no. 4, October 1996.  
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Chapter Four, the final case study, examines a combination of perspectives: the 
manufacturers, the users, and the artifact itself. It traces the transformation of the 
military jeep into a domesticated, widely used form of public transport in the 
Philippines. It examines the strength of the local equine tradition and the 
pervasiveness of socio-religious institutions in simultaneously negating and creating 
novelty. 
I use historical accounts from American expatriates to describe the 
socioeconomic and cultural state of the Philippines after WWII. Photographs, 
paintings, and observations from these travelers capture nuances of Philippine 
commuting life upon the arrival of the jeep. The extensive four-volume Philippine 
Commission Report of 1900–1901, with transcripts of interviews conducted by 
American delegates with key local leaders, proved to be a useful primary source in 
gleaning a sense of the state of roads, infrastructure, horse culture, and practices prior 
to the arrival of American influence. I have also examined contemporary accounts and 
reflections of local literary scholars and have supplemented these accounts with phone 
interviews with local users, conducted in the Ilocano and the Tagalog (Filipino) 
dialects.  
The Conclusion suggests that technological change and diffusion can be 
understood in terms of the continuity of practices. Pre-existing practices provide an 
inherent momentum that may constrain or promote the transformation of peripheral 
artifacts into everyday mainstream devices. The results of this study imply that the 
promotion of large-scale technological change sometimes involves the counterintuitive 
measure of keeping certain elements, concepts, and forms “unchanged.” A nascent 
technological device could benefit from the goodwill earned by its predecessor by 
assuming, in functionality, physical form, or through rhetoric, some of the successful 
elements of its predecessor.   
6 
Chapter One 
Review of Literature  
The purpose of this literature review is to show how the concept of practices, 
namely, ways of doing things, has not been extensively used as a primary focus in 
research on technological change and diffusion. Research on technology tends to 
break down its analysis into two major components—people and things. The dynamics 
of the relationship between the two has been examined through various analytical 
lenses—those of social groups, networks, gender, economics, technical content, 
functional features, to mention a few—with the purpose of explaining how an artifact 
comes to be, or why a certain social order exists. Although studies focusing on people 
and things complement each other, they differ on many fundamental points, 
particularly with regard to the agency and impartiality of social actors. Actor-Network 
theorists and gender scholars, for instance, see artifacts as forces that shape social 
orders, whereas social constructivists recognize agency among humans exclusively.  
Little work has been done, however, to explicate the motivational factors of 
agency, particularly in cases where an artifact initially deemed ineffective or 
superfluous becomes a necessity of everyday life—for example, the automobile at the 
turn of the century. Farmers saw it as a devil wagon but later adopted it for use as an 
all-around device and power source.
1 Why do social groups change their positions 
with regard to a particular artifact? How does a marginal artifact come to be accepted 
as a mainstream device? I argue that pre-existing practices and work routines can be 
used as explanatory devices to understand diffusion strategies and localization 
                                                 
1 Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch, “Users as Agents of Technological Change: The Social Construction 
of the Automobile in the Rural United States,” Technology and Culture 37 (1996), 763–795.  
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measures. Understanding the strength of ingrained practices provides insights into the 
transformative aspects of a technological device as it becomes part of common, 
everyday routine.   
Artifacts 
The general public perception of a new technology as the product of a few 
geniuses has been questioned by researchers such as George Basalla, who sought to 
emphasize continuity in novelty. Basalla uses the artifact as the fundamental unit of 
analysis for studying technological evolutions. Changes in the technological world are 
tracked by looking at things. According to Basalla in The Evolution of Technology, 
“Novel artifacts can only arise from antecedent artifacts [. . .] new kinds of made 
things are never pure creations of theory, ingenuity, or fancy.”
2 Basalla defines 
novelty as a variation of the old. New artifacts do not emerge solely from an 
inventor’s imagination but arise from other artifacts. Thus technological change in this 
model emphasizes a certain dependency on the old. New things must then be 
understood in a historical context.  
Basalla’s theory of technological evolution is characterized by four major 
concepts: novelty, continuity, diversity, and selection. Basalla defines novelty in terms 
of creating variations on old things. Drawing on a Darwinian biological worldview, 
Basalla argues that the modern world spins out new artifacts as a matter of routine and 
compulsion. New artifacts constantly emerge from the old; thus a definitive link exists 
between new and existing artifacts. Old artifacts never completely disappear, even 
when new artifacts emerge to replace them. Consequently, technological diversity 
                                                 
2 George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), vii–
viii.  
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increases over time. However, certain selection decisions are made about which 
artifacts are to be fully developed and reproduced.
3  
Basalla argues that there is no universal criterion for functionality. Each 
society decides on the usefulness of a particular artifact. People decide which things to 
keep, use, and replicate from a myriad of artifacts. This decision is not driven by some 
universal biological need, as a human body needs water. On the contrary, an artifact 
may be useful to one society but not to another. According to Basalla, “Often it is 
difficult to determine precisely what is to be done with a new device.”
4 Things 
themselves do not force a certain use; nor does the material itself make its application 
immediately self-evident. This implies that mass appeal requires persuasive measures.   
Basalla uses the example of the automobile to illustrate the social construction 
of technological necessity. The automobile, before its transformation into an 
indispensable component of everyday life, began as a plaything for the rich during its 
first decade of existence, 1895–1905.
5 Basalla emphasizes the fact that the 
development of the automobile was not motivated by some grave international horse 
crisis or horse shortage.
6 Similarly, the motor truck was not a response to some 
scarcity in horse supply or steam-powered machinery. Rather, “the invention of 
vehicles powered by internal combustion engines gave birth to the necessity of motor 
transportation.”
7 Things came first, followed by the need for them. 
Basalla further supports his argument by stating that the usefulness of the 
wheel itself, considered indispensable to modern society, was in fact socially 
constructed. In Mesoamerica from the fourth to the fifteenth centuries, people created 
miniature wheeled figurines for religious purposes but never put the wheel to practical 
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use, even though by this time people thoroughly understood its mechanical principles.
8 
Mesoamericans just did not find wheels useful for their type of terrain and thus used 
them mainly for ritual and ceremonial purposes.
9  
Some aspects of a new technology mimic those of its predecessors despite 
having no contemporary applications. For example, the traditional cord handles of 
Congo pottery continue to be replicated in the design of contemporary pottery handles 
made from clay.
10 Basalla points to anthropology to support this phenomenon: 
The regularity with which new materials are handled and worked in imitation 
of displaced, older ones has led anthropologists to coin a word to designate the 
phenomenon: skeuomorphism. A skeuomorph is an element of design or 
structure that serves little or no purpose in the artifact fashioned from the new 
material but was essential to the object made from the original material.
11 
Basalla does not explore why old components become incorporated into new 
artifacts, but he does attribute selection decisions to those he calls “selecting agents,” 
those “productive individuals capable of making the choices and changes needed to 
shape the material world as they see fit.” For instance, Basalla attributes the diffusion 
of the gasoline automobile to a group of Midwesterners who saw an opportunity to 
exploit their region’s natural and industrial resources. The Midwest was rich in 
hardwood. It was the nation’s center for carriage and wagon production, with an 
infrastructure ready to build the body of the car. It also possessed the technical 
expertise to make stationary gasoline engines. These resources put the Midwest at a 
competitive advantage for gasoline car production. 
Thus, selectors, such as these Midwestern businessmen, are an enterprising 
group with the potential capacity to choose which artifacts are to be mass produced. 
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Basalla suggests that any artifact in general could be widely distributed through the 
sponsorship of a particular, relevant group of selectors.  
The selectors do not represent all segments of society nor are they necessarily 
concerned with the public’s welfare. However, they have the freedom to decide 
which of the competing novelties would be replicated and incorporated into 
cultural life.
12 
While Basalla touches upon how decisions on technological artifacts are made, 
he does not fully discuss why the rest of that society would concur. Why would the 
buying public choose to accept the artifact that the selectors have decided to replicate 
and diffuse? Basalla attributes the motivations of the selectors to socioeconomic 
rationalist arguments such as profitability and technical superiority (for example, the 
superior performance of gasoline cars over steam and electric vehicles for long-
distance travel, their lower maintenance cost, and so forth), but takes for granted the 
motivations of the rest of the society. Why would the rest of the buying public replace 
their horses simply because a group of Midwestern businessmen decided to produce 
gasoline cars? Is it simply a matter of survival of the fittest, by which selectors have 
the capacity to impose their will upon the rest of society?  
Although Basalla points to an important observation of the social construction 
of needs—what one society finds useful may not be found useful by another society—
he appears to revert to a Darwinian rationale to explain agreement on the part of the 
rest of society. Are societies homogeneous and monolithic enough to reach consensus 
upon what they need—and upon which artifacts from a myriad of options fulfill this 
need?  
While Basalla argues for a social constructivist model to identify the needs of a 
certain society, the rationale for technological diffusion follows a Darwinian model. 
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Social constructivist theories, such as the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT), 
seek to show more complexity in the process of social groups vying for the right to 
impose their own interpretation on the standardization of an artifact. However, similar 
to Basalla’s view, SCOT also adheres to an idea of technological diffusion as a matter 
of one group’s choice of meaning superseding those of other groups.  
Social Groups 
The Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) characterizes technological 
change as a matter of one social group rising above others to impose a standard 
interpretation on a given artifact.
13 The unit of analysis in this case is social groups. 
Similar to Basalla’s notion of a voluntaristic approach to technological change, 
proponents of SCOT argue that humans have the freedom and will to impose meaning 
on an artifact. However, unlike Basalla, who believes that artifacts bring about other 
artifacts, proponents of SCOT believe that social groups bring about technological 
diversity. 
SCOT recognizes in technological change and diffusion three stages, which 
occur along a process of variation and elimination. The first stage involves the 
identification of social groups with a stake in the development of a particular artifact; 
their relevancy is a function of their capacity to influence the artifact’s content and 
form. The second stage, interpretative flexibility, describes how these interpretations 
conflict with one other. In the final stage, closure and stabilization, one social group’s 
interpretation prevails, and a standard is established. 
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Within this framework, technological change is characterized by a contest of 
meanings from which one interpretation emerges to shape the technological form of 
the artifact. Pinch sums up the core of technological change according to SCOT: 
The key element is that such groups share a meaning of the artifact—a 
meaning which can then be used to explain particular developmental paths 
which the artifact takes.
14  
According to SCOT, these potential developmental paths diverge primarily because 
meanings advocated by each social group differ radically from one another. Each 
meaning generates a different type of technical content.
15 A primary task of the SCOT 
analyst is to ensure that the groups are homogeneous with respect to the meanings they 
represent.
16 All members of a group agree on how a particular artifact should look and 
function. Thus, in many ways, one social group represents one worldview. According 
to Pinch and Bijker,  
We need to have a detailed description of the relevant social groups in order to 
define better the function of the artifact with respect to each group. Without 
this, one could not hope to be able to give any explanation of the 
developmental process.
17 
A group-level analysis becomes the critical piece in explaining technological 
change and diffusion in the SCOT model. The fundamental assumption is that shared 
meaning is sufficient to maintain group integrity throughout the developmental 
process. Bijker, however, in his theory on “technological frames,” points to the 
difficulty of establishing a tight one-to-one correspondence between the three major 
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components of SCOT—the relevant social groups, the shared meanings, and the 
artifact.  
Bijker argues that in some instances meanings proposed by one social group 
are shared by another. One relevant social group may work with various artifacts 
simultaneously and interpret each of them in the same way. Hence, meanings and 
social groupings may not have a one-to-one correspondence. For instance, social 
categories may overlap empirically but differ analytically.
18 Celluloid
19 engineers, for 
example, may work with a variety of artifacts with different interpretations and still 
represent one social grouping.
20 Conversely, Bijker also argues, relevant social groups 
may overlap analytically but remain empirically separate. Again in the case of 
celluloid, chemists, molders, and pressing-machine designers all represent different 
sociological categories but share the same analytical frame with regard to celluloid.
21 
In this case, people from different occupational groupings have the same interpretation 
of one artifact.  
In the context of newly emerging artifacts, then, how does a SCOT analyst 
assign a specific meaning to a specific relevant social group without introducing 
inconsistencies and overlaps? SCOT criteria are rather straightforward: groupings 
should revolve around shared meanings of a particular artifact. In practice, however, 
traditional sociological categories such as gender, age, occupation, economic status, 
and geographic location tend to be used as organizing principles in social groupings. 
In an environment in which a multitude of newly emerging artifacts exists, finding a 
reliable method to sort people into different relevant social groupings associated with 
different interpretations becomes a daunting task. 
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Instead, Bijker proposes a theoretical framework that breaks the neat 
classificatory scheme found in SCOT. “The two sides of analysis,” Bijker states, 
“social groups and technical artifacts,” must be folded into “aspects of one world.”
22 
Theoretical concepts, according to Bijker, should be “as heterogeneous as the actors’ 
activities.”
23 But at the same time he proposes a highly restricted model in which 
actions and interactions are constrained by their technological frame, and thus, “not 
everything is possible anymore.”
24 Bijker seeks to show that social groups and the 
meanings associated with them are not governed by their interests in artifacts alone but 
by some other conceptual factors akin to Kuhn’s notion of paradigm.
25  
Users  
As SCOT became known in various academic circles, its applications moved 
beyond explaining the development of a certain artifact to include how modifications 
to a finished product occur. Indeed, after the early 1980s publication of Pinch and 
Bijker’s article on the safety bicycle,
26 in the mid-1990s Kline and Pinch wrote “Users 
as Agents of Technological Change: The Social Construction of the Automobile in the 
Rural United States”
27 to show how change possibilities persist well beyond the design 
stage.
28 In their study of the Ford Model T, Kline and Pinch focus on the consumption 
rather than the design stage, with a consequent emphasis on users rather than 
manufacturers. 
Furthermore, although manufacturers may have ascribed a particular 
meaning to the artifact they were not able to control how that artifact was 
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used once it got into the hands of the users. Users precisely as users can 
embed new meanings into the technology.
29  
Kline and Pinch equate new users embedding new meanings into an artifact 
with finding new technological applications for an artifact once it has been stabilized. 
Identifying technological change, in this application of the SCOT model, becomes a 
matter of recognizing new users applying new sets of meanings to newfound 
functionalities. 
New meanings are being given to the car by the new emerging social 
group of users—in this case, technically competent farm men. To the 
urban user the car meant transport. For the rural users we have identified, 
the car, as well as being a form of transport, could be a farm tool, a 
stationary source of power, part of a domestic technology, or perhaps all 
of these.
30  
Their study suggests that innovation was no longer the exclusive domain of 
designers and manufacturers. Users could propel changes by advocating for new 
features in an artifact’s functionality, a state of affairs which indicates a certain open-
endedness in the model. Indeed, this technological flux is mentioned in Jordan and 
Lynch’s study on the “plasmid prep,” a laboratory technique used to insert pieces of 
DNA into a bacterial medium in order to create genetic material for experimentation.
31 
Jordan and Lynch argue that even in a highly formalized, well established and 
seemingly straightforward laboratory procedure such as the “plasmid prep,” there was 
a “continual genesis of incoherence and fragmentation within the relatively settled 
development of an established technology.”
32 Closure and concession were difficult to 
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establish, even in an area that appears to be an exemplar of standardization, as many 
studies on users of technology have shown.  
In the ten years since the publication of “Users as Agents of Technological 
Change,” the Kline and Pinch study has attracted subsequent research on users of 
technology, as evidenced by the recent publication of How Users Matter: The Co-
Construction of Users and Technologies, edited by Nelly Oudshoorn and Trevor 
Pinch.
33 Oudshoorn and Pinch expand on what Kline and Pinch initially sought to 
illustrate in the Ford Model T study—the possibility of finding new uses for familiar 
technologies. In this study, adoption becomes deeply tied to the notion of localization. 
Users become the new designers of stable technologies. 
Oudshoorn and Pinch also point to the recent trend in feminist studies of 
moving away from a technologically deterministic perspective to granting users, 
particularly women, the capacity to shape technological change. The common 
perception that women were hapless victims of technology has been modified by the 
last two decades of scholarship on women as capable users.
34 The extent of users’ 
influence varies depending on their direct control of a particular artifact and their 
socioeconomic conditions. Implicit in this analysis, and perhaps more explicit in some 
cases, is a sense of struggle emanating from social groups themselves rather than from 
the meanings they advocate.  
Contrary to the approach of impartiality in SCOT, scholars of gender studies, 
such as Judy Wajcman, give prominence to power relationships—the dominance of 
men in the technological world and the disadvantaged position of women. Gender 
becomes simultaneously an organizing and an explanatory device. The meanings 
assigned to each social group often tend to be established a priori, not by the features 
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of the artifact, but by the analyst. One goal that recent gender studies share with 
SCOT, however, is the desire to debunk the idea of users as passive recipients of 
technological change.  
The notion of users as empowered social groups in recent technology studies 
may have arisen as a reaction to the traditional approach of crediting sole authority to 
designers by virtue of their direct access to technological form. In his study on the 
microcomputer in the late 1980s, for instance, Steve Woolgar argues that computer 
manufacturers attempt to “configure the user” with features designed to determine the 
range of user agency. In the view of such designers, form should direct use, and 
designers should direct users.   
For along with negotiations over who the user might be, comes a set of design 
(and other) activities which attempt to define and delimit the users’ possible 
actions. By setting parameters for the users’ actions, the evolving machine 
effectively attempts to configure the user.
35 
In this framework, designers attempt to control user agency through machine 
designs, a concept similar to the notion of embedded scripts advocated by Actor-
Network theorists such as Madeline Akrich.
36 Akrich argues that a “technical object 
defines a framework of action together with the actors and the space in which they are 
supposed to act.”
37 While Bijker describes the limits of social agency in terms of 
conceptual frameworks such as “technological frames,” Actor-Network theory 
attributes constraints to artifacts. Artifacts are not simply the receivers of meanings. 
Technological diffusion in this model becomes a matter of things becoming taken for 
granted, or “black-boxed.” 
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Black Boxes 
Bruno Latour, who pioneered Actor-Network theory with the publication of 
Science in Action, includes non-human actors in his definition of relevant groups.
38 
These non-human actors, once they are “black boxed,” diffuse into “thousands of 
copies all over the world.”
39 For example, in his study of the diesel engine, Latour 
traced the history of the engine from concept development through prototype 
development, product diffusion, and product recall, to its inventor’s suicide. Latour 
described the diesel engine during the diffusion stage as “incorporated as an 
unproblematic element in factories, ships and lorries.”
40 Diffusion, for Actor-Network 
theorists, is synonymous with commodification.  
According to Latour, if a particular commodity falters, stalls, and breaks apart, 
it ceases to be taken for granted because people must determine the source of its 
malfunction. Indeed, mechanics and engineers began opening the black-boxed diesel 
engines when they began to fail repeatedly.
41 Failure may also result from an artifact’s 
inability to satisfy user needs, another condition that could prompt the opening of 
black boxes. Kline and Pinch show how technically competent farmers did not merely 
accept the Model T, even thought it was mechanically sound, but instead modified it 
in various ways to suit their needs.  
In Actor-Network theory, the model of diffusion does not suggest that 
innovations travel through some inherent force; rather diffusion becomes a matter of 
eliminating reasons to open black boxes. Diffusion occurs when “people do not do 
anything more to the objects, except pass them along, reproduce them, buy them, 
believe them.”
42 In other words, trust accompanies diffusion as long as artifacts 
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perform reliably and problems go away, a condition that on this particular point 
resembles the notion of stabilization in the third stage of SCOT.
43 In many ways, the 
last stage of SCOT represents the culmination of an artifact becoming black-boxed. 
Is black box status, then, a necessary precursor to technological diffusion? 
Does flawless technical execution become the primary incentive for users to pick up 
an artifact and use it? What compels users to adopt an artifact? Actor-Network theory 
suggests that for adoption to occur, an artifact must enroll the interests of users. As 
Latour stated, if no player takes up the ball in a game of rugby, “it just sits on the 
grass.”
44 Enrollment occurs when various interests and goals become aligned.
45 This 
enrollment is so critical that lacking it, an artifact “dies,” as Latour sought to show in 
his narration of Aramis.
46  
Aramis is the story of France’s failed attempt to create a Rapid Personal 
Transit (PRT) system that would have combined the workings of a regular railway 
train with the personal service of an automobile. The basic idea involved creating 
separate train “cars” to pick up a small number of passengers on demand instead of 
according to a fixed time schedule typical of a conventional train system. Each train 
car would monitor its own speed and distance; thus the cars would be physically 
separate from each other. Each would find the most efficient route for its passengers, 
bypassing train stations as needed. This method of transportation was designed for 
people living in the suburbs, where train stations are typically smaller and served less 
frequently by conventional trains.  
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Several sophisticated technological advances were implemented to establish 
inter-car linkages, such as the use of microprocessors to replace the job of a train 
conductor. The project spanned almost two decades, from the 1970s to the 1980s, 
before it dissolved—hence the “death of Aramis.” Latour attributes the death of 
Aramis to a lack of human sponsors or, in the parlance of SCOT, a relevant social 
group. 
Aramis had been fragile from the outset—we all know that; not fragile in just 
one respect, in one weak link, as with other innovations, but fragile on all 
points… Here is our mistake, one we all made, the only one we made. You had 
a hypersensitive project, and you treated it as if you could get it through under 
its own steam… If the Budget Office can kill Aramis, what should you do, if 
you really care about it? Impose yourselves on the Budget Office, force it to 
accept Aramis. You can’t do that? Then don’t ask Aramis to be capable of 
doing it on its own. If elected officials from the south Paris region can kill 
Aramis, what should you do? Make them change their minds, or get other ones 
elected. You don’t think you have the power? Then don’t expect Aramis will.
47  
While Latour pioneered the concept of nonhumans as social actors with their 
own agency, his analysis of the Aramis project makes a plea for human support in the 
early stages of technological development. In many ways, Latour subscribes to 
Basalla’s notion that things have inherent momentum, except that for Latour, diffusion 
is contingent upon non-action by users to “open the black box.” Bassalla argues for a 
form of material inertia—a compulsion of artifacts to diversity
48—whereas Latour 
never separates material agency from the network in which an artifact diffuses.   
Thus if technological diffusion for Latour is a matter of an artifact’s reaching 
black box status, then technological change becomes a matter of negotiation among 
human actors. Indeed, Latour describes technological change as a “process of 
negotiations between the innovator and potential users” and the manner in which “the 
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results of such negotiations are translated into technological form.”
49 These 
negotiations may be facilitated by what Actor-Network theorists call “mediators.” 
According to Akrich, “if we are to describe technical objects, we need 
mediators to create the links between technical content and user.”
50 Unlike in the 
SCOT model, in which social groups by virtue of their relevancy directly influence the 
content of an artifact, Actor-Network theorists propose a mediator that arbitrates 
among social groups. Thus, in this model, the mediators, rather than the producers or 
designers—although supposedly devoid of their own interpretation of a particular 
artifact—directly control technological changes.  
The same basic idea echoes in the notion of “boundary shifters” described in 
Pinch and Trocco’s Analog Days.
51 Sales people, for instance, are boundary shifters 
by virtue of their direct access to both manufacturers and users.
 52 “Boundary shifters” 
are people who “move from one world to the other,” and “apply the knowledge, skill, 
and experience gained in one world to transform the other.”
53 Sales people bring 
lessons learned from users back to manufacturers, who in turn modify a particular 
artifact based on user feedback. Sales people as mediators are sometimes users 
themselves, as exemplified by Pinch’s story of David van Koevering, who sold 
synthesizers to rock and roll musicians by capitalizing on his own experience as a user 
of the synthesizer.  
Thus an important point shared by SCOT and Actor-Network theorists is that 
users have some means to transmit their ideas to designers. Users and designers no 
longer interact on just the material level; mediators provide a communication channel 
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whereby social groups can negotiate without directly influencing an artifact. If such a 
channel indeed exists and is effectively used, how else do producers explain the 
concept involved in a new technological artifact? Why would use not be immediately 
evident, as Basalla observed, if in fact users were part of an artifact’s development? 
For that matter, why would there exist other, competing alternatives?  
Gender 
Gender studies tend to answer these questions in terms of humans subjugating 
other humans. Around the time that Woolgar wrote his article on user configuration, 
Judy Wajcman wrote Feminism Confronts Technology, which proposed that 
technology is a product of the “distribution of power and resources between different 
groups in society” and challenged the way social constructivism casts technology as 
neutral.
54 Although later studies on gender issues deemphasized the theme of the 
subjugation of women, the idea of technology as a male dominion resonated in gender 
literature for many years. 
Unlike SCOT, which begins with the assumption that social groups are 
relatively independent from each other and, to a certain extent, have similar 
opportunities to impose their meanings on an artifact, gender studies suggest that 
technologies favor men and place women at a disadvantage. Gender becomes the 
explanatory and organizing principle of social groups. 
As with science, the very language of technology, its symbolism, is masculine. 
It is not simply a question of acquiring skills, because these skills are 
embedded in a culture of masculinity that is largely coterminous with the 
culture of technology. Both at school and in the workplace this culture is 
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incompatible with femininity. Therefore, to enter this world, to learn its 
language, women have first to forsake their femininity.
55 
Wajcman claims that the technological world has essentially been imprinted 
with a male agenda. Thus the analyst’s task is to understand the different ways in 
which women are subjugated by or excluded from this world. For example, in her 
analysis of the diffusion of the automobile, Wajcman argues that transportation has the 
paradoxical effect of restraining women rather than liberating them from their homes.  
I will argue that the transport system, and in particular the dominance of the 
car, restricts women’s mobility and exacerbates women’s confinement to the 
home and the immediate locality.
56  
Wajcman uses Langdon Winner’s concept of technological determinism
57 to show 
how the dependence of American women on modern-day public transport has 
restricted their access to certain areas, preventing them from taking full advantage of 
the various economic and social opportunities available in society.  
Perhaps the most revealing illustration of the way reliance on public transport 
can restrict the access of certain groups to public amenities comes from an 
article called “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” by Langdon Winner (1980).
58 
Winner proposes that technical things—that is, machines, structures, and 
systems of modern material culture—embody specific forms of power and authority.
59 
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A technology, as a device and as a system, contains specific arrangements of power 
that societies use to enforce certain types of social order. For example, the physical 
arrangement of a particular technology may systematically promote social inequality, 
as exemplified by Winner’s much-cited 1986 case study of the Long Island Bridge,
60 
in which he argued that Robert Moses in the 1950s deliberately and successfully 
excluded racial minorities and low-income groups from visiting Jones Beach by 
designing a bridge under which public buses could not pass.
61  
Wajcman uses Winner’s argument to advance her thesis that things are charged 
with the means to advance male dominion. Technological development viewed 
through a gendered analytical lens becomes a matter of identifying the different ways 
in which technology, in whatever form, subjugates women. Wajcman states, “Even 
seemingly innocuous technological forms such as roads and bridges embody and 
reinforce power relations.”
62 Thus artifacts are no longer things to be explained but 
are, rather, the explanatory variables necessary to understanding the perceived 
inequality between men and women.  
Wajcman attacks the traditional notion of technology that focuses on industrial 
machinery and men. Instead, she argues for the centrality of technologies associated 
with women, such as the household devices of everyday life. 
I have already argued that the traditional conception of technology is heavily 
weighted against women. We tend to think about technology in terms of 
industrial machinery and cars, for example, ignoring other technologies that 
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affect most aspects of everyday life. The very definition of technology, in other 
words, has a male bias. This emphasis on technologies dominated by men 
conspires in turn to diminish the significance of women’s technologies, such as 
horticulture, cooking and childcare, and so reproduces the stereotype of 
women as technologically ignorant and incapable.
63 
Women’s technologies, such as “horticulture, cooking and childcare,” center 
on practices rather than on things. Gender as an analytical lens seeks to expand the 
traditional definition of technology beyond mere things to a set of work routines. 
Wajcman’s worldview subscribes to the following: first, the world of technology 
favors men. Second, to participate in this world, women must become like men. Third, 
although the world favors men, there is such a thing as women’s technologies, which 
appear to be associated with household-related work.  
However, even so-called women’s technologies ultimately work to improve 
the lot of men. The labor saved by early household appliances was that of men, not 
women. For instance, the cast-iron stove eliminated the cutting, hauling, and splitting 
of wood, all tasks performed by men, but cooking-related tasks, which were performed 
by women, remained labor-intensive.
64 Thus whether a technology is designed for men 
or women, the outcome tends to benefit men because technology as a rule tends to 
favor men, according to Wajcman’s thesis. 
However, it is unclear in Wajcman’s approach whether it is even possible to 
have a gender-free technology, and if not, how an analyst is to distinguish between 
men’s and women’s technologies. If we accept that the culture of masculinity is 
coterminous with the general culture of technology, it becomes difficult to separate, 
analytically or empirically, masculinity from technology. 
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Judith McGaw sheds some light on this matter by defining feminine 
technologies as “tools, skills, and knowledge associated with the female majority.”
65 
In her view, technology is associated not just with things but also with skills and 
knowledge, which include practices and the uses of things. McGaw argues that 
focusing on women and technology clarifies the idea that technology is ultimately 
dominated by men. 
It is also true that until we began to study women and technological change, we 
were able to remain unaware and ignorant of technology’s masculine 
dimensions—we studied inventors, engineers, and entrepreneurs as though 
they were simply “people,” oblivious to the ramifications of the overwhelming 
masculine predominance, both numerically and politically, in the so-called 
technological professions.
66 
McGaw argues along lines similar to Wajcman’s in terms of the general 
disenfranchisement of women, although McGaw attributes the cause to men 
themselves as social actors rather than to the things they make. McGaw argues that 
turning a blind eye to gender issues conceals the fundamental characteristic of the 
social group that dominates technology—men as technicians.  
Indeed, the “old-boy network” has been identified by many women as an 
exclusive club that helps only men and sometimes even blocks women’s advancement. 
Law’s description of successful engineers as “heterogeneous engineers” for their 
ability to maneuver physical as well as social relations
67 bypasses the issue of gender. 
It fails to consider how the ability to maneuver physical and social resources may be 
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attributable to a gender-influenced ability to access those resources, rather than simply 
to having well-rounded skills.   
Cynthia Cockburn argues that technology may in fact be designed to promote 
precisely this gender-driven agenda. In her study on the early printing industry, 
Cockburn shows how male workers advocated for the use of the Linotype machine 
over the Hattersley because the former did not require the use of distribution work 
typically performed by women or child laborers. Cockburn believes that the heavy 
lifting required as part of composing work in letterpress printing effectively 
marginalized women to low-paid finishing jobs such as bookbinding.
68  
Cockburn writes that during the late nineteenth century, some small print shops 
were run completely by women. Women possessed all of the skills necessary to do 
composing work and engaged men merely to perform heavy lifting and carrying 
duties. However, men influenced the development of printing technology such that the 
control of the typesetting machine required physical strength that effectively kept 
women out of composing work. Cockburn states: 
The bodily strength component of the compositor’s craft may be isolated to 
illustrate the politics involved. Men, having been reared to a bodily advantage, 
are able to make political and economic use of it by defining into their 
occupation certain tasks that require the muscle they alone possess, thereby 
barricading it against women who might be used against them as low-cost 
alternative workers (and whom for other reasons they may prefer to remain at 
home).
69 
The size and weight of the printing presses and printed sheets could have been 
designed to be smaller. Since men typically design machinery with men in mind, 
Cockburn argues, these machines were made to be either too big or too heavy for the 
average woman. The net effect of such designs is that women end up with a greater 
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number of inferior job positions. The more prestigious, highly paid positions require 
body strength, not just skill, in controlling machines. Cockburn concludes that printing 
technology was gendered as a result of a male-dominated power-play.
70   
On a similar theme, Ruth Oldenziel’s study of the Fisher Body Craftman’s 
Guild during the years from 1930 to 1968 shows how various institutions marshaled 
economic and cultural resources to enforce a male technical domain in the design and 
production of automobiles.
71 Oldenziel argues that the Guild socialized boys through 
various activities such as model-making contests in order to prepare them to become 
managers and engineers for General Motors (GM). A stereotypical relationship 
between artifacts, men, and women was characterized as follows: 
Men design systems and women use them; men engineer bridges and women 
cross them; men build cars and women ride in them; in short, a world in which 
men are considered the active producers and women the passive consumers of 
technology.
72 
According to Oldenziel, the world of the passive consumer in the Fisher Body 
advertisements was conveyed with nontechnical, soft, female imagery, such as the 
parallelism made between the soft curves of the female body and the contours of the 
Fisher car. The world of production, on the other hand, was “technical,” “hard,” and 
“male.”
73 When men were encouraged to be consumers, they were still cast as 
knowledgeable producers and builders.
74  
Women, on the other hand, maintained their passive roles as consumers, or 
what Oldenziel describes as “receivers of what the boys produced.”
75 Technological 
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diffusion in this case is explained in terms of women accepting without resistance 
what men produce. Technological change is completely under the control of men. This 
general theme of female disenfranchisement can be traced back to Ruth Schwartz 
Cowan’s seminal book, More Work for Mother, published in 1983.  
Cowan shows how tools, even those designed for women, did not deliver the 
promised benefits. They merely recast the types of work women did, rather than 
freeing them from work itself. According to Cowan, “Modern labor-saving devices 
eliminated drudgery, not labor.”
76 In her discussion of the automobile, Cowan argues 
that the American housewife in the 1950s toiled as much as the American housewife 
in 1850. The only difference was the location where her work was performed: in the 
1850s, the housewife was shackled to the stove, while in the 1950s, the housewife was 
trapped in her car. 
The automobile had become, to the American housewife of middle classes, 
what the cast-iron stove in the kitchen would have been to her counterpart of 
1850—the vehicle through which she did much of her most significant work, 
and the work locale where she could most often be found.
77 
Unlike contemporary women, nineteenth-century women spent little time 
shopping and ferrying goods to their homes.
78 Household goods and services, 
including medical care, were instead delivered directly to them.
 Even in rural areas, 
merchandise was purchased through mail-order catalogues and delivered to the home. 
Retail stores in urban areas provided delivery services and were generally accessible 
on foot.  
However, during the first two decades of the twentieth century, the burden of 
transporting goods and services shifted from the seller to the buyer.
79 The automobile, 
                                                 
76 Cowan, More Work for Mother, 100–101. 
77 Ibid., 85. 
78 Ibid., 79–84. 
79 Ibid., 85.  
30 
according to Cowan, shifted the responsibility of acquiring household goods from men 
to women.
80 In this case, the car became “an agent of change,”
81 facilitating the shift 
in household work from production- to consumption-related activities. The availability 
of household appliances and ready-made goods replaced the need for hired help. 
Nevertheless, the American wife remained harried with work, just of a different kind. 
Consistent with the tenor in gender studies, the car as a masculine industrial machine 
in Cowan’s analysis worked to benefit the lot of men but not that of women.  
Wajcman’s analysis of the automobile as a technology that constrains women 
was inspired by the work of Cowan. Both propose that the automobile ultimately did 
not benefit women but instead bound them more tightly to their subservient role. Later 
scholars such as Virginia Scharff agree that even contemporary housewives spend 
significant amounts of time ferrying children and goods. Because the automobile has 
been associated with leisure, household work performed using the car, such as 
shopping, came to be cast as entertainment rather than a chore, rendering much of 
modern-day homemaking invisible.
82 
Indeed, automobiles in their early years provided the means for women to 
conduct commercial and leisure activities outside their homes with greater freedom 
and less apprehension. Scharff states, 
As such, it seemed to some women a perfect solution to the problem of gaining 
admission to public life, especially commercial and leisure activities, without 
exposing oneself to the vagaries and annoyances of public transportation. It 
opened up the possibility of independent mobility for those who used it. 
Extending that potential to women meant both expanding the private sphere 
into the realm of transportation and, paradoxically, puncturing woman’s 
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“sphere” by undermining the already strained notion that women’s place was 
in the home.
83 
Although Wajcman may have implied that transport technologies were designed to 
constrict women, Scharff argues that automobiles in their early years extended a 
woman’s sphere and provided the means for her to leave her home without having to 
forego privacy and a sense of security. The closed car, for instance, became an 
extension of a woman’s home, like a living room on wheels
84 where comfort and 
convenience came to be associated with feminine features. 
Questions of comfort, for the driver and the passengers, lay at the heart of the 
automobile business debate about woman’s influence. Whenever industry men 
and male consumers invoked customary notions about feminine behavior, they 
used the terms “comfort” and “convenience” to cover a spectrum of meanings, 
from sober concern for safety to lavish luxury.
85  
Scharff argues that automotive manufacturers operated under a gendered 
assumption that women wanted fluffy features that had nothing to do with automotive 
performance. Men, on the other hand, were perceived to value exclusively practical 
features such as fuel economy and horsepower. Scharff claims that because 
manufacturers thought men and women wanted different things, this caused product 
differentiation in motorcars. Technological diversity became driven by gender. 
Nevertheless, manufacturers tended to associate the qualities of comfort, 
convenience, and aesthetic appeal with women, while linking power, range, 
economy, and thrift with men. Women were presumed to be too weak, timid, 
and fastidious to want to drive noisy, smelly gasoline-powered cars. Thus at 
first, manufacturers, influenced by Victorian notions of masculinity and 
femininity, devised a kind of “separate spheres” ideology about automobiles: 
gas cars were for men, electric cars were for women.
86 
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Scharff suggests that this gendered worldview initially fragmented the 
automotive market. The gender bias of manufacturers resulted in sex-specific 
advertising campaigns. At the same time, Scharff recognizes buying power as gender-
free. 
However, when automotive designers and promoters, acting in part under the 
influence of cultural imperatives regarding gender, coupled these desirable 
attributes with the electric’s limited power and circumscribed range, they 
misread their audience. No law of nature dictated that automobiles could not be 
designed to be comfortable, reliable, handsome, and powerful, qualities that 
might appeal to men and women alike. And even if automakers continued to 
insist that males and females had different automotive preferences, a sex-
specific promotional strategy made very little business sense in an economy 
where consumers, male or female, had some choice, and where families buying 
only one vehicle were likely to have to accommodate male drivers who were 
presumed to want to go farther and faster than their female counterparts.
87 
Hence the manufacturers’ gendered worldview, according to Scharff, was not 
ultimately economically sustaining, nor did it make business sense. Although Scharff 
acknowledges that men at this time typically made most major purchasing decisions, 
she characterizes paying customers, regardless of their gender, as having the same 
economic weight in the market.  
While arguing the existence of gender division in the marketing campaign of 
manufacturers, Scharff simultaneously negates this division by arguing that universal 
values such as the power of the pocketbook and the common desire for comfort and 
aesthetics ultimately superseded gender bias. Sharff proceeds to argue that if 
manufacturers had incorporated homey features of comfort into the automobile early 
on, they would have attracted mainstream buyers sooner:  
Had manufacturers recognized the benefits of providing mobile shelter from 
the beginning of the automotive era, the private auto might have made a more 
rapid transition from “pleasure car” to practical means of daily transportation 
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for middle-class workers, both those employed outside the home and those 
who pursued a domestic vocation.
88 
To a certain extent, Scharff attributes significant control to manufacturers. In 
arguing that their actions, though uninformed, ultimately determined the timing of the 
diffusion of the motorcar, Scharff inevitably paints a profile of automotive 
manufacturers as powerful, though mildly ignorant, for their capacity to facilitate or 
negate the diffusion of the gasoline automobile. Scharff softens this categorization by 
arguing that there were other manufacturers and businesses who, more in tune with the 
emerging automotive market, took early advantage of the economic opportunities 
active women drivers represented. 
Defenders of women drivers have never been as numerous as detractors. Given 
the potential market that women drivers represent, those supporters have, not 
surprisingly, included many people who produce and sell automobiles and 
automotive products and services.
89 
Thus, on the one hand, Scharff discusses the disenfranchisement of women due 
to gender bias among manufacturers; on the other hand, she qualifies this position by 
indicating that some manufacturers saw things differently. Still, she also argues that 
even others with gender bias changed their thinking: “In an effort to keep up with 
consumers’ changing demands, producers would at once modify their notions of 
gender and the machines they made.”
90 Are consumer buying power and taste, then, 
ultimately the drivers of technological change?  
Scharff argues that women drivers themselves began to break their own gender 
biases. “As men registered their indifference to the electric, women were 
demonstrating their own unwillingness to leave long-distance touring and high-speed 
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driving to men.”
91 Scharff departs from the traditional gender-studies approach of 
assuming the dominance of men in the technology world at all levels. Rather, she 
argues that economic forces overpower gender biases.  
The electric car, marketed primarily as a woman’s vehicle, provides a striking 
example of the influence of gender ideology on automotive production. 
Paradoxically, the electric’s failure also illustrates the impossibility of 
maintaining rigid gender distinctions in motorcar technology at a time when a 
declining proportion of customers could not afford the luxury of his-and-hers 
automobiles, and where in any case consumers shared certain preferences 
regardless of sex.
92 
Thus what began as a masculine machine came to incorporate “feminine” features, 
such as the electric starter, which all users, including men, came to appreciate. Herein 
lies the contribution of women to the diffusion of the gasoline automobile: the 
standard automobile became user-friendly for all. 
The self-starter, the device that would replace the crank, offered advantages to 
all motorists, but nonetheless began its automotive career marketed as a 
supposedly feminine accessory akin to doors designed to accommodate long 
skirts.
93 
Technological diffusion in this case became a matter of dissolving what had 
previously enforced gender stereotypes. The push for feminine values that came to be 
appreciated by men, such as comfort and convenience, inspired the standardization of 
the automobile. 
Manufacturers who adopted the self-starter made driving easier for all 
motorists. They also redefined the boundary between men’s and women’s 
automotive spheres, no longer identified as the distinction between gas and 
electric motorcars.
94 
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Scharff in many ways sought to show that although manufacturers may have 
had direct control over the way technological artifacts were initially used, they 
eventually had to bow to consumers and their buying power. Cowan makes a similar 
observation when she points to the notion of “market acceptance,” which advertisers 
must consider when selling different kinds of household appliances for economic 
profit.
95 She states, “The machine that was ‘best’ from the point of view of the 
producer was not necessarily ‘best’ from the point of view of the consumer.”
96 Thus 
advertisers must work to court the buying public by providing features they want at a 
price they are willing to pay. 
Indeed, Kline and Pinch point to general socioeconomic factors that facilitated 
the diffusion of the Model T, such as support from farm leaders; use of media such as 
advertisements, editorials, and articles; road improvements; general economic 
prosperity among farmers; and the affordability and availability of cars as a result of 
mass production methods.
97 But is technological diffusion ultimately explained by 
economic choices? In the next section, I focus specifically on the limitations of 
socioeconomic and technical factors as drivers of the diffusion of the automobile.  
History of the Automobile 
Historians such as Berger and Flink emphasize the technical and economic 
advantages of the motorcar over the horse. Berger argues that “the economic argument 
in favor of the animal had little validity when one considered the time saved, the 
increase in potential haulage per vehicle, and the reserve power always available with 
the automobile.”
98 According to Flink, “The motorcar was considered cleaner, safer, 
                                                 
95 Cowan, More Work for the Mother, 102. 
96 Ibid., 143. 
97 Kline and Pinch, “Users as Agents of Technological Change,” 772–773. Also in Ronald Kline, 
Consumers in the Country: Technology and Social Change in Rural America (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 2000), 63–64. 
98 Michael L. Berger, The Devil Wagon in God’s Country (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979), 34.  
36 
more reliable, and more economical than the horse. The car promised to be vastly 
improved and lower in price in the near future, while the expense and liabilities of the 
horse seemed insurmountable.”
99 From a commercial and performance standpoint, this 
argument assumes that common sense accounts for the diffusion of the automobile 
because it was cheaper and better than the horse.  
Indeed, Flink states that “the inability of the industry to produce a low cost 
vehicle in sufficient quantity was all that prevented the rapid disappearance of the 
horse in American cities.”
100 Flink seems to suggest that the diffusion of the motorcar 
and the consequent disappearance of the horse largely depended upon the automotive 
industry’s ability to produce a low-cost vehicle in mass quantities. People appear to 
have been poised to make a purchase as soon as an affordable motorcar became 
available. Flink himself considers the motorcar to be cleaner, safer, more reliable, and 
more economical than the horse—in other words, a common-sense choice. 
However, many people at the turn of the century disdained the general idea of 
driving something inanimate. They did not see in the motorcar the advantages that 
Berger and Flink describe and thus would not have conceivably purchased, at any 
price, something they despised. If indeed the superiority of the motorcar was self-
evident, why would certain social groups adamantly refuse to replace their horses even 
decades after the motorcar was first introduced? As late as 1940, a United States Army 
colonel described the military’s reservations about replacing the horse with something 
lifeless. “A machine has no life; horses have—that is the radical difference.”
101  
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The fundamental concept of a lifeless transport has been overlooked in the 
analysis of historians of the automobile. Indeed, the introduction of motorcars to 
public roads at the turn of the twentieth century caused much public consternation; not 
only in rural
102 but also in urban areas people saw them as aberrations—abnormal and 
dangerous.
103 Given the public’s reaction, then, how was a detested devil wagon 
transformed into a widely used machine?  
Still, many historians, such as Flink, fail to consider conceptual elements and 
instead, suggest price as a barrier to diffusion. There is an implicit assumption that 
once automobiles were mass-produced, the motorcar must inevitably replace the horse, 
because it was simply assumed to be what people wanted; after all, in the mind of the 
analyst, it was the obvious choice. However, evidence suggests that affordability was 
far from being the main barrier to mass consumption. 
As early as 1898, a pro-car observer insisted that a petroleum canopy cart 
carrying two passengers priced at $600 brand new was “infinitely cheaper than 
horses.”
104 Many motor buggies, particularly around the period from 1907 to 1908, 
were advertised to be “cheaper than horses.” Secondhand dealers and brokers offering 
affordable used automobiles were already advertising in several magazines by this 
time. An observer in 1905 noted that it was comparatively easy to find a second-hand 
car of “almost any type at a price very much below its original cost, and in many cases 
at figures that are really absurdly low.”
105 High prices in these early days do not 
appear to have been as significant a deterrent to adoption as many believe.  
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Some scholars, such as Clay McShane, emphasize public health over 
economics, arguing that the organic aspect of horses proved a major disadvantage 
when compared with motorcars. Horses were vulnerable to disease and death, as 
exemplified by the Great Epizootic in 1872, which paralyzed the entire city of Boston. 
Horses were significantly limited in strength and endurance compared to machines, 
particularly in the hauling of freight. They had a shorter life expectancy compared 
with cars. They ate prodigiously even when not in use; caused sanitation and pollution 
problems due to their droppings; created traffic congestion due to their bulky size, and 
even caused traffic accidents because they spooked easily.
106 But if the advantages of 
the automobile were glaringly obvious, particularly in matters regarding public health 
and safety, why did government officials institute strict motor laws that discouraged 
the use of automobiles in the first decade of the twentieth century? Why were 
mainstream users reluctant to replace their horses?  
Ogburn proposed that various parts of a modern culture develop at different 
rates; hence some parts may change more rapidly than others, resulting in what he 
calls a “cultural lag.”
107 The driver of change, or what Ogburn called material culture, 
as an independent variable forces another part of the culture, the adaptive culture, to 
adjust to a new set of conditions.
108 Failure of the adaptive culture to keep pace with 
change causes strain in the system. According to Ogburn, 
The independent variable may be technological, economic, political, 
ideological, or anything else. But when the unequal time or degree of 
change produces a strain on the interconnected parts or is expressed 
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differently when the correlation is lessened, then it is called a cultural 
lag.
109 
Thus in this framework, Ogburn would attribute the presence of horses to a 
“cultural lag” that eventually becomes corrected. While Ogburn did not specifically 
analyze horses versus automobiles, he did use the example of automobiles and 
highways to illustrate his point. He stated, although historically inaccurately, that 
automobiles and highways were two parts within the same culture that were in proper 
balance in 1910; the automobile was slow and the highways were narrow. “The 
automobile,” Ogburn stated, “traveled at not a great rate of speed and could take the 
turns without too much trouble or danger.”
110  
“But as time went on,” Ogburn further stated, “the automobile, which is called 
an ‘independent variable,’ underwent many changes, particularly the engine, which 
developed speeds capable of sixty, seventy, eighty miles an hour, with brakes that 
could stop the car relatively quickly[. . .] The old highways, the dependent variable, 
are not adapted to the new automobiles, so that there is a maladjustment between the 
highways and the automobile.”
111 Thus the corresponding adjustment of wider and 
longer roads resulted from the pressure to accommodate advances in automotive 
performance.  
What Ogburn failed to consider, however, was that the motorcar engine was 
not the factor that determined how fast people drove, for cars were already considered 
too fast and too dangerous well before 1910—fast and dangerous enough that traffic 
laws and regulations were instituted to set speed limits. Judges meted out heavy fines 
and penalties to reckless drivers. Ogburn overlooked the influence of governmental 
intervention through public policies and the manner in which legal controls such as 
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traffic laws address the so-called “maladjustments.” To what extent and at what speed 
a certain technological artifact is incorporated into society appears to be determined by 
more than technological factors alone.  
Thus it was not simply a matter of society being governed by some coherent 
technological system in which one element must play catch up with another element. 
Bijker and Law have even argued that technological artifacts themselves do not evolve 
out of some inner scientific or technical logic but rather are shaped by a range of 
various contingencies, such as economic, professional, technical, and political 
factors.
112 As Bijker and Law inquired about technologies, “Why did they actually 
take the form that they did?”
113 What explains the relationships between various 
elements in a sociotechnological world? 
In The Railway Journey, Wolfgang Schivelbusch argues that train cars were 
purposely designed to resemble horse-drawn carriages to assure British railway 
passengers, particularly the upper class, of a familiar riding experience despite the 
change in locomotion. Even though railways were fundamentally different from 
highway roads,
114 efforts to make train cars look and feel more like horse drawn 
carriages came as an attempt to negate the unfamiliarity of riding in a new form of 
transport. 
The traveling situation of the more privileged classes was entirely different: 
their carriages looked like coaches mounted on rails. Not only was this design 
forgetful of the industrial origin and nature of the railroad, it was a literal 
attempt to repress awareness of them. The compartment, an almost unaltered 
version of the coach chamber, was designed to reassure the first-class traveler 
(and, to a lesser degree, the second-class traveler as well) that he was still 
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moving along just as he did in his coach, only at less expense and greater 
speed.
115 
No consideration, however, was made for the lower class passenger. The open boxcars 
for the less-privileged travelers immediately brought industrial progress to their riding 
experience.
116 The upper class too, despite the camouflage of train cars, felt “like mere 
parcels,”
117 mere objects of an industrial process.
118 They felt “converted from a 
private individual into one of a mass public—a mere consumer.”
119  
While Ogburn described cultural lag as a matter of the old trying to catch up 
with the new, Schivelbush shows how new technological forms purposely couch 
themselves in terms of the old to make new experiences more palatable. The effort to 
continue the traditions of horse carriages in the design of train cars persisted despite 
their ineffectiveness. 
As far as I know, in Europe there were no attempts to create a passenger car 
that would be compatible in its form with the modern technology of the 
railroad—i.e., one that would no longer have anything to do with the coach-
driven compartment.
120 
Thus social relations and experiences, rather than technological homogeneity, 
ultimately shape nascent technologies.  
Would the acceptability of new technologies then hinge upon their 
resemblance to their predecessors? While Basalla, and to a certain extent Schivelbush, 
noted that skeuomorphic elements in new artifacts serve little or no functional 
purpose,
121 their effects on technological diffusion have not been studied. The 
replication of old technological forms as a means to reenact old experiences may 
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conceivably help the introduction of a novelty. Could manipulation of technological 
forms then be used to control social experience?  
Noble’s study of machine tools shows how the purposeful use of technology to 
change social relations does not follow a simple cause-and-effect rule.
122 In his study 
of programmable machine automation, Noble argues that the upper management of a 
General Electric factory attempted and failed to use technology to enforce a certain 
social order that would reduce their dependence on workers.
123 The choice to cut 
metals using a numerical control machine (N/C) rather than a record playback (R/P) 
was motivated by GE management’s desire to gain greater control on the shop floor. 
In the record playback system, the machinist, using blueprints, has to cut the first 
model piece, which the automated machine then replicates. In the numerical control 
system, the first model piece is cut using mathematical models that circumvent the 
machinist. A programmer creates in precise mathematical and algorithmic terms the 
“sight, sound and feel” of an “automatic machinist.”
124 
The numerical control (N/C) system developed through massive financial 
support from the air force supposedly eliminated the possibility of having the 
blueprints stolen by subversives and spies at a time when communist phobia was 
particularly high. Managers would now, in theory, have greater control over the 
production process. However, managers found that the new numerical control 
machines still needed skilled machinists to produce a good finished product. The 
machines and their software programs were not always reliable and still required the 
presence of skilled workers along the production process. Control over the machinery, 
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despite efforts to circumvent it, remained in the hands of the workers. Status quo 
reigned. Noble argues:  
Although the evolution of a technology follows from the social choices that 
inform it, choices which mirror the social relations of production, it would be 
an error to assume that in having exposed the choices, we can simply deduce 
the rest of reality from them.
125     
Indeed, while N/C initially appeared to provide the company with a powerful 
means to control work force productivity,
126 management later found that machines 
could not run by themselves but depended upon the skill, initiative, and goodwill of 
human workers.
127 The effort to impose a new social order using new technology 
failed to succeed because of the machine’s inability to completely replicate the 
practices of skilled laborers. Hence, pre-existing practices from old work routines 
persisted through the new technological form. 
However, some analysts of technology, such as Latour, argue that machines 
could replace human work because the lack of discipline and reliability among 
humans has to be compensated for, and put into order, using nonhuman instruments—
a way of thinking akin to that of GE’s upper management. Humans are supposedly 
substandard in performing certain tasks. In his example of the hinge-pin or door-
closer, Latour described how this nonhuman device, “delegated with human 
characteristics,” made a compliant substitute for a porter. Mechanization in Latour’s 
view becomes a matter of machines being upgraded and reskilled to compensate for 
humans being displaced and deskilled.
128 Is the machine, then, a “better” human 
worker?  
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Hubert L. Dreyfus, in What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial 
Reason, argues that “machines cannot be like human beings,” but that “human beings 
may become progressively like machines.”
129 Dreyfus points to the fundamental 
difficulty of exhausting all possible human actions and situations in programming a 
machine to comprehensively mimic human behavior.
130 Pinch also alludes to the 
failure of machine-like instruments to capture the creativity required in music-making, 
or what he would describe as the impossibility of machines to capture the 
“irredeemable human features of musicianship.”
131  
A human mind can easily sort relevant and irrelevant data, whereas a computer 
must be instructed, in every circumstance, how to treat each variation in input; hence, 
the impossibility of having, in Noble’s term, an “automatic machinist.” Tasks must be 
greatly simplified, in minute detail, in order to be mechanized. As Noble argues, 
efficiency in a machine factory could only result from simplifying the work itself.
132  
Dreyfus argues that if the mind were made to work more like machines rather 
than vice versa, then it would be possible to create an intelligent machine that could 
substitute for humans.
133 However, the human brain does not function like a 
machine;
134 thus, pushing for a thinking machine could potentially result in the 
propagation of subintelligent human beings rather superintelligent computers.
135 In 
other words, it is more feasible for humans to become like machines rather than vice 
versa. 
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Harry Collins subscribes to the same idea as Dreyfus in arguing that human 
work must be deskilled, or immensely simplified, in order for machines to take 
over.
136 Contrary to Latour’s argument that machines are reliable substitutes for 
humans, Collins argues that humans must compensate for the deficiencies of artifacts 
in order for machines to be able to replace the work performed by workers. Indeed, 
Noble’s study on machine tool automation supports Collins’s argument on the need to 
translate human work into simplified tasks that machines would be able to replicate 
without error.  
Collins also points to the difficulty of replicating even routine human work. 
For instance, similar to the difficulty of sorting relevant and irrelevant data, work that 
appears simple in fact requires complex programming. An automotive assembler 
knows, without giving it a thought, that debris must be removed first before mounting 
the wheel,
137 whereas computers must be programmed for all possible variations, as 
Dreyfus points out, in order to account for anything that could possibly go wrong. As 
Collins states, “So long as acts can go on without disturbance, machine-like acts could 
be reproduced.”
138 However, such circumstances are rarities rather than the norm.  
Domestication of Technology 
Scholars in the field of communication, such as Silverstone, argue that 
technology in fact occurs not in small, controlled environments but “in multiple 
domains and in uneven and often contradictory ways.”
139 While Silverstone studies 
household-related technology rather than production-related technology, he seeks to 
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show the importance of human activities in the notion of technology.
140 Feminist 
scholars have argued for a broader definition of technology that includes work 
routines and activities. Similarly, communication scholars have investigated the 
importance of practices, particularly in the way people incorporate new technology 
into everyday life.
141  
As Schivelbush observes with train cars mimicking designs of horse-drawn 
carriages, Silverstone also argues that technology must be mediated in order to be 
accepted,
142 requiring some form of acclimation and ownership. 
Domestication does, perhaps literally, involve bringing objects in from the 
wild: from the public spaces of shops, arcades and working environments; 
from factories, farms and quarries.
143 [. . .] One can think of domestication too, 
as both a process by which we make things our own, subject to our control, 
imprinted by, and expressive of, our identities; and as a principle of mass 
consumption in which products are prepared in the public fora of the market.
144  
Silverstone suggests that domestication of technology involves a movement of goods 
from the public sphere into the private world. Similar to the idea of localization, things 
must be made to become one’s own such that they become taken for granted and 
hence “invisible.” 
The domestication of technology refers to the capacity of a social group (a 
household, a family, but also an organization) to appropriate technological 
artifacts and delivery systems into its own culture—its own spaces and times, 
its own aesthetic and its own functioning—to control them, and to render them 
more or less ‘invisible’ within the daily routines of daily life.
145 
Silverstone argues that technology, as a cultural product, must be appropriated 
in everyday normal life. In many ways, Silverstone’s model argues for the immediate 
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need to neutralize newness in technologies—people tend to make new things familiar 
in order to fit them into their daily socio-cultural life and functioning. Thus the 
implication of Silverstone’s thesis is that the lifespan of new technologies does not 
last. New things are injected with old, familiar elements in order to be absorbed and 
hence, domesticated. 
Conclusion 
I argue that, similar to the notion of the continuity of artifactual designs in 
Basalla’s theory of technological evolution, some elements are carried over from old 
to new technological artifacts. However, unlike Basalla, I suspect that these elements 
are not superfluous. Indeed, the effort to conjure old experiences through a new 
technological medium has been observed by Schivelbush. Train cars were made to 
look like horse-drawn coaches in order to “repress”
146 the “awareness” of a new 
transport vehicle, which in turn made the new riding experience less threatening 
because of its newness.  
Making new technologies familiar resembles Silverstone’s notion of achieving 
invisibility,
147 such that new technologies in essence become part of the woodwork of 
people’s everyday lives. Achieving this “invisibility” may mean achieving black box 
status, or being taken for granted, such that an artifact is no longer questioned, noticed, 
or tinkered with, but is simply accepted and used without much thought or question. 
Indeed, the concept of invisibility has also been used by Scharff to describe the taken-
for-grantedness of work performed by women using automobiles.
148  
The inertia of work routines may shed light on why women, as gender studies 
have argued, accept as normal the persistence of the same heavy burden of household-
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related work despite the plethora of modern appliances available. Focusing on 
practices may also provide the necessary insight into how enrollment occurs as the 
new is packaged and associated with the goodwill earned by old technologies. One 
could argue that even things possess reputation; new technologies appropriate from 
past or pre-existing technologies to project a reputable image. Perhaps these types of 
associations provide currency on how public consensus could be reached, particularly 
for controversial new technologies such as the motorcar at the turn of the twentieth 
century. 
However, the use of practices as the focus of this analysis is not a matter of 
tracing movements and actions, as described by Siegfried Giedon in Mechanization 
Takes Command.
149 Giedon writes that during the nineteenth century, movement in all 
its forms, such as the gait of the horse, the flights of insects, and the pulses of a 
heartbeat, was rendered in graphic form.
150 Scholars using various devices copied, 
point by point, the trajectories of human and animal muscle movement. Such analysis 
focused on the nature of movement rather than on its pragmatic use.  
This dissertation focuses primarily on practices as ways of doing things, as 
work and social routines. As Collins, Noble, and Dreyfus point out, the 
inexhaustibility of intelligent human movement such as work skills cannot be 
successfully replicated by machines. Just as gender studies seek to expand the 
definition of technology to include work practices, this study proposes that focusing 
on past practices manifested through articulations in the designs and operations of a 
new technological artifact may provide insights into why the motorcar, despite its 
affordability and supposed superiority in performance to the horse, was not 
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immediately adopted but was in fact disdained by the general public and by many state 
government officials during the initial decades of the twentieth century.  
Economic rationalist arguments do not explain why price was not an issue for 
adoption, nor do they explain the strong reluctance of users to replace the horse with 
the motorcar. If mediators or boundary shifters, on the other hand, can be perceived as 
change agents, their influence does not explain how consensus on interpretation was 
achieved on a wide scale. What ultimately brings about widespread diffusion? In the 
next three chapters, this study examines three cases in three different time periods and 
settings to understand and verify pre-existing practices as explanatory devices for 
technological change and diffusion.   
50 
Chapter Two 
Case One: Domesticating the Devil Wagon: 
Interchangeability of Muscle and Motor Power 
How does a peripheral object turn into a mainstream device? The first case of 
this three-part study centers on the US automotive history during the first decade of 
the twentieth century, when people were just beginning to grapple with the idea of a 
horseless carriage. I focus on this period to capture some of the dynamics involved in 
marshalling consumer demand prior to mass production. This study assumes that by 
1910, mass consumption of the automobile was underway. The study focuses on 
technological diffusion, and the US provides a conspicuous example because of its 
strong car culture.
1  
What were the issues involved in facilitating the diffusion of the motorcar? 
The automobile at the turn of the century was not only new in form; it was associated 
with rich outlaws, rogue chauffeurs, and other non-mainstream groups. How did this 
newfangled machinery of dubious functionality and reputation find its way into the 
lives of a new, rising consumer class? This study focuses on the first decade of the 
twentieth century with the intent of capturing the automobile’s peripheral status and 
the various measures adopted to overcome it. 
Although the widespread dissemination of the automobile may be attributed to 
the Model T Ford in 1908 and its assembly-line production, this causal explanation 
assumes that mass production brought about mass consumption. Throughout industrial 
Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, European manufacturers possessed the same technical 
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capabilities as the Americans, but the success of the automobile in the US was not 
replicated in Europe.
2 The demand for cars was not present. How was the desire to 
own cars created among mainstream American consumers?  
This study makes the assumption, as proposed by John B. Rae, that if mass 
production is to succeed, mass consumption must already either exist or be poised to 
be generated.
3 To understand mainstream consumer issues, this study reflects upon 
printed advertisements in consumer magazines. Although printed advertisements 
reflect the producers’ version of consumers and their interests, they provide 
information on the types of strategies used to transform the newly emerging motorcar 
into a popular means of transport.  
At the turn of the century, advertisements began to exert great influence in 
American life.
4 Ruth Cowan, in her study of the mechanization of household 
implements, argues that advertising lies at the “juncture” between social change and 
technological change.
5 No longer dependent on general merchants to market their 
products, manufacturers accessed consumers directly through advertising, shaping 
their needs, instilling brand awareness, and opening up new avenues for consumer 
spending.
6  
Advertising provided the means to sell magazines at cost or less, which 
allowed publishers to dramatically increase readership and extend their reach to 
                                                 
2 John B. Rae, “The Rationalization of Production,” in Technology in Western Civilization, ed. Melvin 
Kranzberg and Carroll W. Pursell, Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 49. 
3 Rae suggests that Europe’s lack of market demand failed to sustain the English “rationalization” 
program or Germany’s “Fordismus” (Ibid.). Presumably, other automotive infrastructure systems found 
in industrial America at this time, such as the distribution and repair service systems, did not materialize 
in Europe precisely because of the absence of market support. Thus, if a market does not have sufficient 
demand capacity, mass production will not materialize or, at least, be sustainable, as exemplified by 
Europe in the 1920s–1930s. 
4 Frank Luther Mott, A History of American Magazines 1885–1905 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1957). 
5 Ruth Schwartz Cowan, “The Industrial Revolution in the Home,” in The Social Shaping of 
Technology, Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999), 296. 
6 Richard Ohmann, Selling Culture: Magazines, Markets, and Class at the Turn of the Century (London: 
Verso, 1996), 72–74, 100.  
52 
mainstream America. Printed advertisements provide a good source for evidence of 
strategies used to target potential buyers. In the absence of television and other media, 
US advertisements from the first decade of the twentieth century supply a particular 
perspective on the types of public relations battles manufacturers had to wage in 
selling the automobile to the public.  
A significant amount of money was spent on direct consumer advertising in the 
early years despite the relatively small size of the automotive industry: as early as 
1907, many millions of dollars were spent on marketing the roughly 40,000 cars that 
sold in that year for prices ranging from $650 to $6,000, with the average selling price 
at $1,500.
7 In the first six months of 1907 alone, the automobile industry spent 
$300,000 on advertising in twelve magazines, even though, according to many 
contemporary estimates, the industry was incurring losses at that time, and more than 
60 percent of automobile manufacturers failed in the first six years of the twentieth 
century.
8  
While the lack of advertising metrics for this period makes it difficult to 
establish causality between marketing strategy and shift in perception of the 
automobile, the various elements in printed advertisements certainly document the 
persuasive measures adopted by early automobile manufacturers. Automobile 
advertisements in the first decade of the century focused on convincing consumers to 
buy a car, not to replace an existing one. Thus, the primary task of manufacturers was 
to show that the automobile was a useful and necessary device. Competition revolved 
principally around stealing market share from the horse industry. But how did the shift 
from muscle to motor power gain momentum?  
Pamela Walker Laird, in “The Car Without A Single Weakness: Early 
Automobile Advertising,” indicates that the automobile’s technical superiority 
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dominated the marketing strategy of early advertisements. She argues that early 
manufacturers entered the automobile industry because of their “passion for the 
machines, and for the experiences of automobiling.”
9 However, manufacturers 
refrained from expressing their enthusiasm in their advertising messages.
10 Instead, 
she argues, manufacturers used a staid, “near-universal mechanical theme” in early 
automobile advertisements.
11 
But apparently automakers did not feel the need to prove that automobility was 
exciting. All auto ads before 1920, and most before 1930, featured technical 
discussions appropriate to a new and expensive, exciting but intimidating 
technology, akin to personal computer advertisements today. Lengthy copy 
gave potential owners information calculated to inspire confidence in 
machines.
12 
Laird depicts automotive advertising until the 1920s as highly reactive, 
educating customers rather than anticipating and shaping their needs and tastes.
13 Even 
when automotive brands were associated with prestige for legitimation purposes, 
manufacturers de-emphasized the excitement of owning a car.
14 In this sense, Laird 
argues, automotive advertising, although well funded, was less professional than 
advertising for other brand-name consumer goods.
15 Rather than hiring marketing 
specialists, automotive company owners and chief executive officers wrote their own 
advertisements well into the 1920s; thus their advertisements “reflected owners’ 
ambitions and concerns to a degree not true for other manufacturers then advertising 
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directly to consumers.”
16 This study subscribes to Laird’s proposal that early 
automotive advertisements reflect the thinking of manufacturers.  
However, Laird also argues that manufacturers refrained from expressing their 
own passions for automobiling in their advertisements—hence, their staid, mechanical 
message. Which personal concerns, then, were expressed in these early automotive 
advertisements, and which were not? Laird does not address this issue directly but 
simply alludes to advertisements as reflective of the personal aspirations of 
manufacturers. This study assumes that these aspirations involve increasing market 
share. The advertisements, which were lavish, reflect the manufacturers’ efforts to 
generate sales and thus speak of their specific assumptions on how to win over 
potential buyers. Early automotive advertisements were in a unique position to show 
customer thinking, being customer-driven as Laird proposes, while at the same time 
providing evidence of the persuasive measures adopted to advance profit-making 
interests.  
However, some of Laird’s propositions prove suspect. While she argues for the 
pervasiveness of technical, staid advertisements, she also points to the presence of an 
aesthetic element coming from the carriage industry. She argues that the influence of 
the carriage industry in automobile advertisements also had a sedative effect.  
Instead, the aesthetic roots of auto advertising are to be found in the carriage 
industry, the automobile’s other ancestor, and carriage advertising typically did 
not picture passengers or try to invoke sensations of speed or motion to appeal 
to consumers. The carriage trade origins of so many automakers explain the 
strength of this sedate legacy. [. . .] Certainly no early auto manufacturers 
permitted the enthusiasm they expressed about their cars elsewhere to creep 
into their promotions.
17 
Earlier, Laird characterizes these conservative advertisements as “technical 
discussions appropriate to a new and expensive, exciting but intimidating 
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technology,”
18 but this emphasis on technical novelty seems contradictory to the 
image of the “sedate legacy” of the carriage industry. Scharff, on the other hand, 
paints a completely different picture—manufacturers were quick, rather than reluctant, 
to adjust their advertising strategies, even radically changing from a Victorian mindset 
to a gender-free mentality once they realized that feminine features of comfort 
generated sales to both men and women.
19  
These seemingly conflicting perspectives on manufacturers, and hence, 
advertisements, require further verification. How did advertisements speak to the 
buying public at that time? How did they create a customer base? This chapter closely 
examines three major consumer magazines and two trade magazines from the late 
nineteenth century until 1910. Collier’s Once a Week, which became Collier’s: A 
National Weekly in 1895, was considered a pioneer for its many articles and 
advertisements about automobiles in the early twentieth century.
20 McClure’s, on the 
other hand, while one of the most popular New York-based ten-cent magazines, was 
conservative and unadventurous in its presentation of materials. Despite its traditional 
tone, however, McClure’s featured scientific developments in many of its articles.
21 
Hence, these two consumer magazines provide a good way to discern attitudes and 
perceptions across a broad spectrum.  
Life magazine, which began publishing in 1883, provides a check on the 
claims made by consumer magazine advertisements. Life articulates mainstream 
thoughts and sentiments through illustrations and thus complements written sources 
found in McClure and Collier’s. The two trade magazines used, The Automobile and 
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The Horseless Carriage, were biased in favor of the automobile, and for this reason, 
they provide insights into the concerns of consumers through the kinds of reassurances 
they reiterate in their magazines. These magazines also reported on various activities 
related to automobiling, particularly in the beginning of the twentieth century, and 
thus were included as sources. The periodical literature prior to 1910 constitutes the 
major source of information for the early history of the automobile;
22 therefore, this 
study focuses on printed consumer materials to present insights into the transformative 
elements used to promote the diffusion of the automobile. 
Creating an Anachronism: The Automobile as a Peripheral Object 
“What started the demand for the automobiles, and who first attempted to fill 
it?”
23 asked Charles E. Duryea, the automotive pioneer who built the first American 
car in 1893. “Quite a natural question,” he continued, “but it is based on a 
misapprehension. Radical things are never demanded. Improvements are sometimes 
asked for, but the really great steps in advance are usually so far ahead of the public 
that they decry rather than ask for them.”
24 Speaking from experience, Duryea 
described how technological innovations were an uphill battle with the public. As 
Basalla argues, things come first, followed by the need for them, although this need 
may take some time to be realized, as Duryea suggested, particularly when inspiring 
mass consumption. 
Contrary to what many historians describe as a ready market poised to replace 
the horse, prospective users in fact rejected the automobile outright, both as a working 
mechanism and as a concept. People, Duryea said, would much “prefer to drive 
something with life.”
25 Thus Duryea took pains to hide his first prototype for fear of 
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being charged a lunatic. Elwood Haynes, who claimed to be the father of the 
automobile, used a horse to haul his first self-propelled vehicle out into the 
countryside for a test drive.
26 He thought it unsafe in 1894 to conduct trial runs in the 
city, as no one had seen anything quite like the vehicle. Ray Stannard Baker, the first 
journalist to write about the automobile for a consumer magazine,
27 estimated that 
there were fewer than thirty self-propelling vehicles in working condition at this time 
throughout the world.
28 The following year, when Haynes drove through Chicago’s 
Michigan Avenue to the first US automobile racing event, sponsored by the Chicago 
Times-Herald, a policeman ordered him to leave.
29  
In 1900, US census takers counted 57 automobile factories producing 3,723 
automobiles of every kind.
30 The total number of automobiles in existence four years 
earlier had been only five to six hundred, according to the notes of a New York 
appraiser.
31 Some estimated the number to be even smaller, with no more than 200 
automobiles in 1898.
32 The US Census Bureau in 1900 found the size of the 
automotive industry to be so negligible that it did not warrant a separate report.
33 Even 
in highly urbanized areas such as New York City, traffic laws discriminated against 
this newfangled machinery. An owner of a horseless carriage was arrested for driving 
to the entrance of Central Park.
34 Letters to the Atlantic Monthly, considered a 
highbrow magazine, described the automobile with contempt, as a clattering machine, 
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“an anachronism and a blot,” disrupting the quiet and bucolic landscape of the 
countryside.
35 The automobile at this time still required much work to be convincing.  
Pricing: The Barrier to Diffusion 
Some historians, such as Flink and Berger, believe that convincing consumers 
meant making the automobile affordable. However, high price does not seem to have 
posed a significant barrier to adoption. There are indications that automobile 
manufacturers had in fact provided affordable automobiles from the earliest stage of 
the industry. If people earnestly wanted to own an automobile, it was not out of their 
reach.  
As early as 1901, an automobile writer described that, “for those whose purse 
was short, there were trappy-looking voiturettes.”
36 About a decade later, a motorcar 
company’s advertisement, which ran for three years, stated that a car could either be 
“constructed to humor expensive tastes, or [constructed] to sell on the attractiveness of 
its price.”
37 In other words, a cheap affordable motorcar was available concurrent with 
expensive custom-made models.   
As early as 1903, a reviewer remarked on the large selection of gasoline 
automobiles available for sale for anywhere from $500 to $9,000.
38 In 1905, prices of 
cars with different types of motors ranged from $500 (the Pope Tribune of Pope 
Manufacturing Company, Hartford, CT) to $11,000 (the Napier of Napier Motor 
Company of America, Boston, MA).
39 The price range grew even broader the 
following year, with prices spanning the range from $400 (the Orient of Waltham 
Manufacturing Company, Waltham, MA), a hundred dollars less than the previous 
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year, to forty times higher, at around $12,300 (the Panhard of Panhard & Levassor 
Automobile Company, France, distributed in New York City).
40  
Comparing car prices with the average income at that time, the automobile 
industry appears to have made efforts to cater to a wide range of buyers from different 
locations on the economic spectrum. While the US census did not begin to measure 
annual income until 1940,
41 salary calculations derived from reports compiled from 
the government office of the Bureau of Economic Analysis show that the ratio of car 
price to average salary was not that different from current-day levels. A clerk working 
in the manufacturing and steam railroad industry from 1905 to 1909 earned an average 
of $1,076/year.
42 A federal employee during the same period took home about 
$1,072/year.
43  
While these employees may not have been able to pay cash for a brand new 
car, it was not out of their reach. If the average person was intent on owning a car at 
this time, he would be able to obtain, for instance, a brand new $500 Pope-Tribune 
two-seater gasoline car, or even a two-seater $650 Royal electric car, or a four-seater 
$800 Prescott steam car
44 after a few years of saving or with some form of financing. 
A department manager selling farm implements, making around $2,000/year,
45 would 
be able to afford one of many different types of cars. 
Several years later, options were even less expensive. Throughout 1907 and 
1908, the Success Auto-Buggy manufacturing firm frequently advertised in Collier’s a 
“patented” four-to-forty mile-per-hour auto-buggy “suitable for city and country 
use,”
46 for $250, about $100 less than the price of a good horse outfit in 1911.
47 The 
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Black Motor Buggy manufacturing firm, also advertising in Collier’s throughout 1908 
and often positioning its advertisement on the front page alongside the table of 
contents, touted a $375 motor buggy that obtained a gas mileage of 30 miles-per-
gallon
48 on “country roads, hills and mud;”
49 their cars were affordable to run as well 
as to purchase. 
At this time, a large number of secondhand cars were also available on the 
market. An observer in 1905 noted that it was comparatively easy to find a second-
hand car of “almost any type at a price very much below its original cost, and in many 
cases at figures that are really absurdly low.”
50 Markets for secondhand models 
offered cars selling for as little as $200.
51 Some enthusiasts even ventured to build 
their own automobiles, paying just for parts.
52 Thus the option to purchase a motor 
vehicle was clearly available to anyone willing to experiment with the newfangled 
machine. A wide range of prices was available throughout the first decade of the 
twentieth century for those who sought to own an automobile.  
Despite the decrease in automobile prices, mass demand was not present. If it 
was the “inability of the [automotive] industry to produce a low cost vehicle in 
sufficient quantity [. . .] that prevented the rapid disappearance of the horse in 
American cities”
53 as Flink claims, low cost vehicles were available before the Ford 
Model T was mass produced. Duryea in fact professed to have designed and created 
the first US automobile for “people unable to afford horses,” something that “ate no 
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oats and caused no expense when not in use,”
54 altruistic sentiments perhaps born of 
his experience of four years of economic depression following the Great Panic of 
1893. However, despite the promise of economic relief, and safer and cleaner streets, 
the automobile made no practical sense to those for whom it was built.  
Animating the Mechanical Beast: The Automobile on the Fringes of Society 
What appeared to be an obviously far superior mechanism compared with the 
horse in the eyes of manufacturers and, for that matter, to historians of the automobile, 
was certainly not obviously superior for its targeted market at this time. For one thing, 
these strange mechanical beasts appeared hideous. Automobiles were described as 
“newfangled machinery” that to “yet unaccustomed eyes [were] extremely awkward-
looking.”
55 Even the fervent automobile advocate C. E. Woods acknowledged—but 
understated—the problem: “The unsightly appearance of automobiles has been 
commented upon in this country a great deal.”
56  
Horseless carriages appeared to the nineteenth century eye as carriages whose 
horses had been hacked off. They were ridiculed as having a “carriage-without-a-horse 
look” or as “shaftless bugg[ies].”
57 This mutilated appearance provided such a 
spectacle that the very first cars produced in the United States toured with the Barnum 
and Bailey Circus alongside elephants and trapeze performers (Figure 2.1).
58  
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Figure 2.1. Motorcars as Circus Exhibits. 
Source: Charles Philip Fox and Jean Van Dyke, Horses in Harness  
(Greendale, WI: Reiman Associates, 1987), 88. 
The advertisement for the Haynes gasoline car claimed that its pioneer models 
had been “star attractions at country fairs and drew huge crowds.”
59 Horseless 
carriages appeared in the 1900 Paris Exposition, a venue famous for the display of 
creations conceived beyond the “wildest flights of imagination.”
60 The novelty of the 
horseless carriage was such that people saw it as a curiosity rather than as a practical, 
usable tool.  
A writer recalled that “an automobile drawn up at a city curb was a sight to 
attract a gaping crowd.”
61 One observer sympathetic to the cause of automobiling even 
admitted that “many models shown were not quite acceptable to the eye. Perhaps for a 
lack of previous education we are still feeling the want of a horse in front of some of 
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these odd-looking traps.”
62 In an effort to make the motorcar look more familiar, an 
inventor in 1900 attached to the dashboard an imitation horse’s head, which he 
claimed could also double as a gasoline tank.
63 The same general idea persisted five 
years later in a Life magazine illustration of a motor vehicle posing as a horse and 
buggy.
64 Clearly, the automobile stood out as an irregular piece of machinery at this 
time; thus the type of attention it garnered was generally unpleasant for its owner.  
The dramatic effect of the early horseless carriage was also heightened by the 
various sights, sounds, and smells associated with it. Horseless carriages running on 
steam often left a trail of vapor and, in some unfortunate circumstances, thunderous 
explosions from malfunctioning boilers. A competitor in the famous Paris–Marseilles–
Paris race in 1896 described how his steam engine “needs a mechanic as fireman” in 
addition to a mechanic in charge of automotive maintenance.
65 His horseless carriage 
loomed so large it frightened two drivers off the road, causing them to overturn their 
own carts.
66 With the more modest-sized steam engine, the driver typically sat on top 
of his boiler, which contained about 400 pounds of pressured steam so that it was, 
according to one observer, “a toss up whether he was going to travel straight ahead or 
straight up.”
67  
Petroleum motorcars, on the other hand, convulsed like beasts, threatening fire 
from their fuel. A Cornell University professor in 1901 assured users in all seriousness 
that petroleum motorcars “may be handled by the amateur with no other special 
danger than that of accident resulting in the firing of his tank.”
68 Even the esteemed 
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first-class Daimler, renowned for its reliability, used a tube ignition
69 in 1900 that 
easily caught fire, endangering both the car and its occupants.
70 Accidents and 
mechanical malfunctions were the norm. An 1898 cartoon depicting a horseless 
carriage as a dragon attacking a man
71 speaks of the way early adopters struggled with 
their machines. 
In addition to mechanical hazards, other annoyances plagued early 
automobiling. Motor carriages running on petroleum reeked of foul odors from the 
wastes of oil combustion. A 1903 Life illustration depicted a man strapped behind his 
car and told of his finally having the chance to “enjoy the sweet odors emitted” by his 
own machine.
72 Such illustrations made fun of the extensive stench arising from 
automotive motors. Cars at this time also vibrated vigorously, an observer noted in 
1896, from the rapid explosions in their cylinders.
73 Startling noises rose from 
carriages running on compressed air.
74 Early motor engines made so much noise that 
an observer noted the futility of having a horn; in fact, early models did not have 
one.
75  
Electric cars running for more than 25 miles threatened to spill acid from their 
accumulators.
76 Although they tended to be less noisy, less odorous, and less jarring 
compared with petroleum vehicles, they were heavier because of their storage 
batteries, more expensive, limited in range, and impractical outside cities, where 
current was not readily available. Petroleum motorcars performed well at all distances 
and speeds, but their odors were highly unpleasant, and they were difficult to start, 
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terribly noisy, and rough in motion. Steam engines used cheaper and more readily 
available fuel, but they required a fireman and a mechanic to keep their boilers from 
exploding because of too much pressure. They also corroded easily, with sediments 
building up frequently.  
All these unpleasant properties arose from the means necessary to animate the 
monstrous machines. These disconcerting sights, sounds, smells, and convulsions 
constituted, according to a pro-car sympathizer, the main objections against motorized 
carriages.
77 The notion of an animated machine designed to become part of daily life 
must have been immensely disturbing. Schivelbush writes of a similar experience in 
England in the early years of railways:   
The popular images of the ‘mechanical horse’ manifest fear in the very act of 
seeming to bury it in a domesticating metaphor: fear of displacement of 
familiar nature by a fire-snorting machine with its own internal source of 
power.
78 
Similarly, the average American citizen of this period viewed the new mechanical 
horse invading the streets with fearsome apprehension.  
Dealing with Death Masks and Demons 
That early automobile adopters appeared menacing behind the wheel did not 
help matters. Even the most ardent pro-car magazine called the automobile fashions of 
the day “hideous.”
79 This apparel, said to be in demand in many high-fashion cities 
such as Paris and New York, included a face mask covering the neck, with holes for 
the eyes fitted with goggles (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2. Driver’s Headgear of 1907.  
Source: The Automobile, September 19, 1907, 403. 
An observer commented that the most beautiful woman wearing this face mask would 
have resembled, in his words, “a three-ring circus or Mardi Gras fête.”
80 The gowns 
accompanying these masks covered the entire body, rendering the drivers 
unrecognizable. Automobile gowns typically were made from wool or other heavy 
fabric, with rubber and heavy leather styling, a popular choice at that time (Figure 
2.3).
81  
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Figure 2.3. Fashionable Automobile Outfits of 1905. 
Source: The Automobile, January 14, 1905, 35.  
Even if a pro-car writer wanted to be complimentary, the fiendish effect of 
these outfits could not be overlooked. An article meant to pay homage to the racecar 
driver Fournier, winner of the 1901 Paris-to-Berlin race, described him as “uncanny”  
68 
in his great big black goggles, rendering his “outward appearance [that of] some new 
sort of demon.”
82 The ungainly costumes meant to protect motorists from mud and 
dust created such an ominous effect that even the premier pro-car magazine of that 
time could not resist publishing a lampoon depicting a couple in their automobile 
outfits inducing great fright in their own child.
83 The headgear meant to protect the 
face from the elements became known as a “death mask.” And, indeed, such masks 
lived up to their name (Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.4. Death Masks. 
Source: The Automobile, July 11, 1903, 29.  
The “death mask” rendered the driver unidentifiable and hence unaccountable 
for any fatalities caused by his or her driving. Goggles with face masks became so 
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popular that “all motorists with a love for fast driving came to look uniformly alike,” 
noted a writer on traffic laws and violations.
84 A 1901 Life magazine joke made the 
point: 
Automobilist: Say, I want this mask changed. It doesn’t cover my face enough. 
 
Clerk: But it’s the regular thing. 
 
[Automobilist:] Can’t help that. I find that the people I run over are apt to 
recognize me.
85 
Another derisive but nonetheless apt illustration of this notoriety depicted a 
mother bidding farewell to her daughter with the usual motherly reminders, one of 
which was to flee the instant she happened to run over a child to avoid getting her 
name in the papers (Figure 2.5).
86  
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Figure 2.5. Illustration, Life, November 21, 1901, 415. 
Another equally suggestive joke, published the following year, made the same 
point. “He is the champion of our automobile club,” says a driver as a haughty looking 
man drives by in the opposite lane. “Yes?” the passenger urges the driver to continue. 
“Yes,” says the driver, “he has killed more people without getting his name in the  
71 
papers than any other member.”
87 Indeed, the bloodthirsty image of the early 
automobile driver came to be intimately associated with the concept of the horseless 
carriage itself. Many illustrations and commentaries characterized automobiling as 
being as diabolical as its masked drivers (Figure 2.6).  
 
Figure 2.6. Illustration, Life, January 23, 1902, 63. 
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The gleeful face of drivers certainly emphasized amusement at the expense of public 
safety, and perhaps created a need for the sedate tone of automotive advertisements as 
described by Laird. In the interest of winning mainstream users, manufacturers 
perhaps wished to avoid antagonizing the public further and instead sought to recast 
the villainous image of the automobile. However, it did not help the cause of the 
automobile that many early drivers were members of the upper class and may very 
well have scorned the plight of the average pedestrian (Figure 2.7). Reckless rich 
joyriders pushed the automobile even further from mainstream sentiments (Figure 
2.8).  
 
Figure 2.7. Illustration, Life, July 3, 1902, 9.  
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Figure 2.8. Illustration, Life, October 9, 1902, 303. 
A 1903 Dewar’s Scotch advertisement best captured heedless automobiling in 
its early days with its promise that “there is no more exhilarating sport or recreation 
than automobiling. The pleasure of a spin over country roads or through a city park is  
74 
greatly enhanced if the basket is well stocked with Dewar’s Scotch”
88—again, 
imagery in sharp contrast to the staid mechanical theme of automobile advertisements 
described by Laird. Automotive manufacturers evidently did not need to portray the 
excitement of automobiling; other businesses accomplished that for them (Figure 2.9).  
 
Figure 2.9. Dewar’s Advertisement, Life, July 9, 1903, 34 (inside front cover).  
Also in Life, July 23, 1903, 94. 
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The emphasis on the exhilaration of drinking and driving was indicative of the 
reckless spirit of early adopters who used the automobile for amusement. Some 
examples of the great disconnect between the automobile and the public were captured 
in the many illustrations of the rich amusing themselves at the expense of common 
folk (Figures 2.10 and 2.11). 
 
Figure 2.10. Illustration, Life, November 20, 1902, 439.  
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Figure 2.11. Illustration, Life, October 2, 1902, 279. 
Titles of illustrations lampooning the rich included “Joy-riders drive on after 
running down boy.” Cartoons in Life magazine suggested physically isolating 
automobiles within the close confines of a horse race arena, dubbed “Speedway for 
Millionaires Only.”
89 The sense of entitlement of the rich and their wanton disregard 
for the welfare of average citizens inspired anger and public outrage. Automobiles 
                                                 
89 Life, July 30, 1903, 103.  
77 
became associated with debauchery and delinquency. Hatred for the automobile 
reached such fervor that it became politically astute to condemn the vehicle. For 
instance, in New York City, policemen reportedly arrested automobilists 
indiscriminately in order to please the “higher up” who, for purposes of good politics, 
wanted to please the majority of voters who had been “down on” the automobile.
90 
Thus despite the promise of cleaner streets and other public health benefits, 
government officials were adamantly against the automobile and used government 
resources to curb its use. 
The Slaughterer Absconds 
The media were equally unsympathetic. Social commentaries in the forms of 
illustration, satire, and poetry evoked images of the automobile as a “slaughterer,” 
tossing common pedestrians, including children, into the air (Figures 2.12 through 
2.14).  
 
Figure 2.12. Illustration, Life, December 4, 1902, 490. 
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Figure 2.13. Illustration, Life, August 21, 1902, 151. 
 
Figure 2.14. Illustration, Life, December 19, 1901, 533.  
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Parodies of poems such as Edgar Allen Poe’s “Valley of the Unrest” and Tennyson’s 
“Charge of the Light Brigade” depicted trails of death and damage left by the 
automobile.
91 Vanderbilt’s personal automobile was named the “White Ghost.”
92 In 
his review of the famous Vanderbilt Cup race of 1908, a journalist began with a 
satirical note of astonishment that only one child was bruised and broken. He was 
expecting hundreds.
93  
Cars posed hazards even for their drivers. An observer pointed out that “there 
was not a second while the race was on that any driver of any of the eighteen cars 
might not for a dozen different causes have been hurled into eternity.”
94 In one of the 
earliest studies of automobile accidents, survey results showed that 202 people were 
injured or killed in 96 accidents during the three summer months of 1907 alone—a 
number that even a pro-car sympathizer deemed “really astonishingly small” given the 
amount of traffic at that time.
95 Before this formal study on automotive accidents, 
social commentaries had already alerted the public to what was happening in the 
streets.  
A score of automobilists, many of them prominent businessmen and socialites, 
became fugitives from the police.
96 These costumed drivers came to be associated with 
outlaws, as aptly illustrated in a 1903 comic strip (Figure 2.15).  
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Figure 2.15. Illustration, Life, July 30, 1903, 113. 
The public, indignant about reckless driving, condemned the automobile as a killing 
machine. One notorious case was that of Frank Hodge, who in 1905 ran down a man 
in Pittsburgh in a manner witnesses described as “bold and cold blooded.”
97 Hodge 
fled on the night of the accident back to Buffalo, where his family resided.
 After the 
Pittsburgh police tracked him down on charges of felonious assault and battery, he 
surrendered himself to the Buffalo police but was immediately released on a mere 
$1,000 bail after some maneuvering by his prominent family. The Pittsburgh public 
became so enraged over what had been a long series of cold-blooded automobile 
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killings in their city that steps were taken to extradite the young man to Pittsburgh for 
trial.  
Even the famous race car driver Fournier was arrested for fast driving in New 
York City while demonstrating a car to a prospective buyer.
98 On the same night as 
Fournier’s arrest, a chauffeur was arrested after being chased around New York City, 
where he allegedly intentionally knocked down a policeman on a bicycle.
99 The 
chauffeur was charged with felonious assault and fast driving, with bail set at $2,000. 
When his employer went to the courthouse to bail him out, he learned of his 
chauffeur’s behavior and left in disgust without making the necessary deposit. 
Chauffeurs constituted a group of users that shared reckless driving behavior with the 
rich but had opportunistic motivations as well. They sought to rise above their 
subservient position through their mastery of automotive machinery, making the car 
an ever greater symbol of disruption.  
Recalcitrant Chauffeurs 
Kevin Borg describes the problems wealthy employers faced as a result of their 
dependence on recalcitrant chauffeurs.  
Chauffeurs became a serious problem for wealthy motorists during the first 
decade of the twentieth century. They extorted commissions and kickbacks 
from garage owners, took their employers’ cars out for joyrides at all hours, 
and exhibited a brazen disregard for social decorum. They did not behave as 
servants.
100  
Chauffeurs were hired to drive and maintain large gasoline and steam-powered cars on 
the assumption that they would behave in the manner of coachmen. Borg describes the 
attempt to transfer social practices from horses to horseless carriages. 
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This is exactly what many wealthy motorists did when they purchased an 
automobile: they hired chauffeurs, dressed them in livery, and gave them 
responsibility for the care and maintenance of their vehicles, transposing the 
rules associated with horse transportation to their new horseless carriages.
101 
However, the mechanical problems early motorcars presented, Borg argues, 
made wealthy motorists dependent on their chauffeurs.
102 The scarcity of qualified 
chauffeurs and the specialized knowledge required to maintain a motorcar provided 
the means for chauffeurs to disrupt the master-servant hierarchy. A chauffeur’s wage 
in 1906, anywhere from $75 to $150 per month,
103 would have easily paid for a $250 
Success auto-buggy in two months’ time. Although well compensated, chauffeurs 
preferred to drive the larger and more powerful cars of their employers without 
obtaining consent. 
According to a Life magazine editorial, “the chauffeur owns the highway. Out 
of danger himself, drunk with speed, absolutely irresponsible, and always fleeter than 
his outraged victims, he devastates the country, and in perfect safety.”
104 An attorney 
for a large city garage observed that many chauffeurs who were discharged for 
drunkenness, theft or reckless driving were re-hired repeatedly because employers did 
not bother to conduct background checks.
105  
One of the ways wealthy motorists controlled the chauffeur problem was 
through legislation. Wealthy Pennsylvania employers, for instance, were freed from 
any responsibility for damages done by their autos if they assisted in the prosecution 
of their joyriding chauffeurs.
106 Many states began imposing age requirements (18 
years old), and the testing and licensing of all chauffeurs.
107 Wealthy motorists also 
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addressed their dependence on their chauffeurs’ technical skills by opening YMCA 
training schools that generated alternative sources of skilled labor.
108 Garage owners 
began dealing with car owners directly, instituting stricter accounting procedures, and 
closely monitoring activities in their garages.
109  
Thus wealthy car owners, although seeking to promote the use of automobiles, 
did not share the interests and values of other users such as the reckless rich and 
recalcitrant chauffeurs. Judges who favored automobiles sentenced chauffeurs to five 
days in jail and a $50 fine for speeding violations.
110 In one famous 1905 case, a judge 
professing to be an ardent automobilist himself sentenced a chauffeur to eighteen 
months in prison (the full penalty of the law was two years in jail) plus a $100 fine for 
accidentally running over a little boy.
111 Despite a recommendation of mercy by the 
jury and hopes of an acquittal, the severity of the punishment, according to the judge, 
served to warn and admonish automobile drivers.
112  
In another case four years later, a police judge in the Indianapolis city court 
penalized a chauffeur with 60 days in prison and a $1 fine for driving while 
intoxicated; another $1 for profanity; $200 for malicious trespass for operating an 
automobile without permission and an additional sixty days in prison; an additional 
$200 plus another sixty days in prison (180 days cumulative total) for malicious 
trespass for the damage done to the cab; and a $50 fine for violating speed laws.
113 
Although some judges owned cars themselves, they wished to send a clear message to 
reckless drivers. Chauffeurs were to be severely punished for reckless driving, with 
the aid of the very same owners who favored fast cars.  
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Ambiguity among Automobile Advocates 
Many early users of automobiles attained such notoriety that mainstream 
society became alienated from automobiling. A physician established an insane 
asylum with one ward set apart for deranged motorists and chauffeurs.
114 The two 
social groups publicly associated with the automobile, the reckless rich who amused 
themselves at the expense of the average citizen, and the recalcitrant chauffeurs who 
followed suit at the expense of their wealthy employers, shared the meaning of the 
automobile as a source of pleasure but ultimately were motivated differently. The rich 
used the automobile for simple diversionary purposes, whereas chauffeurs used it as 
means of escape from their subservient role.  
The Automobile magazine, known for its pro-motorcar bias, sought to shift the 
blame directly to the operator of the automobile rather than to the automobile itself. 
Reckless drivers were previously horsemen: “Practically all those who now own 
machines were horse owners before, and if they are discourteous now, they were when 
they drove a horse.”
115 Thus, the implicit message was to associate reckless driving 
with horse riders.  
The owner of the Herald, who sponsored the first car race in the United States 
in 1895, published statistics characterizing horses as unreliable and dangerous. The 
study showed that horses were the leading cause of fatalities and accidents (40%) 
compared with the meager 5% caused by automobiles.
116 The study, however, did not 
indicate the percentage of automobiles in active use that had been involved in an 
accident; the number of automobiles was a fraction of the millions of horses used at 
this time.  
                                                 
114 “In Touch with Market,” The Automobile, October 5, 1905, 370. 
115 “Man, Horse, Automobile, and the Highways,” The Automobile, January 9, 1908, 39. 
116 “Dangerous Animals on the Streets,” The Automobile, February 22, 1906, 434.  
85 
Nonetheless, the pro-car article went on to describe the horse as aggressive and 
dangerous, as well as cowardly and stupid, for it would “take fright at a fluttering bit 
of paper or some equally harmless thing and run away.”
117 This attack on the horse 
came as an offensive move to address the widely held belief that automobiles were 
monstrous killing machines. Thus an aggressive social group sought to defend the 
automobile at all costs by shifting the blame to horses.  
The great divide between horses and automobiles had been underway since the 
advent of the horseless carriage in the late nineteenth century: if one favored the 
automobile, then one must be against the horse. Although SCOT recommends 
organizing social groups based on specific changes made to an artifact, this chapter 
focuses on the concept of the automobile itself—the notion of a self-propelled 
horseless vehicle—rather than specific changes made to a particular type of 
automobile. What was at stake in this early period was the choice between muscle and 
motor power. Thus, this large-scale technological change involved the struggle of 
moving the automobile from the periphery to mainstream, everyday society. 
Unthinking Machines 
Horses had been perceived as a “friend of man” in work and leisure.
118 
Automobiles, on the other hand, frightened horses and pedestrians; many people were 
maimed and killed because of reckless driving and malfunctioning motors. Thus, 
traffic laws were written to protect horses from motors. Massachusetts automobile law 
in 1902, for instance, required automobile drivers to stop at the behest of drivers of 
horses if the latter found their animals frightened.
119 New York, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, and other states required automotive speed within city limits to be no more 
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than ten miles per hour in order to control what were perceived as unruly interlopers in 
public roads.
120  
Articles and illustrations in those early days depicted automobiles as highly 
unreliable, dangerous, and menacing to society—in essence, unlike the horse. As early 
as 1896, a writer argued that people who used horseless carriages must be oblivious in 
general disposition for their inability to distinguish horses from machines. 
Automobiles were purported to be dangerous because they were unthinking, unlike 
horses; people failing to detect the lack of intelligence in motorcars were depicted as 
being as unthinking as machines.   
To tell the truth, all mankind may, with great clearness, be divided into two 
parts—those who understand horses and those who do not. These are people 
who will drive or ride a nag all day, nay, who may own one and use it for 
years, whose powers of observation are not sufficiently enlisted in the details 
of the animal to distinguish it from any strange horse in the next stall, unless 
there be some gross difference in color. Such equestrians will be content to see 
a fine horse, with nerves, eyes, muscles, and possibilities for good or evil, 
cashiered in favor of the dead certainty of a peripatetic steam-engine.
121 
This pro-horse advocate maintained that a failure to notice the most obvious details in 
life, such as the exquisite qualities found in a fine horse, must explain the desire to 
purchase a motorcar. Early adopters of automobiles were depicted as ignoramuses, 
who by sheer lack of observation failed to distinguish between intelligent muscle 
power and unthinking motor power.  
Nevertheless, all was not lost for those who had fallen for the automobile, 
claimed the pro-horse advocate. These machines could serve an honorable purpose—
to perform tasks too senselessly arduous for the intelligent horse: 
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But is it not absurd to defend a good horse from a horseless carriage? Each will 
have its appointed duties, and no one will be so glad as the man that makes a 
friend of his nag that a nerveless substitute has been found for the straining, 
scrambling, jaded creatures which afford such heart-breaking scenes on the icy 
cobble-stones of the city.
122 
This pro-horse advocate sought to confine mechanical work to tasks beyond 
the traditional work of horses in order to limit the increasing transgressions visited 
upon the noble steed. Advocates for the horse believed that replacing muscle power 
would negate the inherent intelligence found in work routines performed by horses. A 
historian in 1897 proclaimed, “The substitution of inanimate power for the animal 
power on which our race was formerly dependent means a separation of the force 
which does the work from the intellect which directs it,”
123 an argument that resembles 
the general criticism of automating human labor at that time.  
Mechanical power lacked both will and the capacity to assist man. People 
wanted to drive something with life, as Duryea himself observed.
124 Thus the lack of 
intelligence in this newfangled machine meant that more effort would have to be 
exerted by the driver. An observer stated, “The man who drives a horse has little to do; 
the horse finds the way and does the work, but the driver of a motor carriage has a 
senseless machine, and all direction must come from him.”
125  
Although some technological analysts, such as Latour, view mechanization as 
an improvement,
126 some people in the nineteenth century disagreed. The arrival of 
motor machines required humans to be even more alert and skilled, for they could no 
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longer rely upon the horse to compensate for their lack of concentration. Indeed, 
studies on intelligent machines, as discussed in the literature review section, suggest 
the tremendous complexity and near impossibility of replacing the human mind, and 
the same might be said about the horse.  
Unless a task itself was significantly simplified and performed in a highly 
controlled and ultimately impractical environment, machines could not reliably and 
comprehensively replace a sentient worker—even an equine one. The experience of 
replacing the horse in this case ultimately meant losing some of the functional features 
that drivers had come to take for granted in the horse, such as its abilities to find its 
way home and to avoid accidents without the need for constant direction from the 
driver. 
Racing commentaries at the first US car race in 1895 agreed that horseless 
carriages would be more prone to accidents because they did not possess the easy 
steering control of experienced horses. A reporter of the race articulated their line of 
thought: 
It should be borne in mind that the carriage without a horse is also without the 
convenience of a horse’s intelligence, which really in ordinary traffic and 
driving relieves the person holding the reins of a large part of his 
responsibility. For not even the best made motor can think, and the slightest 
carelessness on the part of its driver, or failure of the guiding apparatus, might 
precipitate an accident.
127 
The driver of a motorized car would be alone, without aid; there was no horse to 
compensate for the driver’s shortcomings. Accidents then became associated with 
machines, which by virtue of their insensibility were unable to protect drivers from 
their own mistakes. This pro-horse group was fighting to protect the horse from 
obsolescence by showing its superiority over machines.  
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Thus the predominant dynamics of the initial deployment of the automobile 
concerned the credibility of the automobile itself, both as a concept and as a device, 
and its ability to deliver benefits that the horse had not been able to provide or had 
failed to provide. The predominant question in people’s minds was “Why do we need 
the automobile when we have the horse?” Moving the automobile from peripheral to 
mainstream status meant discounting the horse. C. E. Woods,
128 an avid machinist and 
most likely the same C. E. Woods mentioned in the cover story of McClure’s 
Magazine and described as one of the leading automobile manufacturers in 1899,
129 
insisted that the work of the horse had to be directly replaced by a contrivance able to 
perform the same tasks.  
When we review all that has been done by mechanical devices toward the 
displacement of animal power, it is very hard to refrain from drawing a 
conclusion that the horse must go; that is, speaking in the broad sense of the 
word. Mechanically propelled vehicles for all purposes are here.
130 
The struggle for ubiquity became a struggle between the pro-car group and the pro-
horse group. 
Invading the Horse Industry 
The annual production of horse-drawn carriages had been substantial. In 1900, 
907,482 family-use carriages alone were produced, worth a total of $51.5 million.
131 
Added to this number were 575,351 business wagons, with another 2,316 for public 
transportation, together amounting to roughly $32.6 million,
132 giving a total of 1.5 
million horse-drawn carriages of all types, valued at $84 million.  
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Horses at this time fueled much of the rural and urban economy. United States 
Department of Agriculture statistics place the number of horses at roughly 14.2 
million in 1890, and over 17 million in 1905, with their selling price almost doubling, 
from $37.50 per horse in 1899 to $70.34 in 1905, during the supposed period of the 
“passing of the horse.”
133 When the automobile began to be introduced to the public 
streets, there was a simultaneous increase in the demand for horses. According to 
McShane and Tarr, 
Between 1870 and 1900, as society became more dependent on the horse, the 
amount of capital invested and the number of workers employed in industries 
such as carriage-making and repair, saddlery and harnesses, and whip 
manufacture vastly increased.
134 
It is possible that the burgeoning horse industry whetted the appetite of 
automobile manufacturers, who sought to tap into this lucrative market. The autumn 
horse show of 1896 has been described to have increased in importance, one year after 
the first automobile race in the United States.
135 Even as late as 1908, the demand for 
horses steadily increased, with numbers reaching close to 20 million.
136 With an eye 
toward this lucrative market, automobile manufacturers did not intend for automobiles 
to perform types of work different from those performed by horses; they wanted to 
plunder the lucrative horse industry. A writer articulated this desire: 
Naturally there will always remain a limited number of users who, by 
preference or supposed economy, will remain true to the horse and buggy, but 
the total given [937,000 family and pleasure carriages], which represents a 
value of $55,000,000, shows that there is still a tremendous field which the 
automobile builder may invade and reasonably hope to capture by quicker, 
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cheaper and more economical methods of mechanical transport (emphasis 
mine).
137 
Stealing market share from the horse was not the only motivating factor. 
Manufacturers wanted the automobile to be perceived as a necessity, rather than a 
plaything, to ensure its perpetual use. A letter to the editor of The Automobile astutely 
articulated the thoughts of many manufacturers. “When the faddist has worked out his 
pleasure car, he may or may not replace it; when the motorcar is used in business, it 
must be replaced by another.”
138 Automobile manufacturers had much work to do to 
change mainstream perception of their infamous product. 
Moving from the Periphery to the Center of Society 
An automobile advocate who published a manual on the construction, care, and 
operation of the electric automobile in 1900 asked the same question Duryea had 
asked earlier: 
What conditions exist that will make a market for automobiles or create a 
desire in the public mind for their use? Some will say progression, the spirit of 
which surrounds us everywhere; others say, expediency and the desire for 
saving minutes and even seconds; others, again, their convenience and 
readiness for instant use; all of which are true but do not in a broad sense 
answer the question, but create another as to what has made all these things 
desirable on the part of the public as things necessary to its comfort and 
welfare.
139  
Comfort superseding other, more exciting features such as “expediency” and 
“readiness for instant use” would require the automobile, considered a fad rather than 
a necessity, to shed its whimsical image in order to become a staid, reliable form of 
transport. One way to accomplish this transformation was to associate the devil wagon 
with the most accepted form of motive power—the horse. Thus at this early stage, the 
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automobile had to emphasize its similarity to the horse rather than its novelty. At the 
same time, the automobile also sought to displace the horse by highlighting its 
biological limitations.  
Motorized power posing as muscle power came as a move to pull the 
automobile from the periphery to the very center of society—automobile 
manufacturers employed various means to project the image of a reliable, easy-to-
operate, mundane, practical machine rather than that of a foul mechanical monstrosity 
that compromised public safety. As early as 1900, manufacturers such as C. E. Woods 
were already articulating their desire to see automobiles provide services identical to 
those of horse-drawn carriages without any sacrifice in ride quality: 
There is a mistaken idea with many people, who have not given the subject any 
thought, that automobiles are sold for their novelty and because they go 
without a horse. But this is wrong. The purchasing public which uses 
automobiles buys them primarily for the same purpose for which it has always 
purchased any class of vehicle, namely, because a carriage or a vehicle is 
needed for personal transportation, convenience and comfort; and as it is 
among the better class of carriage users that automobiles are generally sold, 
they demand the same diversity of design, the same elegance in finish, the 
same magnificence in appointment, and the same easy riding qualities that they 
have always been accustomed to when drawn by horses.
140  
The pleasure of comfortable riding and the practical necessity of mobility 
embodied what manufacturers sought to display in their automobiles. In early 
automobile construction, rider comfort received minimum consideration until carriage 
mechanics and builders stepped in to help popularize the automobile by creating larger 
and roomier seats, adjusting automotive springs for even weight distribution, and 
installing side doors for easy access.
141  
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A letter to the editor of The Automobile observed that the move to hire 
carriage mechanics came from the need to decrease the weight of automotive parts in 
order to make them look less like heavy machinery and to allow them to have “a 
pleasing effect to the eye” through adjustments to the dimensions of the body for 
symmetry.
142 At the 1905 Carriage Builder’s National Association convention, the 
president, in his opening day speech, admitted that “the carriage maker has already 
been called upon by the engine builder to equip his machinery with durable and 
luxurious bodies and upholstering, and those who have taken up this new branch of 
industry report that it is constantly increasing.”
143 Thus the automobile had to undergo 
a radical shift from the noisy, the dangerous, and the curious to the respectable, the 
classy, and the sensible personal transport of the everyday.  
One could argue that this transformation involved making the horseless 
carriage “invisible,”
144 and hence, in Silverstone’s terminology, “domesticated,” by 
transforming a radically new device into something ordinary, taken-for-granted, and 
part of the everyday worldview. One of the ways this invisibility was accomplished 
was through the horseless carriage’s assumption of the form of the horse-drawn 
carriage. Traditional names and designs from the carriage industry were copied by the 
rising automobile industry. The phaeton, a well known horse-drawn carriage with four 
seats, designed for open air with a portable half-top or without a top, was copied by 
many automobile manufacturers in their standard models.
145 Other examples include 
runabout automobiles, which came from runabout horse-drawn carriages. Coach, a 
generic term used to describe a closed vehicle that could seat four or more people,
146 
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particularly dominated the later versions of the automobile as it sought to emphasize 
comfort and privacy.  
The effort to duplicate horse-drawn carriages in almost all respects speaks of 
the dependence of the nascent automotive technology on the object it sought to 
displace. A 1905 manual for the construction of practical and workable light motor 
carriages recommended using the body frames from horse-drawn carriages.
147 The 
Automobile magazine, a staunch proponent of motorized vehicles, admitted in 1906 
that “without endeavoring to improve on the fundamental principles of carriage 
construction,” horseless carriages could be built by merely “applying mechanical 
power for propulsion” to horse-drawn carriages.
148 The Automobile magazine 
describes the survival of horseless carriages as a matter of mimicking rather than 
differentiating themselves from their competitors. Car designs were translated into an 
equine idiom: the bodies of early motorcars were purposely constructed to resemble 
horse-drawn carriages
149 (Figures 2.16–2.21). 
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Figure 2.16. Simplest Carriages. 
(A) Source: Charles Philip Fox and Jean Van Dyke, Horses in Harness  
(Greendale, WI: Reiman Associates, 1987), 122. 
(B) Source: The Automobile, April 18, 1903, 422.  
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Figure 2.17. Buggies. 
(A) Source: McClure’s, April 1904, 115.  
(B) Source: Life, May 16, 1907, 670.  
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Figure 2.18. Surreys. 
(A) Source: Ladies Home Journal, March 1906, 48.  
(B) Source: Life, January 19, 1905, 62.  
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Figure 2.19. Stanhopes. 
(A) Source: Saturday Evening Post, May 6, 1899, 717.  
(B) Source: Life, May 16, 1907, 671.  
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Figure 2.20. Phaetons. 
(A) Source: Charles Philip Fox, Working Horses: Looking Back 100 Years to America’s Horse-
Drawn Days: With 300 Historic Photographs. 1st ed.  
(Whitewater, WI: Heart Prairie Press, 1990), 150.  
(B) Source: Life, June 1907, 757.  
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Figure 2.21. Broughams. 
(A) Source: Life, March 3, 1904, 200. 
(B) Source: Life, January 19, 1905, 58 (inside front cover).  
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Interchangeability in Form at a Cheaper Price 
The Automobile in 1903 observed that carriage makers would be forced to 
start manufacturing automobile bodies or risk losing their best artists and workmen to 
those who were in the automotive business. Such dilemmas were indicative of the 
motorcar’s invasion of the socioeconomic infrastructure built around the horse. The 
carriage maker had to choose between selling his business to an automotive 
manufacturer and joining the industry himself.  
In practice he generally chooses to become financially interested in an 
automobile firm or to sell out to one. In either case there is a merging of 
carriage traditions and new automobile requirements, which will result in 
more attention being paid to distinctive styles in automobiles and appropriate 
names for each of them. And nothing is admittedly more difficult than to 
devise brand new names for new commodities, those developed in the carriage 
industry will be preserved in so far as possible.
150 (emphasis mine) 
Despite the effort to protect the horse-drawn carriage industry from the 
invasion of the motorcar, a purposeful copying of styles ensued. However, similar to 
horse-drawn carriages, there were no uniformly accepted definitions of styles and 
classes in motorcars.
151 For example, for runabouts, among the simpler carriages 
designed to carry two passengers, there was no single generalized standard 
specification.
152   
Despite the collaboration of several hundreds of men to standardize definitions 
of various types of styles and classes of carriages, they “apparently [were] not [. . .] 
able to discover a uniformly accepted basis for definitions of the various styles or 
classes of carriages”
153 (Figure 2.22–Figure 2.23). Runabouts were generally 
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described as “light, handy open wagons,” but “chelsea” cars also came to assume the 
same characteristics, creating much overlap.
154 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.22. Naming of Vehicles. 
Source: Charles Philip Fox and Jean Van Dyke, Horses in Harness  
(Greendale, WI: Reiman Associates, 1987), 118. 
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Figure 2.23. Runabout Varieties. 
Source: The Automobile, 1903, 423. 
Nevertheless, a likeness between the motorcar and the horse, including the 
horse-drawn carriage, had been made as a way to domesticate the automobile into 
everyday life. While Silverstone speaks largely of individual and social group 
experience, such as families imprinting new technological artifacts with their own 
identities,
155 the automobile case in this chapter speaks more of methods to change the 
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general public’s impressions of the automobile and the efforts exerted to overcome its 
notorious reputation.  
Early adopters of the automobile at this time were in precarious company. On 
the one hand, a recalcitrant but apathetic group of users, such as the reckless rich and 
irresponsible chauffeurs, generated bad publicity for the automobile; on the other 
hand, a group of users, such as the owner of the Times Herald, sought to generate 
goodwill for the automobile but attacked everyone else—at least anyone who caused 
adverse publicity for the automobile.  
The unpleasant effects of bad publicity were such that any buyer in 1903, for 
instance, was assured by articles such as those published in The Automobile of the 
possibility of purchasing an automobile without attracting too much attention.   
The purchaser can, at the same price [$500], also secure an automobile 
carriage in its simplest form, fitted with piano-box body and upholstered seat 
with capacity for two persons sitting side by side. This has the general 
appearance of the light horse-drawn road wagon, and, complete with its 
power plant, weighs but 550 pounds (emphasis mine).
156  
It is also possible that the copying of the designs of horse-drawn wagon emerged 
seamlessly from pre-existing practices from the horse industry. Indeed, for those brave 
souls who sought to try the new mechanical device, the art of purchasing automobiles 
was patterned on the art of purchasing horse-drawn carriages. Laird describes early 
advertisements involving technical discussions and the lengthy exchange of 
mechanical information between manufacturers and buyers;
157 it is possible that this 
practice evolved from the tradition of ordering buggy parts in which buyers needed to 
be fully acquainted with the inner workings of their machine. 
At the same time, manufacturers purposefully promoted assimilation of the 
automobile by instructing the buying public to transfer pre-existing practices from the 
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horse culture into a new mechanical medium. A 1904 Pierce automobile advertisement 
talked of “the education of the automobilist” as a matter of transferring knowledge 
about horse buggies to automobiles, including criteria for purchase, such as price 
versus quality. With the predominance of cheap automobiles in the market during the 
first decade of the century, a Pierce advertisement attempted to render price a non-
issue by emphasizing the importance of quality. The cost rationale remained equally 
compelling. Automotive advertisements sought justification by appealing to the pre-
existing practice of acquiring a horse and a buggy: 
A man buys an auto just as he formerly bought a buggy. The first time a man 
buys a buggy he buys a cheap one, because price is the only thing he 
understands about buggies. After he has had some experience, quality comes 
before price, and nothing but the highest grade carriage will satisfy him after 
that.
158 
At this time, a price war between horses and motorcars motivated many 
manufacturers to provide a cost rationale for the automobile. Many motor buggy 
companies, particularly during 1907 and 1908, advertised their products as being 
“cheaper than horses.” The Lindsley delivery car, at $375, was claimed to have a 30-
mile-per-gallon fuel efficiency, which meant that its operation was “much cheaper 
than horse help.”
159 The Kiblinger, advertised frequently in 1907 and 1908 in 
Collier’s, was claimed in large, bold print to be “cheaper than horses.”
160 The Brush 
Runabout was advertised to “cost less to run than a horse.”
161 A brand new runabout in 
1911 was claimed to be the same price ($350) as a good horse outfit.
162 Reliable 
Dayton, which also ran the same advertisement for many years in Collier’s, claimed 
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that its vehicle was “more economical and serviceable than a horse,” and while it 
might not be lowest in price, it would be the “cheapest in the end.”
163  
Rapid claimed that its commercial cars saved their owners anywhere from 
$500 to $1200 per year.
164 A large Brooklyn, New York department store was touted 
to have saved $1,360 during a six-month period by replacing its horse wagons with 
motor trucks for delivery.
165 The Metz Company published a customer testimonial in 
1909 professing that their new motor vehicle “ha[d] taken the place of two driving 
horses” and that its upkeep cost was considerably less than that of maintaining one 
horse.
166 In the same year, Maxwell Motor Car advertised that its business runabout 
“costs less to keep than a horse and buggy” because “when not in use expenses stop,” 
whereas “a horse eats all the time.”
167 Some advertisements phrased it as a matter of 
the motorcar “not eating its head off when standing still.”
168  
In 1910, Maxwell Motors printed a full-page advertisement entitled 
“Automobile vs. Horse,” which was purported to conduct a “disinterested” cost 
comparison between the automobile and the horse and buggy under the supervision of 
the Contest Board of the American Automobile Association.
169 After several days of 
test runs for six hours a day, the board concluded that the automobile was cheaper to 
operate. The advertisement proclaimed,  
This is our answer to the charges made that the automobile is an extravagance. 
It proves the automobile an economic factor that would save millions if the 
Maxwell were everywhere substituted for the horse and buggy.
170 
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Advertisers took the approach of showing how the automobile was a machine to be 
taken seriously for its potential to “save millions” of dollars.  
As late as 1916, the cost justification campaign continued. The Federal Motor 
Truck Company, for instance, advertised that it reduced “horse-drawn haulage costs to 
fractions” when it replaced the “horse-drawn methods of yesterday” with motor 
power.
171 While these advertisements were geared toward enticing horse and buggy 
users to the automobile, they implied that the automobile was the “new horse of 
today.” By virtue of its association with the horse, the automobile came to justify its 
purpose. By virtue of its cost-saving claims, it justified itself as a replacement for the 
horse. 
Interchangeability in Operation  
Prospective automobile drivers were soon convinced that the newfangled 
machines could be operated just like horse-drawn carriages. The Pope Manufacturing 
Company, famous for its bicycles, launched a Columbia motor carriage advertisement 
in 1898—one of the earliest
172—claiming that “any one can learn to control it in ten 
minutes.”
173 In 1901, Toledo advertised its steam carriage to be so simple that “a 
woman can operate it conveniently.”
174 In the same year, Columbia advertised its cars 
to be “easily operated by man, woman or child” (emphasis mine).
175 As late as 1909, 
the Maxwell Motor Company advertised its gasoline cars as being so easy to drive that 
one’s “wife, daughter or son” could run and care for it.
176 As late as 1913, the Haynes 
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gasoline motorcar was proclaimed a children’s product that “even women and children 
can drive […] with enjoyment and safety.”
177  
Thus in addition to being economically sensible, the automobile was presented 
as being as easy to operate as a horse. Women and children had been known to operate 
horseless carriages and thus, the argument was, if motorcars could be considered a 
replacement for horses, then women and children could operate them as well. A 1903 
Life magazine illustration suggests that children, particularly the rich, received 
automobiles as presents and were allowed to operate them.
178 Illustrations of this type 
were published for several years, with pictures of gleeful children driving automobiles 
in most dangerous circumstances (see Figure 2.24).
179  
A sixteen-year-old boy working for an automobile and repair company was 
given an official license to operate all classes of automobiles, including trucks, in 
1903.
180 Three years later in 1906, a fourteen-year-old boy was licensed as a chauffeur 
and made long trips around Fresno, California during the busy fruit season.
181 Efforts 
were made to normalize automobiles and render them as harmless as horses such that 
women and young adults were deemed capable of controlling these machines.  
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Figure 2.24. Illustration, Life, January 1, 1903, 9. 
An Oldsmobile advertisement of 1903 suggested that the controls for a 
gasoline vehicle required the same intuitive skills used to direct horses: “the 
controlling mechanism is simple, strong and instantly responsive to the will of the 
driver, giving a sense of perfect security” (emphasis mine).
182 While no explicit 
mention of the horse was made in this ad, the automobile is given life in these 
descriptions—the unthinking motor suddenly becomes responsive to non-mechanical 
influences such as the “will” of the driver. A similar description appeared in a 1904 
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Northern automobile advertisement in which the motor was described to run smoothly 
and to give “instant obedience,”
183 again insinuating a form of a sentient machine.  
While such descriptions would seem strange in modern-day advertisements, 
the early nineteenth century sensibility must have been quite attuned to working with 
living things; thus the terms “obedience” and “will,” befitting the training and 
handling of animals, were employed to make the motor seem more familiar. Indeed, 
manufacturers strained to make motor and muscle power operationally equivalent. 
Advertisements promoted automobiles as operating just like horse-drawn carriages.
184 
The Autocar Company splashed its ad in Life magazine claiming its controls were 
“Simple As a Pair of Reins.”  
The control of Type XI Autocar brings automobile driving to the simplicity of 
horse driving. In the rim of the steering wheel, and forming parts of it, are set 
two grips, one at the right hand, one at the left. These two grips control the 
throttle and the spark, regulating the speed of the car from 3 to 35 miles an 
hour. This arrangement brings the steering and the speed regulating together, 
so that in all ordinary running the only position necessary for the hands is on 
the steering wheel.
185  
The positioning of the accelerator on the steering wheel employed automobile controls 
that mimicked the experience of operating the reins of a horse-drawn carriage (Figure 
2.25). 
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Figure 2.25. Steering Wheels Touted as Reins. 
Source: Life, September 7, 1905, 266 (inside front cover).  
However, unlike the horse-drawn carriage, in which the effects of starter, brakes, 
accelerator, and steering wheel resulted from the manipulation of the reins, the 
motorcar separated these functions into different control mechanisms. Levers and 
switches had to compensate for the sensibilities of the horse, particularly in braking  
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and maneuvering. The driver had to pay close attention to the brakes, which 
constituted another lever. Nevertheless, advertisers strained the parallelism by adding 
some qualifications: 
To be sure this car has a gear shift lever and an emergency brake lever at the 
right of the driver. The gear shift, however, is needed only on particularly hard 
hills, or very bad bits of road. The car loaded with four passengers will climb 
nearly all hills on the high gear. The foot brakes being ample for all ordinary 
use, the emergency brake is rarely required. Hence we say that except in 
extreme cases only one position is required of the hands in driving Type XI 
Autocar.
186 
The concerted effort to downplay these compensating devices resulted from a 
desire to convince users that skills employed in the driving of horses were transferable 
to cars. However, ease in mechanical operation was not the same as riding a horse, 
although some pro-car advocates discounted differences in any form. According to 
C. E. Woods, “The simplicity attached to the operation of an electric vehicle by any 
person of ordinary intelligence is too well-known to need comment at this point; the 
same care needed to drive horses is the same as driving an electric vehicle.”
187 The 
implication was that if one knew how to manage horses, then one must also be 
naturally proficient in managing cars; however, such was not the case.  
A training course for automobile drivers
188 in 1899 strained to make the 
parallelism work. The driving school described the steering-lever as similar to the 
steering of horse-propelled vehicles; it turned the rear wheels rather than the front. 
However, a more detailed description of the automobile driving technique betrayed the 
school’s effort to shift skills from horse to car handling. The school estimated a week 
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of training (rather than 10 minutes) was required to “manage all the brakes and levers 
with perfect presence of mind.”
189 The actual driving was described as follows: 
Both of his hands and both of his feet are fully employed. With his left hand he 
manages the power lever, pushing it forward one notch at a time to increase the 
speed. With his right hand he controls the steering-lever, which, by the way, 
turns the rear wheels and not the front ones, as is done with horse-propelled 
vehicles. His left heel is on the emergency switch, and his left toes ring the 
gong. With his right heel he turns the reversing-switch, and he can apply the 
brake with either his right or his left foot. When he wishes to turn on the lights, 
he presses a button under the edge of the seat. Hence, he is very fully 
employed, both mentally and physically. He can’t go to sleep and let the old 
horse carry him home.
190 
This highly involved physical and mental activity, that is, the use of left and 
right heels to turn various switches, the use of the left toe to ring a gong, and so forth, 
constituted textbook driving. In practice, driving appeared to be even more complex 
and counter-intuitive for anyone accustomed to riding a horse. In fact, a 
comprehensive article advising the novice on how to purchase a car, covering topics 
from price considerations to the various motor and style options, admitted that in the 
end, it all came down to a matter of driving competence: “the great, essential fact that 
the beginner is apt to forget is that, for him, the first consideration is not to get a car 
whose power, size, and style meet every whim that he can devise, but to get a car that 
he can run.”
191 Thus the skills required to drive a horse-drawn carriage did not 
seamlessly transfer to driving an automobile, but a forced likeness was made.  
A seasoned car driver described the many difficulties of learning the various 
nuances of early cars, such as the lack of an efficient means to prevent a car from 
running backwards if stopped on a hill, even with a first-class machine such as the 
Daimler.
192 He learned from experience that when a car ran backward, the best way to 
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make it move forward was actually to put the reverse gear into action.
193 Clearly such 
peculiarities found in machines operating on actual roads and in traffic provided 
another learning gap that a driver had to quickly bridge; he must teach himself as he 
drove along. The qualifications made by the earlier Type XI Autocar advertisement 
regarding the rare use of the gear shift lever and emergency brakes were clearly 
understated, particularly since “bad” roads were the norm at that time.  
The greater demand on the driver’s mental and physical faculties was such that 
some companies built engines that could be operated with reins in order to facilitate 
the transition from driving horses to motorized tractors.
194 The advertisement for the 
Klaxon horn, for instance, described the “pressure of [its] button” as warning horses to 
keep them at bay “as surely as if you held in your own hands the reins of every horse 
ahead.”
195 This effort to connect mechanical switches, buttons, and levers directly to 
horses and reins signifies a purposeful effort to transfer concepts and practices 
associated with the horse to the motorcar. A slew of advertisements strained to make 
the newfangled machine interchangeable with the horse in form and functionality 
despite their pronounced differences. 
Works like a Horse but Better 
It is not surprising that pro-horse advocates taunted automobile adopters as 
unaware of the differences between motor and muscle power, because advertisers 
attempted to make them interchangeable. Automobile advertisers took every 
opportunity to describe motor performance in terms of the work traditionally 
performed by horses. As early as 1901, the Triumph Motor Vehicle Company 
advertised that its automobile “climb(s) any hill a horse can climb,” and that it “carries 
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two people, and will go over any road a horse could travel on.”
196 This direct 
association with horses could also be seen in an advertisement for an Oldsmobile 
whose range of applications was posted simply as “an entire stable of horses in 
itself.”
197 The Reliable Dayton Motor Car, which ran the same ad for at least three 
years from 1907 to 1909, was claimed to be “the First Real Successor to the Horse” 
because it had “the same reliability as the horse.”
198 The Herreshoff car in 1909 was 
described as “the smart, light cob of the automobile stable.”
199  
These direct appeals to the functionality and capabilities of the horse provided 
advertisers the means to orient consumer perception of cars as useful devices. 
Advertisers presented their automobiles as capable of accomplishing any function 
performed by horses, with faster and better results. A more explicit comparison 
between literal horse power and figurative horsepower came from a 1905 
advertisement of the Autocar Company: 
The Auto Runabout has a motor of 10 mechanical horsepower which is about 
equivalent to 15 animal horse-power. 
 
The horses, however, could furnish this power for only 8 hours a day. As the 
Autocar Runabout can be run for 24 hours a day, it will be seen that if both 
power and endurance are considered this car is equal to 45 horses.
200 
In directly translating mechanical horsepower in terms of animal horse power, 
advertisers sought to display in quantifiable terms the superiority of motor 
performance over horses. Indeed, Kiblinger Motor Wagons, which often advertised in 
the front pages of Collier’s, sometimes right under the editorial bulletin, claimed that 
not only would its machine “climb hills easier than horses,” but also that it would “do 
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quicker work than 3 horses and wagons.”
201 A 1908 advertisement for the Lindsley 
claimed that it would “easily do the work of 5 delivery wagons of the horse kind.”
202 
Rapid recommended “discarding the antique method of horse-drawn vehicles” and 
instead, “install[ing] motor wagons which cover 3 to 5 times as much territory as 
horse-drawn wagons, and give less trouble as they never tire, are easy to operate, and 
cost less to maintain.”
203  
The message of these advertisements was consistent, clear, and definitive: 
motorcars worked just like horse-drawn carriages except that they were far superior to 
them in performance and economy. Automobiles became continuously associated with 
horses while at the same time jostling to replace them. On one level, horses were 
expensive, inefficient, and weak, but on another level, motorcars worked just like 
horses. Manufacturers depended upon the horse to explain the automobile’s concept 
but, at the same time, discounted the horse in order to justify replacing it. The 
automobile had to become horse-like and unhorse-like at the same time.  
This tension between continuity and discontinuity relates to the strength of pre-
existing practices in defining the admissibility of new devices. Manufacturers 
recognized the entrenched position of the horse in people’s work routines and work 
processes. People carried out their work in terms of their conceptualization of the 
horse. Thus the automobile as a new technological artifact aspiring to replace the 
horse could not seek to disrupt work routines and processes by presenting itself as 
unlike the horse; instead it needed to prove itself a much “better horse.”  
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Recognizing Women’s Patronage 
A marked shift occurred indeed, an observer remarked in 1905, when the 
automobile shed its “machine”-like effect in order to become more “coach”-like.
204 As 
late as 1923, advertisements such as that of Delco Electrical Systems still called 
automobiles “A Stage-Coach of Today” and considered them “modern successors of 
the old stage coaches.”
205 The move toward a coach-like effect in automobile 
construction came as early as 1900, when Woods Motor Vehicle advocated the car for 
personal transport rather than for sport, describing its motor carriage as the “lightest, 
smartest-looking and most graceful Automobile ever built.”
206 Several years later, the 
same emphasis on the “coach”-like properties of other makes and models was made 
with descriptions such as “luxurious upholstering and elegant finish,” “refinement in 
design,” “perfect taste,” and “essence of good form” typically used in many electric 
vehicle advertisements, such as that of the Thomas Town Car in 1908.
207  
Gasoline vehicles, on the other hand, emphasized the riding qualities of 
coaches. A 1909 Oldsmobile advertisement promoted large wheels as a protection 
against ruts, cracks or any “inequality of the road” that might compromise luxurious 
riding.
208 The Brush Runabout in 1908 was claimed to “be durable, certain, 
comfortable, lively, handsome, almost noiseless, almost vibrationless and [to ride] like 
a baby carriage.”
209 The more definitive “no vibration, noise or odor” phrase of the 
Riker Motor Vehicle, sometimes phrased as “if you appreciate in an Automobile 
Cleanliness, Freedom from Noise, Vibration, and Odor, you will buy a Riker,”
210 
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hinted at some of the public relations battles that manufacturers faced in repackaging 
the automobile. 
The transformation of the automobile from the early days of reckless driving—
when the various sights, sounds, and smells it made repulsed the American public—
required a shift in emphasis from the driving to the riding experience. Focusing on 
passenger comfort included addressing non-visible concerns, such as fears and 
apprehensions about the unruly machine. Advertisers such as Lindsley typified this 
effort, claiming that its car was “safe, sane, practical and durable” (emphasis mine).
211 
The terms “safe” and “sane” appearing in automobile advertisements suggest the 
pressure faced by manufacturers to ameliorate fears about the destructive image of the 
automobile. Consternation was a result of the actual riding experience, as exemplified 
by the Lindsley advertisement, which described its vehicle as appealing “to those 
ordinarily nervous when in a motor car” and “the safest car for women’s use.”
212  
The focus on women as a customer base constituted another effort to associate 
cars with everyday life.
213 The functional use of the car in the 1904 Pope-Waverley 
advertisement listed female-related purposes first and foremost, claiming that “ladies 
prefer them [automobiles] for shopping and calling,” while business reasons came 
second, with appeals to physicians for their readiness and economy (Figure 2.26).
214  
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Figure 2.26. Pope-Waverly Electric Car Advertisement, Life, June 2, 1904, 523. 
One could argue that automobiles still served entertainment purposes at this 
time, but the emphasis was on the ability of the car to take its driver somewhere to be  
120 
entertained rather than on the driving experience itself as entertainment. A 1904 
Oldsmobile advertisement promised to take a woman to an enjoyable destination: the 
Oldsmobile was an “ideal machine for any woman who enjoys the outdoor life” 
because it was “safe, reliable, easy to operate” and would bring her in perfect comfort 
to her destination, “rain or sunshine.”
215 The promise of a delightful afternoon was 
found in places, people, and various activities rather than in the automobile itself, 
signifying a move away from its sporting past and perhaps a move toward being an 
integral part of everyday life.  
The transformation of the automobile to a mode of everyday transport can be 
understood in terms of the simultaneous equine and feminine articulations that sought 
to court an important consumer base. The move toward projecting a “coach”-like 
effect required the motor to be the equivalent of the horse not only in its functionality 
but also in its virtuous qualities. Franklin Motor Cars described its steam vehicles in 
1904 as being “as sensitive and spirited as a thoroughbred horse.”
216 The emphasis on 
cars having the genteel qualities of thoroughbred horses appeared in many other 
earlier horse and buggy advertisements, such as that of the 1899 Spider Stanhope. 
Stanhope advertised the “perfectly correct” and harmonious style of its carriages and 
again used only women as drivers and passengers in its posters.
217  
A Franklin Motor Car advertisement also featured a woman at the controls of 
its steam vehicle, with a man seated on the passenger side. Many automobile 
advertisements featured female drivers and passengers exclusively. The background 
undertones were feminine, evoking the coach by using phrases such as “light, flexible, 
ease of management, and extreme luxury” replacing the “unnecessary, heavy and 
troublesome” machine of the past.
218 The use of women as a domesticating device for 
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the daredevil automobile enhanced the move toward the automobile’s coach-like 
reputation because the image of the woman driver conveyed safety: it was observed 
that women were careful drivers and thus generally not involved in vehicle 
accidents.
219  
Feminine descriptors intertwined with equine features appeared consistently in 
many advertisements in the early twentieth century regardless of the type of motor 
power used. Haynes-Apperson, in the early twentieth century, used women almost 
exclusively in many of its advertisements for its gasoline automobiles in Life and 
Collier’s magazines. Woods Motor Vehicle similarly used only women in its 
advertisements.
220 The extensive use of women in advertisements at that time 
constituted a different sensibility from their use in modern-day automobile 
advertisements.  
Women in the early twentieth century were considered an influential consumer 
base and thus were depicted as potential customers, whereas modern-day 
advertisements tend to make decorative use of women.
221 In the advertisements of the 
early twentieth century, women were depicted in the driver’s seat and were sometimes 
illustrated from a distance. Modern-day advertisements, on the other hand, show 
women as what Scharff calls “automotive accessories,” as exemplified by a 1948 
photo in her book in which a woman is used as a hood ornament.
222 Other more 
popular advertisements show women flanking automobiles in close-up provocative 
full-body poses, but rarely operating them.  
The early woman automobile shopper, on the other hand, was described as 
“out in force” by 1906: she “looks over the automobile advertisements in the daily 
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newspapers and makes the rounds of the salesrooms in about the same frame of mind 
that she would if she were shopping for a new bonnet.”
223  
Some observers believed that the entire automobile industry relied upon 
women’s patronage for its survival. As early as 1898, a writer noted the manner in 
which women had taken an interest in the new machine: 
The women, strange to say, have from the first shown more enthusiasm than 
the men for the new vehicle. It is they who have been its most ardent 
promoters, who have organized horseless coaching excursions, given prizes for 
races—in short, created the first paying demand for a clean, speedy and 
reliable machine.
224  
The notion that women created the “first paying demand” for a practical automobile 
problematizes the commonly held gendered typifications of the car as a male domain 
that came to be usurped by women. Historian Scharff, for instance, argues that “the 
auto was born in a masculine manger, and when women became drivers, they had to 
overcome their own lack of confidence and combat both subtle and overt 
resistance.”
225 Women supposedly appeared in many advertisements as passive figures 
seated next to a man.
226  
Historical data, however, show less timid and, in fact, highly participatory 
behavior among women. In 1901, an automobile writer described how women—
“plenty of them”—were already driving their own automobiles.
227 A 1901 
advertisement in Collier’s described the Triumph automobile as a “swell carriage” for 
ladies without mentioning other prospective customers.
228 In 1903, Oldsmobile, 
Haynes-Apperson, Searchmont, Cudell, and many other manufacturers used women 
almost exclusively in many of their advertisements. Even tire companies such as the 
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Hartford Rubber Works Company generally depicted a woman behind the wheel in 
their advertisements during the years 1903–1904 (Figure 2.27).
229 As late as 1908, 
Stepney Spare Wheel tires also used women in their advertisement in Collier’s.
230  
 
Figure 2.27. Dunlop Tire Advertisement, Life, April 7, 1904, 351. 
In 1906, the Ladies Home Journal featured a story of an enterprising young 
woman who organized a two-week excursion for 24 girls, including a chaperone, for a 
trip from Philadelphia to the Delaware Water Gap, for only $1.60 per day including 
expenses.
231 By this time, many women easily handled large touring cars, and a 
significant number of them owned and operated their own automobiles.
232 It was not 
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uncommon in 1906 to see a large touring car filled with women driving in congested 
business districts and on city boulevards.
233 Four women made a transcontinental trip 
in a Maxwell car in 1909, performing all the necessary repairs themselves along the 
way.
234 By this time, a column written especially for women drivers dispensed advice 
on many aspects of driving, including how to handle emergencies and avoid 
accidents.
235 Was ease of use, then, specifically aimed at women?  
While Scharff acknowledges that a few gasoline auto manufacturers 
recognized a female market for their products,
236 she generally provides the 
impression that the majority of the manufacturers did not specifically target women 
drivers for their larger gasoline touring cars. Scharff claims that the rapidly growing 
number of women driving gasoline cars disrupted the gendered stereotype in the 
minds of the advertisers who saw electric cars as the car for women and gasoline cars 
as the car for men.
237  
However, advertisements depicted women at the helms of gasoline cars as 
early as 1902 (Figure 2.28). The emphasis on the ease of operating gasoline cars at this 
early stage confirms the idea that manufacturers would sell a car to anyone, regardless 
of gender, who could afford it. Indeed, whether manufacturers were catering to the 
needs of women or whether they were specifically targeting them as potential buyers 
could be argued in a number of different ways, but one thing is certain: manufacturers 
had women foremost in their minds from the start (Figures 2.28 through 2.37). 
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Figure 2.28. Haynes-Apperson Advertisement, Life, March 6, 1902, 182.  
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Figure 2.29. Peerless Advertisement, Life, August 6, 1903, 119.  
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Figure 2.30. Searchmont Advertisement, Life, July 23, 1903, 93.  
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Figure 2.31. Cudell Advertisement, Life, June 4, 1903, 505.  
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Figure 2.32. Franklin Advertisement, Life, May 5, 1904, 419.  
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Figure 2.33. Studebaker Advertisement, Life, June 2, 1904, 560.  
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Figure 2.34. Studebaker Advertisement, Life, May 5, 1904, 446.  
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Figure 2.35. Locomobile Advertisement, McClure’s, April 1905, 75.  
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Figure 2.36. Oldsmobile Advertisement, Life, April 6, 1905, 360.  
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Figure 2.37. Pope-Waverly Advertisement, Ladies Home Journal, July 1906, 27.  
135 
John W. Haynes, a well-known race car driver, noted in 1907 that women 
“who learn to drive cars are as a rule exceptionally capable after they have mastered 
the mechanical details of the work.”
238 Many women automobile workers also helped 
commercialize cars. It was observed in 1909 that women performed the “better class 
of work” in almost every automobile plant, particularly for tops and upholstery 
work.
239 The notion of the car as being “born out of a masculine manger,” as Scharff 
argues,
240 may require further clarification, particularly when the birth of the 
automobile appears to be intimately tied to the patronage of women as buyers and as 
factory workers. 
Although there is little accurate data on the number of drivers, in general, in 
the first decade of the twentieth century,
241 female motorists certainly were featured in 
many accounts of motoring. A noted automobile observer in Buffalo, New York, 
noticed that women drove to the shopping district in their own cars, paying no heed to 
the cold or snow, whereas three or four years earlier, no one, including men, had dared 
to drive in Buffalo’s winter weather.
242 As early as 1903, women in many cities, such 
as Pittsburgh, demanded a separate motor school and instructors of their own.
243 At 
this time, the Ladies’ Automobile Club of Great Britain and Ireland secured a large 
drawing room in the Hans Crescent Hotel for six months reserved exclusively for 
lectures and practical lessons in motorcar driving.
244 The cover of the Automobile 
Club of America’s annual banquet menu card in 1903 featured a picture of a woman 
driving an automobile.
245 Life magazine in 1902 began publishing advertisements for 
automobiles featuring women as passengers and drivers.  
                                                 
238 “Considers Women Most Careful Drivers,” The Automobile, September 5, 1907, 332. 
239 “Female Labor is Now Being Utilized,” The Automobile, December 30, 1909, 27. 
240 Scharff, Taking the Wheel, 13. 
241 “Motor Car Law,” Motor, June 1909, 40–45. Also Scharff, Taking the Wheel, 25. 
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It is conceivable that manufacturers of electric cars focused specifically on 
wealthy women rather than on women in general. Thus the contrast between electric 
and gasoline as a gender-driven category, as Scharff
246 proposes, could be argued 
along the lines of economic and class distinctions. However, even the class issue does 
not seem to provide a neat classificatory scheme for the various types of motors. An 
Oldsmobile advertisement in Life magazine in 1903, for instance, despite featuring a 
gasoline car, attempted to appeal to economic prestige by showing how the continuity 
of upper class distinctions between 1703 and 1903 persisted despite changes in modes 
of transport (Figure 2.38).
247 An almost identical image appeared in Life magazine 
seven years later, again depicting two wealthy women, one from 1710 and the other 
from 1910, meeting on common ground despite having arrived in different types of 
transport.
248  
Perhaps rather than viewing different types of automobiles as a mechanism for 
creating different types of gender and class distinctions, one could examine the 
availability of different price and model options as mirroring pre-existing social 
structures. Class distinctions in existence during the period of the horse and carriage 
appeared to have been transplanted into the motor era: specific cars were designed for 
specific types of buyers.  
                                                 
246 Scharff argues that the popularization of gasoline vehicles came as a result of the 
incorporation of supposedly feminine frills, such as electric starters in lieu of cranks (Taking 
the Wheel, 58–59). 
247 Life, September 3, 1903. 
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Figure 2.38. Oldsmobile Advertisement, Life, September 3, 1903, 210  
(inside front cover).  
The Automobile magazine’s comprehensive profile of car models available in 
the market in 1906 showed that the lowest price category, from $400 to $800, and the  
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highest price category, from $6,500 to $12,300, consisted of gasoline cars.
249 That 
gasoline cars dominated both ends of the price spectrum, from most affordable to most 
luxurious, indicates the effort of gasoline car manufacturers to appeal to different 
types of buyers from the beginning, not just to those at the low end of the market. 
Electric cars competed with gasoline cars within the same price category. During the 
horse era, some carriages were built specifically for the upper class, but the 
automobile era also appealed to the same class distinctions regardless of the motor 
power used. A 1915 Life illustration best exemplifies how the social practice was 
simply transferred into an automotive medium (Figure 2.39).
250  
                                                 
249 The lowest price category includes Orient ($400); Ford ($400–$500); Olds, Reo, Holsman and 
Northern ($650); Cadillac, Wolverine, Mitchell, Pierce-Racine, Randall ($750); Maxwell ($780); 
Wayne, Queen, Holsman ($800); while the highest price category consisted of Lozier ($6,500); Simplex 
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($12,000); Rochet-Schneider ($11,000); Panhard ($12,300). See “Chief Characteristics of 1906 
Models,” The Automobile, January 11, 1906, 32–66. 
250 Life, May 13, 1915, 8.  
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Figure 2.39. Illustration, Life, May 13, 1915, 861. 
Nearly all automobile builders at that time admitted to studying idiosyncrasies in 
fashion, particularly with regard to color, in order to effectively harmonize or contrast 
cars with women’s dresses.
251 A company that made one of America’s costliest cars 
sold two machines at a private exhibition to two women buyers who bought the cars 
simply on the basis of their being the right color to match their wardrobes.
252 Many 
socialites had their cars repainted on a regular basis to match their gowns.
253  
                                                 
251 “Casual Cut-outs,” Dress and Vanity Fair, October 1913, 108. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid.  
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Supplanting the Horse 
The transplantation of social practices onto the automotive platform occurred 
as manufacturers sought to redefine the monstrous as the mundane. While early 
advertisements may have adopted persuasive measures to convert early horse and 
buggy users, early adopters themselves informed advertisers in various creative ways 
to make this transition work. For instance, as early as 1896, for a Horseless Carriage 
Race conducted on the horse race track in Narragansett Park at the Rhode Island State 
Fair, all drivers wore jockey outfits of derby shirts and hats rather than goggles and 
hoods.
254 The sport of foxhunting in Nashville, Tennessee, had been greatly facilitated 
by the use of the automobile in 1905 because it decreased travel time to and from the 
hunting grounds.
255 Seven years later, the actual hunt itself in England was described 
to have been “revolutionized” by the replacement of horses with automobiles,
256 
although horses remain a part of the hunting tradition of the elite gentry in England 
today.  
A telling Life magazine cartoon, captioned “Will the horse be superseded by 
the automobile in every equestrian sport?” featured a woman behind the wheel 
controlling a series of cars harnessed together like horses (Figure 2.40).  
                                                 
254 M. Worth Colwell, “America’s First Track Race,” The Horseless Age, February 1, 1911, 273. 
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Figure 2.40. Illustration, Life, January 7, 1909, 23. 
Almost thirty years later, the same analogy of automobiles replacing 
racehorses was suggested by a Kelly automobile advertisement. The advertisement 
showed a man standing beside a car and a woman sitting behind the wheel: “Got any 
tips, Tommy?” asks the woman. “Well, they say Kelly is a good bet in the third race,” 
replies the man. The woman answers, “That sounds good to me. I’d bet on a Kelly any 
time.”
257 Thus there were cases when suggestions of a direct replacement of the horse 
were made without any modifications of practices. Perhaps a more telling example of 
the enduring character of preexisting practices is the picture of a woman in The 
Automobile magazine in 1902, in which her spinning wheel was replaced by a driving 
wheel, with the caption, “the more things change, the more they stay the same” 
(Figure 5.1)
258  
Tales of courtship with lovers eloping via automobile instead of horse were a 
common theme. For instance, an illustrated story of a father running after his daughter 
showed young lovers escaping in an automobile while the father tried to catch up with 
his horse-drawn carriage.
259 Some stories used “then” versus “now” pictures showing 
lovers running away in a horse-drawn carriage with Cupid in the background pointing 
                                                 
257 Saturday Evening Post, June 30, 1923, 65. 
258 Automobile Magazine, July 1902, 587. 
259 Collier’s, July 4, 1908, 6.  
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his arrow at the lovers (“then”) only to be replaced with an automobile (“now”) with 
Cupid chasing after them on a bicycle.
260 Another illustration of this type of past-
present scenario included that of a horse tied outside the house of a lady being courted 
(“then”) replaced with a car parked outside the same house (”now”).  
These then-versus-now illustrations suggest that nothing much had changed 
except for the direct replacement of the horse with the automobile and the obvious 
difference in speed. These reassuring images of familiar circumstances surrounding a 
new and increasingly proliferating technological device could perhaps be taken as a 
cynical social commentary on the inability of social order to change with the times. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on continuity of practices associated with the horse in 
advertisements and social commentaries assures the consistency of the message given 
to the public—using an automobile would not radically change people’s lives. 
Suggestions of automobiles supplanting horses were also depicted in 
traditional folklore stories. For example, an illustration of Lady Godiva riding in an 
automobile rather than on a horse (“Had Lady Godiva Lived To-day)
261 attests to the 
many ways in which horses were physically supplanted by automobiles, although not 
in conceptual and functional terms. In more practical matters, street sprinklers, 
ambulances, and fire trucks were motorized in the first decade of the twentieth century 
in place of animal horse-power. The general appearance of these public service 
vehicles has been described as closely resembling their equivalent horse-drawn 
prototypes, with the motor doing the work of the horse.
262 American Indians, or 
“aboriginal Americans” as they were called in the early days, were said to have caught 
the motor craze as well, with a description in the cover article of The Automobile 
magazine claiming that the “noble red man seems to have [taken] very kindly to the 
                                                 
260 Life, February 4, 1909, 163. 
261 Life, September 13, 1906, 281. Also, a similar illustration with the same caption appeared in Life, 
September 17, 1914. 
262 “An Automobile Aid to Good Roads,” The Automobile, April 8, 1905, 1.  
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automobile” and that a number of them owned and operated their own machines on 
the reservations.
263 A comic strip of 1909 depicted a cowboy riding an automobile 
much like a horse in pursuit of a cow (Figure 2.41).
264  
 
Figure 2.41. Illustration, Life, March 4, 1909, 287. 
California ranchers were described as using motorcars to ride up to “snow 
peaks and down to desert valleys below the level of the sea,” as one observer claimed, 
for automobiles were supposedly as common as horses in sparsely populated areas of 
the cattle country of the west from as early as the first decade of the twentieth 
century.
265 These later examples again show the increasing trend toward replacing the 
horse physically but maintaining its functional and conceptual use.  
The automobile also made use of pre-existing distribution and service 
infrastructures built around the servicing of the horse. Commercial supply routes in 
                                                 
263 “Poor Lo Takes An Automobile Outing,” The Automobile, May 18, 1905, 1. 
264 Life, March 4, 1909, 287. 
265 John S. McGroarty, “The Valley of Surprise,” The West Coast Magazine, June 1911, 266–267.  
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urban areas relied on the use of horses for the distribution of goods and services. 
According to McShane and Tarr, the entire internal city circulatory system at the turn 
of the twentieth century, such as freight delivery, passenger transportation, food 
distribution, and police and ambulance services, was constructed around the horse.
266  
Many carriage companies such as Pritchard, Edwards and Sullivan
267 in 1890 
began selling horseless carriages side by side with buggies in their stores; this 
continued into the early twentieth century. The established firm of Fiss, Doerr & 
Carroll Horse Company of New York City took on the exclusive distributorship of 
Columbia electric vehicles.
268 The Studebaker Carriage Company advertised 
automobiles and horse carriages side by side in many of its posters.
269 Sales barns for 
horses were used to exhibit automobiles.
270 Secondhand cars were sold on horse 
auction blocks.
271 Storage facilities were referred to as “automobile stables” rather 
than garages.
272 Terms such as a “stable full of cars” used in many Oldsmobile and 
Herreshoff advertisements continued to appear as late as 1909. Shifting the 
infrastructure of carriages to cars occurred with ease and without massive start-up 
costs.  
While horses had been argued to be a “liability” compared to automobiles, 
particularly in terms of daily operation and maintenance for public transport,
273 the 
rapid diffusion of the automobile appears to have been facilitated by the ease with 
which it inserted itself into well-established infrastructures from horse culture such as 
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distribution and sales systems, service and maintenance centers, and even cultural 
infrastructure such as reasons for using a transport vehicle. In positioning itself to 
work like a horse, the automobile did not have to challenge the existing work structure 
directly in order to find its way into people’s lives. It merely had to supplant the horse. 
Conclusion 
The momentum gained in shifting from muscle to motor power required 
measures of forced likeness to be made between the automobile and the horse. 
Motorized power posing as muscle power came as a move to pull the automobile from 
the periphery to the very center of society—automobile manufacturers employed 
various means to project an image of a reliable, easy-to-operate, mundane, practical 
everyday transport in order to overcome an infamous reputation of technical novelty 
with dubious functionality. Early automotive advertisements provide interesting 
insights into how this was accomplished. 
During the first decade of the century, automotive advertisements had to 
contend with uncertainties regarding the viability of a self-propelling vehicle and its 
ability to deliver benefits not already being provided by the horse. The automobile had 
to shed its whimsical and sporting past in order to be accepted as everyday transport. 
Despite its significant differences from the horse in terms of driving, operational 
controls, and, for that matter, sights, smells, and sounds, the automobile was presented 
as the horse’s operational (motorcar steering working like reins) and functional 
(working just like a horse) equivalent. As a writer observed in 1905, there was “in 
automobile affairs the constantly recurring allusion to the work of horse-drawn 
vehicles.”
274  
In becoming like a horse, the automobile justified its purpose as a useful 
device. At the same time, in becoming unlike the horse—a cheaper and better 
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alternative—it justified itself as a replacement. An interesting paradox transpired in 
many advertisements to promote the motorcar. Horses were supposed to be inferior, 
needing to be replaced with machines—machines that worked just like a horse, only 
better. Hence, the intentional effort to align the automobile with horse culture raises 
the question of technical superiority and economic sensibility as the sole determinants 
of automotive diffusion. I argue that by virtue of its association with the horse, the 
automobile was transformed from a deviant spectacle into a commonplace device of 
everyday life. The automobile, loathed by the public, came to assume an image of 
familiarity and conformity. 
The transformation of the automobile to a mode of familiar everyday transport 
also came to be understood in terms of feminine articulations. Women constituted the 
“first paying” customers who insisted on a machine that was clean, speedy, and 
reliable.
275 The use of women in early automotive advertisements showed their 
importance as patrons and had the added benefit of conveying an image of safety, 
comfort, and ease of use to a cantankerous machine. Feminine descriptors intertwined 
with equine features helped enhance the automobile’s reputation as a replacement for 
the horse-drawn carriage. Automotive manufacturers hired carriage mechanics and 
builders to create a more coach-like automobile, emphasizing comfortable ride over 
exhilarating drive, bringing in another element of familiarity to mainstream 
commuters. Traditional names and designs of horse-drawn carriages were copied.  
The need for motor power to be interchangeable with muscle power may 
appear to have emerged seamlessly from the strength of pre-existing practices rooted 
in the horse culture. However, it also appears that this transition was initially 
facilitated by manufacturers who expressed this intention through advertising. 
Automobile advertisements borrowed heavily from preexisting social norms 
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concerning the various uses of the horse to deliberately redirect consumer orientation 
from literal horse power to figurative horsepower. The horselessness of the motorcar, 
its novel aspect, was less emphasized. Rather, the motorcar was simply introduced as a 
functional equivalent of the horse without its organic limitations. The motorcar co-
opted pre-existing equine culture and practices in order to survive, particularly in its 
early, and most precarious, stage of development.  
Automotive ubiquity did not occur simply because cars became much more 
affordable and cleaner and performed more efficiently than horses. Historical studies 
generally have not discussed how the automobile relied upon society’s long-standing 
working relationship with the horse in order to be understood and accepted. When cars 
began to be seen as functioning like horses, rapid diffusion ensued as socioeconomic 
and cultural practices built around the horse were transferred to the car.  
In the next chapter, I will show how this recurring dependency of the motorcar 
on equine culture persisted even in military settings. In an attempt to motorize the 
cavalry, the military was caught in a similar predicament of having to preserve its 
long-held tradition of speed and mobility on the battlefield, which had been carried out 
using the horse. At the same time, there was urgent pressure to motorize, and a battle 
ensued between the proponents of the horse and the proponents of the motorcar.  
While the motorcar appeared to have gained some military support from a 
policy standpoint after WWI, the actual transition to motorization was far from 
straightforward and, in fact, faltered despite direct mandates from those in high 
military offices. Reconciliation occurred when specifications for a reconnaissance car 
followed the performance requirements of the horse, paving the way for the most 
popular vehicle in World War II, the jeep. However, this reconciliation came about at 
a slow and arduous pace.  
148 
Chapter Three 
Case Two: “Breeding” the Jeep: 
The Conceptualization and Diffusion of the Iron Warhorse 
As the automobile began to appear in public streets at the turn of the century, 
the US Army began to explore various military applications of the newfangled 
machine.
1 Despite many years of experimentation and numerous attempts to 
motorize,
2 more than forty years elapsed before the army transitioned from muscle to 
motor power on an organization-wide scale. The US military continued using the 
horse during the interwar years despite its ineffectiveness in WWI. The US cavalry in 
particular fought fiercely to maintain the use of the horse well into the early 1940s 
despite significant pressures from high-level military offices to motorize. How was it 
possible that the motorcar diffused in such a hostile environment? 
This second case examines how the military group most adherent to muscle 
power—the cavalry—became motorized. Similar to the early years of the horseless 
carriage in civilian society, the motorcar was peripheral to the cavalry world and, to 
some extent, to the army. The horse, on the other hand, was central to the social 
culture of the US army.
3 To even mention motorcars, at one point during the 1920s, 
was considered sacrilegious by many high-ranking cavalry officers. The horse was 
considered to be the chief weapon of the cavalry.
4 How did the military group most 
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2 The War Department in 1928 defined motorization as the replacement of animal transport with motor 
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opposed to motorization, just as farmers were to the horseless carriage, conceptualize 
a substitute for the horse after years of protecting it from obsolescence? 
The Cavalry Journal, an internal military publication, provides a good source 
for understanding the entrenchment of horse culture in the cavalry and the role that 
that culture played in impeding—and eventually facilitating—the change to 
motorization. The Cavalry Journal, 1920–1946, with a circulation of about 1,500–
2,000,
5 provided a forum for various ranking army officers to voice their opinions on 
matters concerning the cavalry. The bias of the Journal’s articles toward the horse 
sheds light on the various rationales given for opposing motorization. In general, the 
qualities of the horse were the same qualities argued to be lacking in the motorcar. 
This study also relies heavily upon the 1914 Cavalry Service Regulations 
issued to all cavalry regiments at a time when principles of leadership had been 
inculcated in cavalrymen for many years. The same principles of leading also 
appeared in the new drill and service regulations manual of 1916.
6 It appears that no 
other succeeding cavalry manuals of these kinds were widely circulated. The 1914 
Cavalry Service Regulations manual was issued immediately after a re-organization in 
the cavalry in which the detached troops of enlisted cavalrymen who volunteered as 
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park rangers at Yellowstone in 1872 were discharged from the Department of the 
Interior.
7  
Needing to incorporate these volunteers, the cavalry required definitive 
standards for its operations. It is conceivable that the 1914 manual was intended to 
provide a unifying role in the cavalry in terms of its fighting principles and practices. 
Thus, this study uses these manuals as sources for understanding the fundamental 
principles of their combat culture. The centrality of the horse in these fighting 
principles provides a backdrop to the heated discourses found in the Cavalry Journal 
regarding motorization.  
The different means used to cope with the pressure to motorize can be gleaned 
from various articles published in the Journal. One can see from the writings of 
cavalry members their conflicting sentiments about the motorcar during the interwar 
period as the organization struggled with the increasing trend toward modernization. 
The various coping mechanisms employed to maintain equine tradition and cavalry 
status while remaining true to cavalry missions and principles led to the 
conceptualization of the jeep.  
In addition to exploring the conceptualization of the jeep, this case study also 
examines the context of use. It looks at how soldiers used jeeps as warhorses to fulfill 
their combat roles. The work of Virginia Cowles,
8 who interviewed David Stirling and 
the SAS group immediately after WWII, provides the major source for an illustration 
of how the jeep was used in cavalry-style raids. Cowles’s work has been the basis for 
many succeeding historical accounts regarding Stirling. For a more individual level of 
analysis of soldiers directly relating to their jeeps, the work of Ernie Pyle, a well-
known reporter and the first to conduct interviews by “embedding” himself with the 
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troops, is a major source, as well as Bill Mauldin’s poignant images and 
characterizations of the soldier with his jeep. Other accounts by WWII reporters and 
soldiers, as well as government documents, manuals, newspaper reports, feature 
articles, films, political cartoons, and secondary sources are among the other materials 
used to capture the manner in which the American soldier made the switch from 
muscle to motor power.  
General Overview 
After WWI, the United States Congress passed the National Defense Act of 
1920 for the purpose of modernizing the army. Congress wanted to investigate why 
the United States entered the war with a wholly inadequate supply of men, arms, 
ammunition, and other military equipment, not to mention significant delays in 
transporting military support to Europe.
9 This disorganization harked back to a similar 
predicament at the outbreak of the Civil War in April 1861, when the Union 
government found itself utterly unprepared.
10 The 1920 Defense Act sought to ensure 
military procurement and industrial preparedness in the event of another war,
11 and 
thus official doctrines for motorization
12 and mechanization
13 were created. 
During the postwar years of 1919 to 1921, the War Department conducted a 
battery of tests to determine the feasibility of replacing the horse. The German 
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mechanized attack of WWI forced the army to reexamine its traditional approach to 
warfare in earnest. Brigadier General George Van Horn Moseley, commander of the 
1st Cavalry Division, stated, “When the cowboy down here is herding cattle in a Ford, 
we must realize that the world has undergone a change.”
14 The motorcar appears to 
have gained some military support from a policy standpoint, but the horse maintained 
its paramount position in the cavalry.  
Under the 1920 Defense Act, tanks came under the supervision of the United 
States Infantry because the army believed that tanks would serve as a protection 
against an attacking enemy.
15 The act essentially attempted to prepare the tank to 
assume some of the battlefield roles performed by the cavalry.
16 The cavalry served as 
the protector of other combat arms;
17 thus the idea of tanks serving as a replacement 
was alarming to the cavalry.  
The cavalry’s chief task was to assist other arms of combat. The cavalry tended 
to maneuver widely and freely because it was in charge of pursuing retreating enemies 
as well as covering the retreat of its own forces; it was responsible for charging the 
flank and rear of the enemy, and for delaying the advance of the enemy until the 
arrival of other arms.
18 Thus it was often situated at a distance from the main body of 
the army. 
The cavalry was also responsible for reconnaissance work, for controlling 
strategic positions, and for executing all types of raids because these attacks required 
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speed and mobility.
19 It was the arm assigned to assist the infantry in filling the gaps in 
a firing line.
20 In essence, the cavalry was the combat arm in the first line of fire.  
Despite the cavalry’s sacrosanct position in the military,
21 its value came under 
fire with modernized warfare. The Cavalry Journal in 1922 described the controversy 
raging within the cavalry at the time.
22 Some groups wanted to embrace motorization, 
others sought to block any type of change, while still others tried to reconcile the two 
extremes by incorporating some level of motorization into the cavalry. Disagreements 
within the cavalry caused such internal upheaval that the organization was engaged in 
a public relations battle within its own ranks. Many high-ranking cavalry officers 
sought to preserve the status quo at all costs, and discouraged any discourse that ran 
contrary to cavalry tradition. Anyone who vaguely entertained the idea of using 
motorcars was ostracized.  
Thus when General Douglas MacArthur, acting as the new Chief of Staff in 
1931, attempted again to motorize and mechanize, he was met with a renewed cavalry 
effort to block motorization. For instance, the cavalry refused to adopt MacArthur’s 
term “mechanized force,” instead insisting on the term “mechanized cavalry,” which 
emphasized the precedence of horses over machines. Under MacArthur’s directives,
23 
mechanization became a responsibility of both the chief of infantry and the cavalry.
24 
From 1931 to 1940, mechanization developed along two separate lines with two 
different doctrines, although the so-called infantry fast tank and the cavalry combat car 
were exactly the same vehicle.
25 How, then, was cohabitation of the motorcar and the 
horse managed under the cavalry leadership? 
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One study argued that although the army intellectually appreciated the 
capabilities of the motor truck, emotionally its faith and trust remained with the 
horse.
26 The study found that a “feeling” of faith and trust in the horse was apparent in 
archival records from many years,
27 but it failed to cite any examples of how these 
emotions manifested themselves in a highly militarized environment. The following 
sections attempt to uncover the foundations of the cavalry’s alliance to the horse and 
the various means and motivations adopted to defend this alliance in the face of 
increasing mechanization. 
Warhorses and Cavalrymen: Interchangeability in Identity 
The bond between the cavalryman and his horse has been described as one of 
the oldest relationships in war.
28 Mounted attacks in the eighteenth century, initially 
carried out by soldiers who volunteered for the task, became a key strategic weapon of 
the US Army in many wars during the nineteenth century.
29 Mounted rangers were 
appointed by Congress in 1832 to fight the Indians on the western frontier, forming the 
first officially recognized cavalry in the regular army.
30 The use of horses influenced 
the pace and design of combat strategies; herein lies the beginning of the long-
standing tradition of the cavalry. The horse became inseparable from the act of 
fighting and from the soldier himself. A 1925 Cavalry Journal article described the 
relationship as one marked by deep loyalty: “Since civilization began the horse has 
been the companion, servant and friend of man.”
31 More than ten years later, even 
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with advances in automotive technology, the horse was still described as “far from 
being outmoded. Man’s oldest servant of the animal creation is proving to be 
indispensable to the United States Army.”
32  
The image of the cavalryman mounted on a horse charging toward the 
battlefield typifies a classical picture of a war hero. Without his horse, the cavalryman 
was just an infantryman. Indeed, cavalrymen were former infantrymen who traveled to 
the battlefield on horseback. Fighting, at one time, meant dismounting, finding cover, 
and shooting from the ground.
33 The horse provided the cavalry with the speed and 
visibility necessary to win wars. The emphasis on mounted attacks provided a 
psychological rallying point for soldiers to be aggressive and to take the offensive.  
The 1914 Cavalry Service Regulations manual reiterated the need to “lean 
always toward the aggressive; to develop the ‘habit of prompt decision’; and in cases 
of doubt, to take the boldest decision.”
34 Ten years later, it was still a deeply held 
belief that “without mobility the cavalry [was] of little value.”
35 Mobility allowed the 
cavalry to move across various terrains where the enemy might be hiding to launch 
attacks. It was believed that only horses could provide such mobility.  
The enemy and the terrain were the two elements critical to controlling the 
battlefield. According to the 1914 manual, “the character of the enemy and the nature 
of the terrain exercise [were the] controlling influence on the operations of the 
cavalry.”
36 The enemy could be defeated through the boldness and offensive actions of 
the soldier, while the horse took care of conquering the terrain. 
Dismounted actions were strongly discouraged because they hampered rapid, 
decisive movements. The 1914 manual stated that the “habitual reliance on 
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dismounted action will weaken and eventually destroy initiative.”
37 George S. Patton, 
an advocate of the mounted cavalry despite its wartime experience with tanks, 
believed that “success in war depends upon the golden rule [of] war. Speed—
Simplicity—Boldness.”
38  
Horses provided not only speed but also the necessary means for leaders to 
display boldness with sensational maneuvers and audacity on the battlefield. Leaders 
must be “active and energetic with a keen eye and good judgment, quick decision and 
a firm will,” qualities considered essential to seizing control of the battlefield.
39 
Failure to act decisively constituted a “more serious charge against a cavalry officer” 
than acting too quickly, with a resulting mistake in operations.
40  
Horses provided the means for cavalrymen to be both nimble and aggressive 
on the battlefield. Without horses, it was difficult for men to deliver surprise offensive 
attacks that would keep the enemy off-balance. The emphasis on offensive and prompt 
action was such that the 1926 War Department training regulations for the entire army 
insisted that only offensive attacks win wars and that every individual in the military 
must be “imbued with the spirit of the offensive.”
41 This spirit of the offensive was 
deeply attached to the horse and the mobility it afforded, which may explain the 
disdain for motorization.  
The removal of the horse was seen as akin to a loss of control, and even of a 
sense of self. It was even believed that the fighting qualities of a good cavalryman 
could be made manifest only with a continued reliance upon the horse. Without it, the 
cavalryman’s fighting qualities would atrophy. Thus while the cavalryman depended 
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upon the horse for survival and success during wartime, during peacetime he relied 
upon the horse for the preservation of his fighting skills.  
The directors of the Cavalry School believed that long periods of peace may, 
and often do, impair the efficiency of the cavalryman. There is a mental and a 
physical, as well [as] a mechanical, rut. Daring and aggressiveness, qualities 
that are indispensable to the mounted man, may easily be lost. They must be 
preserved at all odds. Only constant practice, day in and day out, can keep a 
man a bold and confident rider.
42  
Such was the dependency of the cavalryman upon his horse that without it, he 
would become weak, not only physically but also mentally. The horse had been deeply 
ingrained in the development of the cavalry’s skills and abilities such that inherent 
behavioral qualities, including aggressiveness, depended upon the presence of the 
horse to be made manifest. Only through the continued use of the horse could the 
cavalryman exhibit the qualities necessary to defeat his enemy and bring glory to 
himself and to his unit. Without his horse, the cavalryman became a virtual non-
combatant. As late as 1940, a colonel confessed his attachment to his horse: 
The true cavalry soldier thinks of his horse’s well being before his own—it is 
his friend and companion in danger; he enjoys going to war as long as he goes 
on a horse. It is a fact that a man while riding a blood horse, seldom had much 
fear of death.
43  
Thus motorization was perceived not only as a matter of replacing one type of 
transport with another but also as the dissolution of the cavalry’s way of life on the 
battlefield. The horse had been an integral part of men in war. Even after WWI, with 
the rise of trench warfare, poison gas, and powerful artillery, the cavalry remained 
resolute in its belief that mobility was the key to victory. According to a 1925 Cavalry 
Journal article, “Mobility, fire power, and shock are the characteristics of cavalry. The 
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greatest of these is mobility.”
44 What was different in 1925 was that mobility prepared 
the way for machine guns to execute a fatal attack,
45 whereas the 1914 cavalry 
regulations manual recommended the actual killing be executed by the cavalrymen 
themselves, while machine guns served only to clear their path.  
While the 1914 cavalry manual approach would soon be proven ineffective in 
WWI, the position of many high-ranking cavalry officers was that mobility remained 
indispensable to winning wars, regardless of who or what delivered the fatal blow to 
the enemy. As the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in France stated after 
WWI, “The power of an army as a striking weapon depends on its mobility. Mobility 
is largely dependent on the suitability and fitness of animals for army work.”
46 The 
horse was fervently held to be indispensable to the army’s combat arsenal, despite its 
proven ineffectiveness against machines guns. 
Warhorses and Men of War: Interchangeability in Functional Specifications 
To the cavalry, the horse provided the speed necessary to stay ahead of rapid 
changes on the battlefield. A major in the Ordinance Reserve described battles as 
incredibly rapid so that “when things happen they happen very fast.”
47 The enemy was 
a moving target, and a good horse was necessary to keep up with his movements. 
Unlike in the civilian setting, where equine instinct provided many advantages in the 
carrying out of domestic duties, a warhorse had to be trained to suppress this instinct, 
particularly in its need to flee from danger.  
Horses had to follow cavalry commands, even if such commands led them 
charging toward their deaths. Good horses were described as possessing a high degree 
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of courage, endurance, and speed, as well as an even temperament when faced with 
danger,
48 a description that could very well apply to a good cavalry leader. In this 
sense, the cavalryman’s positive qualities were almost interchangeable with the 
qualities of a good horse.  
In order to be successful on the battlefield, a warhorse had to be trained, just 
like any soldier, to overcome its fears. Intelligence and sensory nerves had to be 
suppressed in order to win battles. Warhorses would be “easily governed by the 
consistent application of recognized aids applied with kindness,” and differences 
among warhorses “[would] be offset in part by intelligent training.”
49 In many ways, 
these requirements describe a machinelike profile in which the horse’s inherent 
instinct for self-preservation was suppressed so that it followed orders without 
resistance. There was also a machinelike quality to the military’s “intelligent horse 
training,” which differed from the civilian use of the term. 
Intelligent horse training in the military would not be considered intelligent to 
the average civilian. Military horses had to be, first and foremost, easily governable 
and predictable. An army general described the importance of spending enough time 
in training a horse because “one great difficulty in raising new cavalry [was] that the 
horses [were] new, untrained, fractious, and that the men [had] not yet learned to 
ride.”
50 While civilians would appreciate an intelligent horse that avoided danger, in 
the military, an intelligent horse would not exhibit independent thinking and would 
overcome its instinct for self-preservation at all costs.  
Good horses, like good soldiers, must follow orders without resistance, and 
their peculiarities had to be ironed out, in a process much like standardization in mass 
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production. What would emerge from the military’s intelligent training was an army of 
fairly homogeneous combat warhorses with a range of predictable and hence 
controllable responses. Horses had to become “mechanical” in order to withstand the 
rigors of war. 
The Percheron, a light draft horse, was considered ideal for military purposes 
because of its machinelike quality. Able to withstand the strain, exposure, and 
hardship of the battlefield, the horse could “best meet the exacting demands of modern 
warfare.”
51 A light Percheron, weighing around 1,500 pounds, was considered the 
“Allies’ most successful war-horse”
52 and was even described as “the best artillery 
horse the world had ever seen.”
53 Indeed, the technical specifications of a mechanical 
horse would later prove to be nearly equivalent to the physical traits of the Percheron.  
Horses were kept in reserve for as long as possible in order to save their 
strength for fighting battles. The US Cavalry, emphasizing prompt action over 
planning, placed less emphasis on reconnaissance and hence delegated this task to 
motorcars. According to the US 1914 Cavalry manual, motorcars were to be used for 
reconnaissance to conserve the strength of the horse for combat.
54 The British fighting 
style, taken to be more deliberative, differed from the American style of boldness and 
prompt action.  
The British cavalry highly valued reconnaissance and relied on the horse to 
perform this important task. The British cavalry commander typically dispatched the 
maximum possible number of cavalryman to obtain much-valued strategic information 
in order to determine his plan of attack. The British, emphasizing planning and 
intelligence, sent horses to perform what was deemed the most critical task, while the 
American forces deemed fighting performance more important and thus saved the 
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horse for the battlefield. Regardless of the approach, the horse was consistently used in 
those tasks deemed most critical. The role of the motorcar supported that of the horse.  
The US Cavalry’s battle routines, combat style, and training revolved around 
the use of the horse. Faith and trust in the horse led the cavalry to assign tasks deemed 
most strategic in winning wars to mounted rather than to motorized operations. This 
trust in the horse can be understood as confidence in the familiar and, hence, as a 
means to minimize the level of uncertainly. Because cavalrymen understood horses 
better than motorcars, they presumably could better factor their weaknesses and 
strengths into their plans, and in this sense, horses were more controllable and 
predictable in carrying out critical missions compared with motorcars. At the same 
time, the cavalry’s elite status also may have influenced the assignment of critical 
tasks.  
While social class hierarchies were not as prominent in the United States as 
they were in Great Britain, there was nevertheless a sense of superiority felt within the 
US Cavalry with regard to other branches of the military.
55 The replacement of the 
horse meant the loss of the cavalry’s elite status, along with its romantic imagery. The 
use of horses in Europe was also associated with nobility and aristocracy. During the 
Middle Ages, mounted knights were the highest status warriors in England and 
elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, the word “cavalry” comes from the French word 
chevalier, or mounted knight.   
Thus the threatened removal of the horse constituted a collapse in the 
fundamental elements of the cavalry. A cavalry lieutenant-colonel wrote in the late 
1890s that “without horses there can be no cavalry.”
56 Twenty years later, a cavalry 
captain made a similar declaration: “Without the horse, the cavalry had been deemed 
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‘practically useless.’”
57 According to a 1925 article, “The horse makes cavalry, 
distinguishes cavalry from foot troops, and gives the arm its characteristic of mobility. 
Cavalry therefore may operate within the powers of the horse and is held by his 
limitations.”
58  
A 1925 Cavalry Journal article may well have been a campaign to protect the 
paramount position of the horse in military combat. The argument was that the horse 
was essentially indistinguishable from the cavalryman himself and from the entire 
cavalry as an organization. To further advance the cause of the cavalry, a major 
general even argued that men and machines were dispensable but that horses were not: 
“There are many things in war that can not be done by men nor machines; and that 
only animals can do.”
59  
A soldier writing to his brother of his WWI experience advised, “The horses 
must come before anything else and you must always bear this in mind. No matter 
how much work is to be done on other jobs, be sure the horses have been attended 
first.”
60 Such was the importance of horses that their replacement was perceived as the 
destruction of the cavalry.  
The Horse on Trial: Pressures to Motorize 
The wartime experience of the cavalry during WWI was painfully thin, 
however. Out of the seventeen cavalry regiments in the US Army, only one, the 2nd 
Cavalry, was sent to Europe, and there it spent most of its time, as the last Chief of 
Cavalry Major General Herr described it, working on the “thankless and uncongenial 
task of running various remount stations.”
61 Some US Cavalrymen sent to the 
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battlefield in August 1918 to pursue retreating German soldiers were outfitted with a 
“hodge-podge” of animals that resembled, again in the words of Major General Herr, 
“Don Quixote and Sancho Panza chasing after windmills.”
62 The Chief of Cavalry felt 
that the respect and honor accorded the heroes of the Civil War was lacking. It was 
clear that the cavalry deeply resented the secondary role it played in WWI. The once 
proud and brave cavalrymen were essentially reduced to comic figures.  
The fearlessness and prompt action that characterized the fighting style of the 
cavalry appeared foolish when wave upon wave of horses and men fell in front of 
German machine-gun fire. Despite lessons learned by the French and British cavalries 
early in the war, American soldiers fought in 1917 with the same aggressiveness and 
rashness found in the cavalry tradition. George Marshall explained the American 
disposition in 1918: “Our men gave better results when employed in a ‘steamroller’ 
operation, their morale suffered from delays under fire, their spirits were best 
maintained by continuous aggressive actions.”
63 However, the US cavalry’s offensive 
attacks near the end of WWI no longer commanded the admiration they had inspired 
in the American Civil War, for the nature of war had changed. 
The “lightning strike” of German mechanized forces through Belgium during 
WWI rendered the US cavalry and cavalry style of attacks obsolete. Tanks replaced 
horse-drawn cannon and thus, despite the War Department’s continued support of the 
US Cavalry, it could no longer simply dismiss pressures to replace the horse. What, 
then, would justify the existence of the cavalry in the face of modern warfare? While 
the US Cavalry could not easily justify its importance abroad, it found a useful cause 
domestically—the capture of Pancho Villa. The services of the horse had been 
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invaluable in guarding the long border with Mexico, where mountainous terrain and 
nonexistent roads rendered motorcars unusable.  
Unfortunately for the cause of the horse, even in the Mexican expedition, the 
motorcar began to emerge as a viable alternative. Ironically, the very figure who 
actively sought to block motorization, George Patton, led the first publicized use of the 
motorcar in combat. In May 1916, the then-Lieutenant George Patton killed a critical 
member of Pancho Villa’s guerrilla force, Julio Cardenas, and three other men, using 
the automobile as a form of warhorse. Patton and his men rode their automobiles much 
as cavalrymen used horses for mobility and mounted attacks. Patton later described 
this motorized warfare as simply a matter of employing the car like a horse and 
insisted that only cavalrymen were best suited to utilize the motorcar as such.
64 The 
combat application of the motorcar made headlines and popularized it as a potential 
combat weapon.  
Suddenly cavalry combat was no longer exclusively associated with the horse. 
The stark contrast between the horse as a combat weapon and the car as a transport 
vehicle began to blur. Perhaps sensing this trend, Patton immediately sought to de-
emphasize the glorious moment of the motorcar and insisted that the combat use of the 
automobile was simply a matter of continuation of the great horse tradition.
65 But the 
well-publicized shift from muscle to motor combat appeared in newspaper headlines, 
and the indispensability of the horse in military combat functions became less 
definitive. The motorcar’s features, after all, were not radically different from what 
soldiers expected of a trained military horse. Horses had been trained to be 
machinelike in disposition in order to survive the rigors of war.
66 As discussed earlier, 
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the performance of exceptional warhorses had always been machinelike in the face of 
danger.  
However, the cavalry maintained a stark disassociation between muscle and 
motor power. The War Department’s higher-ranking officers, sympathetic to the long 
tradition of horse culture in the military, ruled against complete motorization in the 
1920s by officially citing the lack of cross-country capability in motorcars as a 
significant limitation.
67 Modern warfare, many argued, was still a war of mobility. In a 
war of mobility, the horse was considered irreplaceable.  
Military work came to be defined in terms of tasks associated with the horse 
such as cross-country movements. Battlefields encompassed varied terrain. Thus 
reconnaissance work had to be conducted principally in cross-country terrain in order 
to prevent detection. In defining war by where it was fought rather than by how, one 
could argue that horses were the only sensible means by which soldiers could carry 
out their daily work. As Patton aptly phrased it: 
True, there are a limited number of gasoline neophytes who, while admitting 
the impossibility of using machines in such country, avoid the issue by the 
happy statement that, in future, wars will not take place in that sort of country. 
The futility of such evasions seems almost too flagrant to merit remark.
68 
The argument for the survival of the horse became a matter of discrediting the 
motorcar, the reverse of what happened with the horseless carriage, discussed in Case 
One, in which the horse was discredited. The style of contention, however, was 
strikingly similar. In this case, it was the motorcar that failed to meet the physical 
                                                 
67 Cary, “The Use of the Motor Vehicle in the United States Army,” 133–136. See also Johnson, Fast 
Tanks and Heavy Bombers, 56. 
68 Major George S. Patton, “Motorization and Mechanization in the Cavalry,” The Cavalry Journal 39, 
no. 160 (July 1930): 333.  
166 
standards set by the horse. Patton described how “obstacles that appear trifling to a 
well-mounted Cavalryman often put serious handicap upon machines.”
69  
Motorcars could not function at night, in the fog, in storms, or in deep snow. 
Neither could they traverse mud and water as well as horses could. A cavalry captain 
stated categorically that “horses could explore portions of the terrain impracticable for 
motors.”
70 Enemies would be alerted by the noise of an oncoming motorcar, which, in 
addition, would leave behind tire marks that could easily be traced. Patton argued that 
“without gasoline, machines are junk,” and thus without this “priceless liquid,” the 
mobility of soldiers would be seriously undermined, resulting in a situation “far more 
fatal than enemy fire.”
71  
Horses, on the other hand, could eat anywhere and whenever possible, whereas 
gasoline might not be readily found. The motorcar could not replicate the qualities and 
acquired wartime experience the horse had provided the army for many years. For 
these reasons, the motorcar was not the equivalent of the horse. A major claimed that 
many wars had been fought without mechanical transport but that no wars had yet 
been fought without horses.
72 Another captain of the cavalry argued similarly: “The 
horse was first an animal of war, and it is inconceivable that war will ever be waged 
without him.”
73 As late as 1939, the last Chief of Cavalry testified before a 
congressional committee that the horse had “stood the acid test of war” while the 
motorcar had not.
74 
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Despite the German mechanized force attack in WWI, Patton, who was a 
lieutenant colonel commanding the 304
th Tank Brigade in 1918 in France,
75 stated, “A 
general survey of the tactical tendencies at the close of the World War seems to point 
to greater, and not lessened, usefulness and importance for cavalry.”
76 The same 
argument was used by a cavalryman who insisted that modern warfare enhanced the 
cavalry’s strength: “It has been said that the development of scientific and mechanical 
weapons renders the cavalry useless. On the contrary, these weapons give the cavalry 
an added efficiency.”
77 These modern weapons, it was argued, could be easily 
incorporated into mounted attacks, although how such attacks could be carried out in 
modernized warfare without significant casualties remained unclear.  
Nevertheless, a captain stated, “War is a conflict between elements of flesh and 
blood, and inanimate armament is but a means by which it may be more successfully 
waged.”
78 Fundamental to these arguments was the privileged position of the cavalry 
and the sanctity of the horse, regardless of technological changes occurring in the 
outside world. The cavalry toward the end of the 1920s became increasingly resolute, 
arguing a line of thought that demanded absolute conviction—almost a leap of faith—
at a time when valid arguments had been advanced regarding the questionable value of 
the horse in modern warfare.  
An article attributed to “one of the faithful” stated, “As cavalrymen, we must 
have faith in the cavalry service, and we must have a doctrine which will allow other 
branches to see how well we keep the faith. To the cavalry itself, that faith must be 
sacred.”
79 Faith thus meant unquestionable acceptance of the status quo: its tradition, 
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leadership, combat strategy, and most of all, the inseparability of the horse from the 
cavalry.  
This nearly religious position, in an organization that prided itself on having 
sentiment only upon the “execution of a plan drawn in cold reason,”
80 required 
cavalrymen to ignore the impending changes brought about by modern warfare. A 
colonel stated it differently: “Every great general of the war has expressed his belief in 
the future brilliant role of cavalry. It is only the lesser individuals who refuse to be 
informed, close their eyes and choose to doubt.”
 81 Hence anyone who chose to 
critically examine the viability of the cavalry in modern war was described as ignorant 
and uninformed and was considered an outsider. 
Adna Chaffee, often referred to as the “father of American armor,” who began 
his campaign for mechanization in 1927, had been told by the President of the War 
College to be “visionary and crazy” when he delivered a lecture calling for greater use 
of advances made in the automotive industry for military purposes.
82 Patton argued, 
however, that the incorporation of machines would only condemn the army to 
“disaster and defeat.”
83 Again according to Patton, 
Regardless of the progress made in the development of fighting machines, 
Cavalry will always be necessary. It will hold its own because no other agency 
can perform Cavalry duties with equal reliability and dispatch. It can operate 
effectively in woods and mountains where machines cannot go; it can swim 
streams that would stop machines; and whether its supply trains come through 
or not, it can carry on day and night under any conditions of roads and weather. 
To expect mechanical vehicles—impotent without regular supplies, blind and 
deaf to control, and restricted by terrain—to take over these duties, is to expect 
the impossible.
84  
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For Patton, there was no substitute for the horse. Perhaps similar to the 
argument of scholars on artificial intelligence, Patton pointed to the inability of the 
motorcar to match, item for item, each of the horse’s capabilities. Thus Major General 
Williard A. Holbrook, Chief of Cavalry, recommended that if the cavalry were to 
motorize as required under the 1920 Defense Act,
 85 it be for the purpose of enhancing 
the capabilities of horses, not supplanting them.
86 It is conceivable that Holbrook’s 
approach was a concession for the purpose of containing the influence of the motorcar 
within the cavalry. The succeeding Chief of Cavalry, Major General Herbert B. 
Crosby, also used the same tack, suggesting in 1928 that machines should be used to 
supplement horses.
87  
However, the initial reconciliatory move of the Chiefs of Cavalry to 
incorporate motorization came to a halt when MacArthur, as Chief of Staff in 1931, 
sought to institute a sweeping change to a modernized army.
88 In a written statement 
released by the War Department on May 18, 1931, MacArthur stated,  
Thus there has grown up in the public mind a very natural conception that 
Cavalry must include the horse. Modern firearms have eliminated the horse as 
a weapon, and as a means of transportation he has become, next to the 
dismounted man, the slowest means of transportation.
89 
MacArthur’s mandate was in line with the growing trend toward motorization, which 
began with President Woodrow Wilson’s comments about war. Wilson, quoted by 
Major General George Van Horn Moseley in a Cavalry Journal article, hinted at the 
obsolete style of boldness and bravery in cavalry battles. “Modern wars are not won 
by mere numbers. They are not won by mere enthusiasm. They are not won by mere 
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national spirit. They are won by the scientific conduct of war, the scientific application 
of industrial forces.”
90 This emphasis on “scientific application” over the traditional 
values of patriotism and courage was a direct hit to the idealized but nonetheless 
fundamental values of the cavalry’s fighting principle and the cavalryman’s identity as 
a soldier.   
One of the initial but symbolic moves to modernize the cavalry in the 1930s 
was to de-emphasize the importance of the horse in war and to emphasize the role of 
modern weaponry. For instance, the pack the horse carried containing firepower and 
ammunition was touted to be more vital than the horse. A colonel said unequivocally 
that the pack was now the most important element in a cavalier’s outfit:  
It requires no study to see at once that the pack element of the command is of 
the greatest importance in all cavalry operations. It includes the bulk of the fire 
power with its ammunition, the signal communications, demolitions and 
messing facilities. Without its packs Cavalry would be reduced to 
approximately the power it had at the end of the Civil War and would be out of 
place in modern combat.
91 
The pack, a lifeless material, now superseded the horse in importance. Some 
officers were even of the opinion that without the machine gun in the pack, the horse 
would be rendered useless on the battlefield.
92 While the 1914 cavalry manual’s 
fighting philosophy—an attitude that held throughout much of the 1920s—placed 
modern weapons in a supportive role for mounted troops, the new emphasis on 
modernization in the 1930s placed firepower at the center of its combat strategy. 
Mounted troops came to be only as important as the packs they carried.  
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Horses, in this view, were no longer as critical as the mobility they provided. 
The cavalry kept its integrity as a combat arm only insofar as it was geared with the 
appropriate amount of firepower. Indeed, a brigadier general stated in 1940, “With the 
increasing efficiency of hand firearms and their consequent increasing use, the horse 
soldier more and more found that his usefulness on the battlefield was limited.”
93 Thus 
it appeared that in order to survive, the cavalry had to begin seriously considering 
military life without the horse. A lieutenant stated: 
Our Cavalry is instinctively hostile to any machine which may supplant the 
horse, and inclined to disparage its effect. We are retreating to mountain trails 
and thick woods, hoping that no fast tank can follow. Our policy, on the 
contrary, should be to encourage the new arm, experiment with it, and bring 
out its characteristics, both favorable and unfavorable, since the place of the 
new arm in the army team, its missions and tactics, are far closer to those of 
Cavalry than they are to any other arm. The cavalryman is best able to 
understand its potentialities. It is improbable that a machine will ever be 
invented that is more efficient for all military purposes than the horse. But 
whether our cavalry divisions are completely mechanized or not, cavalry 
missions and cavalry tactics will remain, and the mechanized force will act in 
conjunction with the Cavalry.
94  
The cavalry lieutenant who wrote this piece recognized the strengths and 
limitations of machines in serving military needs but nevertheless promoted their use. 
Similar to MacArthur, he sought to redefine the cavalry in terms of its mission and 
tactics rather than the means by which it went to war. As a cavalry colonel observed, 
We are living in a machine age and to be modern, Cavalry must take every 
advantage of the machines this age places at its disposal. This the Cavalry has 
done, and will do, more and more as these mechanical auxiliaries are 
developed and proved of value.
95  
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Under MacArthur, the 1st Cavalry, the oldest and most respected regiment, was 
ordered to dismount and to begin experimenting with motorization and mechanization. 
This mandate was taken as a signal of the increasing expansion of mechanical 
auxiliaries in the cavalry. With the move to disengage the horse from the cavalry, a 
search for what now defined the cavalry began. 
Major General Guy V. Henry, Chief of Cavalry in 1932, articulated the crisis 
in the cavalry’s organizational identity, asking, “If the cavalry is less important today 
than it has been in the past, of what are we speaking?” “No one knows,” he said, “for 
there is no standardized conception of cavalry.”
96 In opening up the definition of 
cavalry to something non-definitive, Henry disengaged its traditional identification 
with the horse and launched the search for a new meaning.  
Cavalries in other countries faced similar pressures. Germany posed the same 
question, seeking to define “what modern cavalry looks like, what it does and what 
can be required of it.”
97 In more pessimistic terms, a French cavalier asked, “Will 
there be room for cavalry missions in the war of tomorrow?”
98 Italy’s policy after 
WWI had also been to move away from using horses.
99 The proud, long tradition of 
the cavalry and its elite status seem unsustainable without the horse. 
“Breeding” a Motorcar: Conceptual Origins 
The Chief of Cavalry, Guy Henry, was asked point blank in a 1937 
congressional hearing, “Is the horse obsolete?” Instead of answering the question 
directly, Henry responded with another question, “Can the modern iron horse supplant 
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the animal horse?”
100 Henry reframed motorization, not as a phasing out of the horse, 
but as a transfer of capabilities from a biological to an iron form. The cavalry, despite 
its continued display of defiance, recognized the need to find ways to preserve equine 
tradition in the midst of an increasingly mechanized world. Similar to the discourse 
regarding motor power mimicking muscle power in the civilian setting, military 
conversations about motorcars articulated in terms of horses appear to have provided 
the initial means to open the doors to motorization.   
As early as the 1920s, an ex-cavalryman, in praise of the horse, made a parallel 
between the circulating water system of the motorcar and the bloodstream of the 
horse. He also compared the motor’s radiator to the horse’s lungs: 
Let us make a comparison between the horse and the motor. When the motor is 
working, heat is rapidly developed. When the temperature exceeds a certain 
degree, the efficiency of the motor is lessened, if it does not cease to function 
altogether. To accomplish the liberation of heat, most motors are provided with 
a circulating water system and a radiator. The water circulating through the 
heated working parts takes up the heat, or a portion of it, and carries it to the 
radiator, where it is liberated. The radiator is so constructed as to expose a 
maximum surface to the air. If this surface be appreciably reduced, the cooling 
out is retarded. In the horse, the blood stream and the lungs can be compared 
roughly to the water system and the radiator of the motor. The blood 
circulating through the working parts—the muscles—takes up toxins and heat 
and carries them to the lungs, where they are given off through expiration.
101 
This simple example of a one-to-one correspondence between muscle and motor 
power shows conceptual associations occurring around the time when the cavalry was 
most adamantly against motorization. The description of the motorcar’s cooling 
system, phrased in terms of the horse’s biological workings, provides a conceptual 
link between mechanical and biological functions. The horse was described as 
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releasing heat to the air through expiration while the motorcar used the surface of the 
radiator to accomplish the same purpose. Although the motorcar was considered 
operationally inferior to the horse, there was, nevertheless, an effort to compare the 
two on similar grounds.  
Another discourse regarding the motorcar, again phrased in terms of the 
superiority of the horse, relates to the need to “breed” an “iron horse” specifically 
designed for battle.
 102 A colonel described how the cavalry should delineate the 
requirements needed for combat cars rather than make do with commercially designed 
vehicles:  
Therefore, in this day of the “Iron Horses” for use on cavalry missions we 
should fix our types and demand breeding (i.e. speed, correct design, and 
equipment) and insist upon these requisites. To adopt a policy for taking any 
cheap ill-bred scrub iron horse obtainable in quantity on the streets of the 
nation is certain to greatly reduce the effectiveness of mechanized cavalry units 
in the performance of their missions. It is a makeshift poorly planned 
procedure.
 103 
The colonel sought to apply fundamental principles of horse breeding to the 
designs of an ideal cavalry car. He rejected the idea of making do with commercial 
cars. “The cavalry knows by practical tests that such commercial vehicles do not meet 
all cavalry needs by any means.”
104 Modified commercial cars, he argued, were 
“fundamentally unsound,” and their supporters “display[ed] an ignorance of cavalry 
experimentation to date.”
105 Despite the derision of the motorcar, conceptual links 
were being established and comparisons made. Hence, criteria for an ideal cavalry car 
started to creep into the thoughts of cavalry. 
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Many military authorities indicated that commercial cars, particularly the Ford 
Model T, were too light and fragile for combat.
106 On the other hand, large, ponderous 
vehicles, such as those used in WWI from the Four Wheel Drive Auto Company of 
Clintonville, Wisconsin, stood out, and made an easy target for enemy fire.
107 The 
American Minneapolis-Moline truck with four-wheel drive was sturdy but sank in soft 
ground.
108 The standard Chevrolet two-wheel-drive passenger car, which had been 
tested by the military since the 1920s, was lightweight but did not perform well in 
cross-country terrain.
109 Marmon-Harrington’s 1930s four-wheel-drive truck was 
similarly ineffective because it was too heavy for reconnaissance missions and too 
hefty for quick maneuvers on the battlefield.
110 
The problem with these commercial vehicles was that one desirable feature 
conflicted with another. The power, performance and durability of four-wheel drive, 
for instance, conflicted with the need for light weight and agility on the battlefield. A 
cavalry major summarized the dilemma: “It is the combination of all desirable features 
which presents a problem.”
111 He recounted that many cavalry officers wanted a 
sturdy machine that could traverse gullies, stumps, rocks, and carry various items of 
equipment and artillery, while at the same time, they “[didn’t] want one of these big, 
expensive monstrosities such as the present scout or combat car.”
112 In other words, 
they wanted something that performed like what they were used to and which was an 
equivalent of the horse.  
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Patton expressed the same sentiments: “But, to be useful in any of the above 
capacities, the car must be mobile, practical, and simple to repair—not a costly, 
hypothetical monstrosity.”
113 Patton was describing the light tanks that the cavalry 
acquired from the infantry, which had been initially solely responsible for them as a 
result of the 1920 Defense Act.
114 When the cavalry also assumed responsibility for 
light tanks in 1931 under the directives of Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur, 
they renamed them “combat cars” to distinguish their tanks from the infantry, but 
essentially they were the same tanks 
115 (Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1. Early Cavalry Cars. 
Source: Colonel Bruce Palmer, “Mechanized Cavalry in the Second Army Maneuvers,”  
The Cavalry Journal 45, no. 6 (November–December 1936): 462. 
Thus given the need to balance robustness, speed, and mobility in the field, a 
balance these combat cars by virtue of their sheer size certainly could not provide, 
Major Grow stated, “Decisions must be made as to the relative importance of several 
contradictory factors.”
116 He recommended giving mobility the highest importance in 
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the list of requirements. In this regard, the horse still remained unrivaled, most 
particularly in cross-country capability. Commercial vehicles could not fully satisfy 
this requirement. This was not because of a lack of available technological know-how 
but, as the cavalry major stated, because of the difficulty of combining various 
technical specifications into one artifact, much like the way the horse provides 
significant strength and power relative to its weight.  
One can argue that much of the opposition to the motorcar at this time rested 
upon its significantly inferior combat-related functionality relative to the horse. The 
fastest car would not necessarily be desirable for military use, because speed would 
compromise the vehicle’s sturdiness. A sturdy machine, on the other hand, would 
weigh more, compromising speed and agility on the battlefield. Deciding at what level 
of weight, power, and performance these specifications should be set in order not to 
counteract, but rather to complement, each other resulted in much discussion in the 
Cavalry Journal. 
Specifications for a Cavalry Car: The Iron Horse in Conceptual Form 
Because modified commercial vehicles could not satisfy the needs of the 
cavalry, many articles were written in the 1930s on the technical specifications of an 
ideal cavalry car. It is interesting that these articles consistently reiterated the same 
message: the cavalry car had to be lightweight, rugged, and have good visibility with 
cross-country capability—very much the description of an animal warhorse. The 
demand was not for the fastest, strongest, nor the most heavily armed vehicle. 
As early as 1930, a lieutenant colonel began the dialogue in The Cavalry 
Journal on possibly entertaining the idea of replacing the horse: 
The development of motor driven vehicles has progressed far enough to make 
it possible for us, without undue strain on the imagination, to visualize a  
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machine capable of maneuver and attack across nearly all types of terrain at a 
speed of from ten to sixty miles an hour.
117  
First Lieutenant H. G. Hamilton, Cavalry-Reserve, provided a comprehensive 
list of specifications in a 1935 article: 
It would appear that to fulfill the requirements of Cavalry, any type of machine 
used for reconnaissance should have extreme mobility, be of rugged yet light 
construction, possess an extended cruising radius, and be able to operate over 
cross-country terrain as well as on established roads.
118 
The three general specifications Lieut. Hamilton lists capture the essence of what 
would later become known as the jeep: (1) it had to be inexpensive and easily 
produced so that in an emergency, such as a state of war, an ordinary commercial 
chassis could be easily converted into a wartime vehicle; (2) it had to be designed 
essentially as a reconnaissance car, whose defensive measures were speed and 
concealment rather than heavy armor; and finally, (3) it must be able to traverse cross-
country terrain at uniform speed.
119 Phrased differently, it had to be “speedy, easily 
concealed amid trees, brush, or in small ravines, and capable of carrying a crew of 
from one to four men, depending on the mission.”
120  
Major Grow described a vehicle of a “cavalry nature” similar to Hamilton’s 
but sought to explain the inseparability of mobility from the cavalry’s identity. 
“Mobility is the paramount characteristic for cavalry. Mobility alone cannot win the 
battle but without mobility our unit would cease to be a cavalry.
”121 This statement 
could easily have come out of the 1914 Cavalry Service Regulations except that the 
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horse would now be in iron form. Major Grow argued that protection, while important, 
would not be as critical as speed, for speed would allow the necessary offensive 
attacks to destroy the enemy first.
122  
Cavalry operations are comparable to open field running in football. Tacklers 
are likely to spring up from anywhere, flank or rear. Personnel in moving 
vehicles are rather helpless against surprise fire. Unlike the man on foot, they 
cannot drop to the ground instantly. They cannot even take rapid advantage of 
local cover usually available to the mounted man…. Protection, however, must 
never predominate over mobility and fire power if we expect to carry out 
cavalry missions. Our real protection consists in striking the enemy first. Our 
objective must be to “Hit the other fellow before he hits you.”
123  
Indeed, the bold offensive attacks prescribed in the 1914 cavalry manual, in which 
protection meant being an elusive target rather than wearing heavy armor, began to 
make sense. As Patton indicated, “Men who fought in tanks would willingly dispense 
with 50 percent of protection in order to gain 5 percent of mobility.”
124  
A colonel described the ideal cavalry car as having technical specifications 
similar to those Hamilton described: “cars should be light-weight, cross-country type 
with low visibility to the enemy—but with visibility open to the sky for the crew, and 
minimum armor.”
125 Another cavalry general phrased it differently, but with the same 
emphasis on the importance of balancing mobility, weight, fighting power, protection, 
and stability.
126 Too much weight meant sacrificing mobility. As Patton observed, 
buttressed by his wartime experience with tanks, every ounce of extra weight would 
greatly reduce the machine’s fighting capability.
127 Thus, virtually all articles written 
on the ideal cavalry car insisted upon two consistent features—mobility and light 
weight. 
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The insistent emphasis on the importance of mobility could be found in the 
many objections to the motorcar’s dissimilarity to the horse. What disqualified the 
machine was precisely the shining feature of the horse—its ability to cross various 
types of terrain: 
Vehicular reconnaissance alone will never be able to give the commander all 
the definite information required. It must be gathered either by men on 
horseback or men on foot and, considering varied terrain and the time element, 
horsed cavalry must be available.
128 
The arguments for the use of the horse and the technical specifications for the 
ideal cavalry car basically mirror each other. The emphasis on cross-country capability 
and the light weight requirements fit the description of a horse. The horse could easily 
be manhandled in various environments and was, at the same time, sturdy enough to 
withstand the pressures of war. It needed to be able to gear up immediately for high 
speed but also to be robust enough to traverse rough terrain. These were precisely the 
requirements converted commercial cars purportedly failed to meet. Thus the failure 
of such vehicles to serve military needs became the justification for keeping the horse.   
In creating this ideal cavalry car, the War Department assigned the task of 
specifying the technical requirements to the offices of the Chief of Cavalry, the 
Cavalry School, the Cavalry Board, and the First Cavalry (Mechanized). The Chief of 
Ordnance was also assigned to the task, and it was the only non-cavalry office in the 
team. The Ordnance Department was experienced in utilizing the services of civilians 
in scientific matters and maintained close relations with industries during the interwar 
years.
129 These offices were ordered to devote their “utmost thought and attention” to 
crafting a car suitable for the practical use of the cavalry.
130  
                                                 
128 “Necessity for Horsed Cavalry under Modern Conditions,” May–June 1937, 251. 
129 Major-General William Crozier, Ordnance and the World War (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1920), 290. 
130 Scott, “Progress in Cavalry Mechanization: Scout Car Developments,” July–August 1936, 281.  
181 
Breeding the Warhorse 
The Chief of the Cavalry, together with the Chief of Infantry, submitted to the 
Secretary of War on July 2, 1940, the technical requirements for a 4X4 quarter-ton 
prototype: maximum weight of 1,275 pounds, maximum wheelbase of 80 inches, and 
overall height of 40 inches.
131 By engineering standards, the weight requirement made 
no mechanical sense, according to Karl Probst, the engineer who designed the 
prototype. By the time all the military options were added, the weight of the vehicle 
would reach 2,000 pounds.
132 While it was a mechanical impossibility to fulfill the 
military’s list of requirements, it was not a physical impossibility. 
While no direct written evidence could be found which explicitly states that the 
military used the actual physical attributes of the Percheron as a template, there were 
nonetheless numerous articles in the Cavalry Journal indicating the intent to create the 
mechanical equivalent of a warhorse. The striking resemblance between the technical 
specifications of the prototype and the physical attributes of the animal horse brings to 
mind the discourses on the “breeding” of a motorcar and the urgent need to preserve 
military life built around the horse. 
The weight limit of 1,275 pounds,
133 for instance, roughly equals the average 
weight of a light Percheron.
134 The 40-inch height of the prototype is about the 
average height of shrubberies found in and around the eastern US, which means that 
the prototype was intended to hide behind bushes to avoid enemy fire.
135 With the 
windshield up, the height of the prototype is 64 inches, or 16 hands in equine terms, 
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exactly the height of an average Percheron. The 80-inch wheelbase, the distance 
between the front and the back wheel, is exactly the average body length of a 
Percheron.
 136  
Indeed, even if it were a mere coincidence that the technical specifications of 
the iron horse closely map onto the physical characteristics of an animal horse, a 
homegrown military device developed in the late 1930s by Major Robert Howie and 
Master Sergeant Melvin C. Wiley provides evidence of the failure of an “unhorselike” 
concept despite fully satisfying the cavalry’s list of functional requirements. The 
official name of the Belly Flopper was the “Howie machine-gun carrier,” although it 
quickly earned the name “Belly Flopper”
137 because of the need to maintain a prone 
position while driving it and the jarring one felt from its lack of suspension, which 
seems to contradict the imagery conjured by its inventors as gliding like a “snake in 
the grass.”
138 Although the “Belly Flopper” has been accorded by the military equal 
importance with the jeep prototype,
139 it never captured the imagination of soldiers; it 
was not even tested under real battlefield conditions (Figure 3.2)
140  
Thus it may be possible that ingrained practices built around the horse failed to 
be carried out by an object envisioned as a different animal despite fulfilling in paper 
all the functionalities explicitly articulated by the military. What the Belly Flopper did 
contribute, however, was its chassis, which came from the British Austin Seven 
automobile.
141 It was the technical expertise of its franchise, the American Bantam, 
which provided the prototype for what became the widely recognized replacement of 
the horse. 
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Figure 3.2. Belly Flopper. 
Source: T. Richards, Military Jeeps, 1941–45 (Brooklands Road & Track Series. Bloomfield, NJ; 
Cobham, Surry: Portrayal Press; Distributed by Brooklands Book Distribution, 1985), 6. 
Feminine Origins of the Jeep  
The original idea for the Austin Seven was born of the need to create a vehicle 
designed for women just learning to drive.
142 The adaptability, maneuverability, and 
lightness of its handling account for the emphasis on its light weight. The Austin 
Seven was launched at the time of the British Roads Act of 1921, a law that taxed 
every automobile based on its horsepower.
143 The Austin originally weighed just over 
700 pounds, with an overall length of 104 inches, width of 40 inches, and maximum 
speed of 50 mph when fully loaded.
144 The small, durable Austin Seven could seat two 
adults in the front and a few small children in the back, or one adult sitting 
sideways,
145 although it could—and often did—carry four adults.
146 It was considered 
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a remarkable engineering achievement and was a huge commercial success in 
England, but failed miserably in the United States.  
In a desperate move to save the American Bantam Car Company, the sole 
licensed manufacturer of the Austin Seven, Roy Evans, a well-respected automobile 
dealer, took ownership of the company in 1932 and faced an oversupply of 1,500 
unfinished cars, with the entire production facility at a standstill.
147 After years of 
trying to revive the fledgling company, Evans approached the military in 1939, which 
at that time was experimenting with small, highly maneuverable utility cars such as 
the Belly Flopper. He provided the Pennsylvania National Guard with three Bantams 
for testing as scout cars, and the rest, as they say, is history.
148  
The Pennsylvania National Guard was impressed with the performance of the 
Austins, and the following year, the military invited various manufacturers to bid on 
creating a prototype of a scout car made to military specifications. Of the 135 
manufacturers the military invited, only two replied: American Bantam and Willys-
Overland Motors, Inc. The American Bantam Car Company won the bid, promising to 
complete a pilot model within the specified forty-nine day period, a deadline large 
manufacturers decided they could not meet. With the exception of the weight 
requirement, Karl Probst of the Bantam Car Company, hired as an independent 
contractor, fulfilled all of the military’s specifications and—with the help of Bantam’s 
factory manager and Detroit’s auto parts suppliers—delivered the prototype on 
time.
149  
Approximately one month later, the Bantam Reconnaissance Command, 40 
horsepower, known as the BRC 40, passed the military’s grueling prototype tests in 
Maryland, witnessed by major manufacturers such as Ford, Chrysler, General Motors, 
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and Willys-Overland, who took notes on the Bantam’s design. The Bantam was driven 
through mud two feet deep, over hills and various other types of terrain (Figures 3.3–
3.5), and a cavalry general even ordered two men to see if they could lift it out of a 
ditch.
150 The weight requirement was added to ensure that the prototype could be 
manhandled easily like a horse.  
 
Figure 3.3. Testing the Bantam. 
Source: Karl K. Probst with Charles O. Probst, “One Summer in Butler—Bantam Builds the 
Jeep,” Automobile Quarterly 14, no. 4 (1976): 434. 
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Figure 3.4. The Bantam in the Mud. 
Source: Karl K. Probst with Charles O. Probst, “One Summer in Butler—Bantam Builds the 
Jeep,” Automobile Quarterly 14, no. 4 (1976): 435. 
 
Figure 3.5. The Bantam over the Hills. 
Source: Karl K. Probst with Charles O. Probst, “One Summer in Butler—Bantam Builds the 
Jeep,” Automobile Quarterly 14, no. 4 (1976): 437.  
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After the Bantam passed the required vehicle tests, the head of the inspection 
team, Major Lawes, announced his verdict: 
I have driven every unit the services have purchased for the last twenty years. I 
can judge them in fifteen minutes. This vehicle is going to be absolutely 
outstanding. I believe this unit will make history.
151 
A lieutenant described the reaction of the 6th Cavalry, which was given eight Bantam 
cars for testing. 
Within the short span of the past four months, the entire Army has become 
Bantam conscious. The novelty of these small cars has captured the fancy of 
all the arms and bids fair to effect major changes in our ideas on cross-country 
mobility.
152 
The Bantam tested weighed 2,200 pounds, far more than the 1,275 pounds of the 
original specifications. However, the cavalry found that the Bantam was able to 
perform all tasks typically expected of a horse and dubbed it the new “Iron Pony.”
153  
Several months earlier, the commanding officer of the 6th Cavalry had 
personally subjected the Bantams to “every conceivable test. From sticking them in 
mud holes to towing a 37-mm. gun,” and the iron pony proved able to perform 
satisfactorily in these tests.
154 The 6th Cavalry later tested the eight Bantams more 
extensively, using the plan outlined by their commanding officer. They found that the 
Bantam, like the horse, could operate cross-country with a gun in tow.
155 A lieutenant 
described in detail the performance of the Bantams: 
The field tests themselves consisted of putting the car through mud and water, 
over rough ground, through brush, up and down banks, and over every adverse 
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type of ground a vehicle could be expected to traverse—and over a good many 
that no other type could traverse. Through these tests, it has been proved, 
beyond any reasonable doubt, that these little cars can and will do far more 
than even the manufacturers expected…. It has also been noticed that in the 
case of the Bantam, more than in any other, its ability to get out of tough spots 
is predicated directly on the boldness and ability of the driver.
156 
Two goals measured by the test reflected what was foremost in the minds of 
the cavalry officers: the ability to traverse cross-country terrain and the importance of 
the driver’s boldness in getting “out of tough spots.” The emphasis on the driver’s role 
in exhibiting boldness certainly harked back to Civil War days, when wars were 
deemed to depend upon dramatic exhibitions of offensive maneuvers by the cavalry. 
With the use of the Bantam, mechanized war was no longer simply a matter of 
operating machines; boldness in men was also perceived to play a central role in the 
use of the little cars, just like the principle of leading described in the 1914 cavalry 
manual. 
The 6th Cavalry test was also primarily organizational and functional in 
character, with a verdict that there was “no doubt in the minds” of the members of the 
regiment, including the commanding officer, that the little Bantam fulfilled the 
requirements of an ideal cavalry car.
157 However, it was the 6th Cavalry that a year 
earlier had been described by a staff correspondent as most adamant about keeping the 
horse. The 6th Cavalry believed that “there is no medium which exists that excels the 
mounted trooper for cross country mobility under all conditions.”
158 In other words, 
they believed the horse to be irreplaceable, but the field tests of the little motorcar 
convinced them to change their hard-line position:  
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1.  Reconnaissance. “The Bantam upon receiving fire, upon observing the enemy, 
or upon catching sight of a physical road block darts quickly under cover off 
the road.”
159 This ability to hide from the enemy but to maintain visibility 
satisfied the requirements of the cavalry in conducting reconnaissance missions. 
As mentioned by a major in the early 1930s, ideal cavalry cars should have 
“low visibility to the enemy—but with visibility open to the sky for the 
crew.”
160 The Bantam tested well in these types of situations. It was also 
deemed light enough to move across weak bridges but sturdy enough to 
reconnoiter on back trails.
161  
 
2.  Noise Factor. The Bantam moved quickly and quietly.
162 One of the main 
contentions about early motorcars, including motorcycles, was that their noise 
alerted enemies. Bantam cars on the roads were described to be “practically 
without noise.”
163 
 
3.  Supply. The Bantam could “certainly prove to be a life-saver” in transporting 
supplies, rations, gasoline, machine guns, and ammunition over difficult 
terrain, according to the examiners.
164 It was able to carry radios and other 
communications equipment, such as signal lamps and flags.
165 
 
The cavalry also continued to modify and improve the Bantam to better suit its 
needs, for example, affixing iron rails over the headlights for protection, but the 
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overall result was overwhelming acceptance of the vehicle by users.
166 The vehicle 
eventually produced in mass quantities by Willys and Ford did not radically differ 
from Bantam’s prototype or, for that matter, from the original specifications issued by 
the military, except perhaps for its weight.  
Based on the US War Department’s technical manual, 1/4-Ton 4 X 4 Truck 
(Willys-Overland Model MB and Ford Model GPW), the jeep that went into final 
production did not significantly deviate from its original specifications, apart from a 
dramatic increase in weight and a slight increase in height with the windshield down 
(Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1. Comparison of Original and Production Specifications. 
Vehicle Specifications  Original Specifications  Willys MB/Ford GPW* 
Performance  Four-wheel drive  Four-wheel drive 
Weight  1275 lb  2453 lb 
Payload    600 lb    800 lb 
Wheelbase      80 inches      80 inches 
Height 
    - top up  
  - top down 
 
    64 inches 
    36 inches 
 
   69.75inches 
    52 inches 
Ground Clearance         6.5 inches        8.75 inches 
* From The Complete WW2 Military Jeep Manual (Hong Kong: Brooklands Books, Ltd., n.d.). 
Co-opting Horse Infrastructure 
The infrastructure for teaching horsemanship also began to be taken over by 
the new iron pony. The Cavalry School began offering motor classes soon after the 
Bantam passed the cavalry’s rigorous field tests. A major observed, “The Cavalry 
School, heart of the Cavalry service, opened a motor school, where under the central 
control and with the ablest personnel obtainable, motor specialists [were] trained.”
167 
It would have been inconceivable in the 1920s for such an arrangement to occur. 
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However, with the materialization of the jeep, the horse infrastructure began to serve 
motor purposes in the early 1940s: driver maintenance, preventive maintenance, 
repairs, overhaul and rebuilding were taught.
168  
Using the facilities of the Cavalry School, automotive education became part 
of cavalry curriculum. Automotive maintenance and repair were taught alongside 
horsemanship. No longer was motor power segregated from muscle power, as was the 
case during the 1920s. The procurement process, unlike the 1930s decentralized 
approach, became the provenance of one entity, the Ordnance Department. More 
important, the work routines of horse maintenance and care in the cavalry continued 
with automotive maintenance and repair.  
By 1943, the Cavalry School included a Department of Motors, which was 
divided into five sections: Department Headquarters, Supply Sections, Automotive 
Section, Special Classes Section, and Tank Section. The Headquarters and Supply 
Sections taught supervision, administration, and supply, while the Automotive Section 
taught all matters concerning wheeled vehicles. The Special Classes Section 
conducted all motor instruction, primarily for officers. The Tank Section was 
responsible for teaching the mechanical functioning, operation, and maintenance of all 
cavalry-type vehicles; hence the Bantam was most likely covered under this section.
169 
In addition, the Cavalry Replacement Training School (CRTC) trained mechanics 
specializing in repair and maintenance (Figures 3.6–3.7). 
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Figure 3.6. Military Mechanics in Training. 
Source: “Training Mechanics at C.R.T.C.,”  
The Cavalry Journal 52, no. 2 (March–April 1943), 76. 
Training in the use of motorcars for combat was also placed at Fort Knox, 
Kentucky,
170 a traditional training ground for cavalry horses. Basic formations of the 
mechanized cavalry, such as the line, column, and echelon, closely resembled those of 
the horsed cavalry. Techniques of scouting and patrolling also remained the same as 
their horsed counterparts. Each crewman was responsible for his own vehicle, in much 
the same way a traditionally equipped cavalryman was expected to care for his own 
horse.  
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Figure 3.7. Bantams in the Cavalry School. 
Source: “The Cavalry School of 1943,” The Cavalry Journal 52, no. 1  
(January–February, 1943): 89. 
The conventional infantryman, by contrast, was used to looking after himself only. 
Routines of maintenance and care in the infantry were nonexistent, which the cavalry 
never failed to point out whenever it sought to control the armored or mechanized 
forces.
171 
The repair and maintenance of motorcars became centralized through the 
Quartermaster Corps. The strict performance specifications of the Bantam necessitated 
standardization in supply parts for efficient maintenance and repairs,
172 similar to the 
way standardization of horse behaviors was effected through intelligent training.
173 
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During the postwar years, the Quartermaster Corps worked closely with the 
automotive industry, attending important transportation conferences to influence the 
development of designs and inventions.
174 The Quartermaster Corps was responsible 
for maintaining auto parts, although some responsibilities regarding technical matters 
overlapped with those of the Ordnance Department, which also participated in 
administrative activities involving the creation of the iron pony. 
In terms of combat doctrines, tactics, scout techniques, patrolling, and basic 
formations, cavalry fundamentals remained unchanged. River crossings, for instance 
(Figure 3.8), were taught in horse and motor versions.  
 
Figure 3.8. Integrating Jeeps into the Cavalry Curriculum. 
Source: Lieutenants W. S. McCauley and R. M. Vance, “R.O.T.C. Graduates at the Cavalry 
School,” The Cavalry Journal 51, no. 5 (September–October 1942): 76. 
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With the Bantam it was at last possible, in the eyes of soldiers, to decouple the 
horse from the cavalry. Motorization was no longer perceived as a threat to the cavalry 
way of life. The cavalry was able to maintain mobility as a combat strategy, and the 
Bantam served as a platform upon which the traditional cavalry continued to exhibit 
aggressiveness and prompt action. The Bantam, lightweight with cross-country 
capability, provided functionalities similar to those of the horse, which earlier, 
commercial versions of the motorcar had been unable to replicate. 
The presence of the horse came to be expressed through the “iron pony,” 
which allowed the cavalry to maintain its combat identity of mobility and boldness. 
The many objections to the motorcar, which mirrored the arguments for keeping the 
horse, had been specifically addressed in the technical specifications and performance 
requirements of the Bantam. Motorization no longer required a redefinition of the 
cavalry’s core identity as a combat arm. The sustainability and rapid diffusion of the 
Bantam, soon to be called the jeep,
175 may be partly explained by its having taken over 
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a well-institutionalized infrastructure revolving around the horse; it may also be partly 
explained by the ease with which soldiers transferred practices related to animal 
warhorses into this new iron form. 
Witnessing the Warhorse in Action: The Jeep in World War II 
Indeed, the jeep in WWII was declared the replacement for the horse.
176 The 
jeep was described by army men as a “blitz buggy,” which could “scramble over 
rough country better than a horse.”
177 Many other commercial motorcars, such as the 
famous Model T, and even homegrown army machines such as the Belly Flopper, 
failed to captivate the army’s imagination. What made the jeep compelling? 
The jeep’s popularity among soldiers in WWII can be partly attributed to its 
horse-like versatility. The jeep quickly replaced the horse in the more highly 
intensified combat environment. The acceptance of the jeep might not have been as 
immediate and widespread if its use had required fundamental changes in the soldier’s 
tactics, routines, and mobility. The new “warhorse” provided a platform on which the 
spirit of the cavalry could be carried out in modernized warfare. In fact, the GIs’ use 
of the jeep showed that the mechanical horse was able to carry out many of the daily 
tasks usually performed by the animal horse. This versatility made the jeep almost 
indispensable everywhere, and in this sense rendered it inseparable from the soldier.  
The traditional bond between cavalrymen and their horses was made manifest 
in the way GIs cared for their jeeps, that is, giving them names and personalities, and 
bestowing attention on them as if they were sentient beings. A sense of familiarity 
developed such that soldiers’ knowledge of their jeeps resembled the same level of 
familiarity typically found between cavalrymen and their horses. For instance, some 
cavalrymen, just by looking at a horse, would know if the horse was lame in the front 
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or back leg. Similarly, soldiers learned to know their jeeps inside out, to make Band-
Aid fixes and patch-up repairs in order to cure their jeeps of damage and mechanical 
problems. The speed with which soldiers became skilled in using jeeps in various 
theatres of war indicates a seamless transfer of preexisting practices from the horse 
culture.   
The Jeep Goes to War: The Jeep Raid as a Cavalry Raid 
One of the early applications of the jeep occurred in North Africa with David 
Stirling, whose conception of desert raiders followed the basic principles of cavalry 
warfare in which shock and mobility were the key elements of an attack. Stirling’s 
jeep raids blew up pipelines, attacked airfields, destroyed transport and fuel tankers, 
and essentially inflicted mayhem on German general Erwin Rommel, known as the 
“Desert Fox.” As Rommel described the situation, “These Commandos, working from 
Kufra, and the Qattara depression, sometimes operated right up into Cyrenaica, where 
they caused considerable havoc and seriously disquieted the Italians”
178 (see Figure 
3.9).  
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Figure 3.9. Stirling’s Raiding Areas. 
Source: Modified map version of Arthur Swinson, The Raiders: Desert Strike Force  
(New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1968), 88–89. 
In a single week, Stirling’s highly trained 21-man team destroyed 61 planes 
and at least 30 vehicles without suffering any significant casualties.
179 Stirling’s jeep 
raid, though unconventional for the English army,
180 resembled a cavalry-style attack 
as described in the 1914 Cavalry Service Regulations manual:  
The object of a raid, in the general case, is to strike the hostile army in the 
arteries upon which it depends for the flow of ammunition, reenforcements, 
food and supplies of all kinds indispensable to its efficiency.
181 
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The most spectacular example of this type of raid in Stirling’s portfolio was conducted 
in July 1942. The target was the airfield in Sidi Haneish, located on the Egyptian 
coastline less than a hundred miles west of El Alamein. This airfield was Rommel’s 
major staging area, where planes constantly arrived at and departed from North Africa. 
Thus, it was perpetually full of aircraft, including badly needed transport carriers.  
The Jeep-Cavalry Formation 
Eighteen jeeps took part in the Sidi Haneish raid. The jeeps formed a double-
line column which advanced between two rows of planes with their guns firing 
outwards. One column of jeeps would destroy one row of planes. Stirling would lead 
the group, driving at the tip of the arrowhead, with the navigator right behind him. 
Stirling diagrammed his jeep formation as follows (Figure 3.10):  
 
Figure 3.10. Attack Formation. 
Source: Basic diagram from Virginia Cowles, The Phantom Major: the Story of David Stirling 
and His Desert Command (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1958).  
Modifications by Imes Chiu. Technical illustration by Jackie Sherman.  
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The “jeep raid” formation Stirling popularized bore a striking resemblance to 
the two-column habitual formation illustrated in the Cavalry Drill Regulations manual 
of 1916.
182 The typical double-column formation of a cavalry also placed its senior 
noncommissioned officer at the arrowhead leading the two columns about three yards 
ahead of the group. A two-yard distance was typically maintained between two 
cavalry columns (Figure 3.11).
183  
 
Figure 3.11. 1916 Two-Column Cavalry Formation. 
Source: Detail from Cavalry Drill Regulations, 1916 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1917), 198. 
According to Stirling’s plan, the jeeps would be about five yards apart. All 
jeeps, except for that of the navigator, would be equipped with a driver and two 
gunners; each gunner would handle two Vickers guns, each of which was capable of 
firing a thousand rounds per minute. The first gunner would be in front with the two 
guns mounted before the driver, while the other gunner would be in the back handling 
the other two guns.  
The jeeps kept in perfect formation during the attack, circled around, and hit 
other planes on the outskirts of the field. Moments later, the jeeps disappeared into the 
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dark desert before the Germans could respond. Each jeep took a different path toward 
a common rendezvous point. The Sidi Hanesh raid destroyed or damaged about 40 
German aircraft and several tents and station buildings.
184 Stirling’s spectacular jeep 
raid bore the qualities of a successful cavalry raid.  
The command must move rapidly and secretly. As a raiding force has no 
communications it is free to move in any direction. It should avoid serious 
combat except when necessary to accomplish its object or cut its way out. As 
far as possible, the enemy should be kept in ignorance of the position of the 
main body of the raiding force and of its destination and object of attack, and 
efforts should be made to deceive him as to future movements, especially as to 
the route of return.
185 
The similarity between the desert raiders’ attack strategy and traditional 
cavalry warfare strategy, including the striking resemblance of the jeep raid formation 
to the cavalry’s habitual two-column formation, shows that Stirling’s approach was 
not completely new in concept, although it has often been presented as such. The jeep 
certainly proved its cross-country capability in the trackless deserts of North Africa. In 
fact, while no direct relation has been established, Willys-Overland, one of the two 
primary manufacturers of the jeep, called its primary model in the 1940s the “Phantom 
MB,” which correlated interestingly with Stirling’s sensational use of the jeep in North 
Africa.  
The Jeep: An All-American Wonder 
The jeep was celebrated as “the most universally popular vehicle in the war; it 
was the one the Germans most liked to capture for day-to-day use.”
186 General Dwight 
D. Eisenhower stated that senior officers considered the bulldozer, the jeep, the 2 1/2-
ton truck, and the C-47 airplane as equipment vital to their success in Africa and 
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Europe.
187 General George C. Marshall considered the jeep the greatest contribution of 
the United States to modern warfare, while General Courtney Hodges described it as 
the “most useful motor vehicle we’ve ever had.”
188 Ernie Pyle, the famous war 
correspondent embedded in the front lines, stated it differently: “Good Lord, I do not 
think we could continue the war without the jeep. It does everything. It goes 
everywhere…. The jeep is a divine instrument of wartime locomotion.”
189  
The jeep’s versatility was immediately recognized during the war, even by 
Axis troops, who were known to capture jeeps whenever possible. The jeep’s 
numerous applications included the following: ambulance to haul wounded men from 
the front lines, as it worked better than a regular ambulance because of its low 
silhouette; ground weapon, particularly when mounted with machine guns, because of 
its maneuverability and mobility on the battlefield; weapons carrier; smoke-screen 
spreader, because of its ability to sprint across various terrain; plow for digging 
ditches to lay underground cables; tow truck to move smashed planes from bomb-
pocked airfields; portable power-plant for aircraft searchlights; mobile dump truck to 
fix airfields; field radio car; field telephone exchange; mobile antiaircraft unit; fuel 
and water supply car; fire fighting unit; mobile air compressor, snow plow; railroad 
car when mounted with steel wheels, with the ability to pull as much as 52 tons of 
cargo; a converted altar used by priests to conduct mass.
190  
The versatility of the jeep endeared it even to those not on the front lines. 
Similar to the way horses had been used across a wide spectrum of social classes, the 
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jeep was associated with people from all ranks and walks of life; from lowly 
infantrymen to various high-ranking dignitaries, such as presidents and prime 
ministers like Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill; royalty such as King George 
and Queen Elizabeth; high-ranking military officers, such as various commanders-in-
chief and generals; and even Hollywood celebrities.
191 The fervent horse advocate 
General George S. Patton had a 1944 Ford Jeep custom-made to his liking.
192 One 
general who spent a significant amount of time on the front lines had been known to 
ride in a jeep for five to eight hours a day, insisting that, just like the Model T, the jeep 
was good for the liver.
193  
The “Four Jills in a Jeep” project, later turned into a film, further popularized 
the jeep. The War Department commissioned four female actresses to tour England, 
Ireland, and Africa in a jeep to perform for the troops.
194 General Marshall commented 
that this group of four entertainers was a huge success. Marshall suggested that in the 
future, perhaps two entertainers could be sent to front lines, and specifically 
mentioned transporting them to various ground units using “a single jeep.”
195 In many 
ways, the jeep served as a social equalizer because no matter what station in life 
people came from, they liked being seen riding in a jeep. However, the best known 
companion of the jeep was the American GI.   
The GI and the Jeep 
The motorized divisions of the United States Army in WWII were designed to 
be a hybrid of armored and infantry divisions, which, among other motorized vehicles 
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such as tanks and modern weaponry, included jeeps.
196 Numerous stories about the 
inseparability of the GI from his jeep proliferated during the war. In a frequently cited 
and possibly apocryphal story related to the jeep, a watchman, usually identified as a 
Frenchman, was guarding his post at night when he suddenly heard a group of soldiers 
approaching on foot. He propped his machine gun to position and asked them to 
identify themselves. One of the members of the group replied that they were 
Americans. Without a moment’s hesitation, the guard shot them all to death.  
Later, the dead men were identified as German infiltration troops disguised in 
American uniforms. When asked how he knew they were Germans, the watchman 
replied triumphantly, “That’s easy! Americans, they come in jeeps!”
197 This story has 
been recounted in many different versions in a wide range of popular books written 
about the jeep. The inseparability of the GI from his jeep was reminiscent of the 
inseparability of the cavalryman from his horse. 
The jeep has been described as such a constant companion of the GI that the 
identity of the American soldier became inseparable from the jeep,
198 similar to the 
way the cavalryman was inextricably associated with the horse. This emotional 
attachment has been depicted in many different GI stories, particularly along the lines 
of soldiers crying over their shot-up jeeps and simply refusing to accept a 
replacement.
199 Similar to the way the horse became inextricable from the cavalryman 
and the cavalry as a whole, the jeep came to represent America and the American 
soldier. One of the classic images of WWII is the cartoon by Bill Mauldin of an old-
time cavalryman shooting his broken-down jeep as one would shoot a dying horse 
(Figure 3.12).  
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Figure 3.12. Cartoon. 
Source: Bill Mauldin, Up Front (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1946), 114.  
Copyright 1942 by Bill Mauldin. Reprinted courtesy of the William Mauldin Estate.  
This scene resembled a story by Ernie Pyle, who recounted a sergeant named 
Buck, a cowboy from Missouri Valley, Iowa, who loved animals. When Buck saw a  
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mule crying in pain because of a bad shell wound, he took his .45 and put a bullet 
through the mule’s head and said, “I wouldn’t have shot him except he was hurtin’ 
so.”
200   
Another form of emotional expression came in the form of assurances, as a 
soldier confessed in WWII, that when new supplies of the “inevitable jeeps” would 
arrive together with other supplies, the soldiers felt more secure.
201 Jeeps brought new 
supplies of water and C-rations
202 in Africa every night.
203 Jeeps also brought the 
much-awaited mail from home.
204 The attachment of the GIs to their jeeps was such 
that they began to give them proper names. Bill Mauldin, a decorated war hero 
himself, referred to his jeep as a person with its own personality and idiosyncrasies: 
Two hundred miles is a long way for a jeep, even such a jeep as my pampered 
and well-manicured “Jeanie,” who had covered more than ten thousand miles 
of Anzio, Italy, and France. The ordnance people called her the most neurotic 
jeep in Europe. But they cleaned out the carbon, ground the valves, and 
adjusted the carburetor. In spite of all this tender care, Jeanie developed 
ignition trouble on the way north and I had to stop every few miles in a 
pouring rain and get out and get under. After the first one hundred miles I was 
very glad that mud had obliterated the name “Jeanie” on the jeep’s sides 
because I was swearing at the car in a way that would have crisped her 
namesake’s lovely ears.
205   
Ernie Pyle wrote that it was customary throughout the army for soldiers to 
paint names on their vehicles. These were often girls’ names, such as Suzy,
206 but 
some jeeps were called “Hitler’s Menace” or “Invasion Blues,” and one was named 
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“Bientot,” which means “soon” in French.
207 Ernie Pyle observed that although many 
soldiers, even marines, might be killers, they were also “just as sentimental as 
anybody else.”
208 
Such was the intimacy shared by soldiers with their jeeps that, just as 
cavalrymen were expected to know their horses well, GIs were expected to know their 
jeeps thoroughly and to take good care of them. Ernie Pyle once recounted how a 
sergeant stopped a jeep in which Pyle was a passenger to ask the driver some 
questions. As he turned around to walk back to his own jeep, he ordered the driver to 
get his spare tire fixed, exclaiming, “Goddammit, why don’t you take care of your 
vehicle?” “Spare tire?” replied the driver. “Yes, goddammit,” the sergeant roared. “It’s 
flat.”  
While the sergeant was talking to the driver, he discovered the flat tire merely 
by feeling it with the slight pressure of his hand.
209 This level of knowledge about the 
jeep echoed the level of familiarity that was expected of cavalrymen with regard to 
their horses.
210 Many soldiers did take meticulous pride in their jeeps and some kept 
them, as Ernie Pyle said, “as neat as a pin.”
211 
Indeed, as a film on the history of the jeep described it, “The average soldier 
forged a bond with their motorized horses.”
212 The jeep design of the early models 
resembled that of a horse; it had no doors, no locks, and the ignition key was just a 
simple switch.
213 Thus a soldier would just hop in his jeep and go, as one would mount 
a horse, and take off.  
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The jeep was described as able to “scramble over rough country better than a 
horse. Cross streams. Climb rocky terrain. Beat down barbed wire entanglements. 
Dodge through forests. Hit more than 60 miles an hour on any solid road.”
214 The jeep 
mirrored the description of an “iron horse” in the cavalry’s imagination: 
“Iron horses” must be handy, able to turn and reverse in narrow lanes and other 
small spaces, and to negotiate obstacles; they must be capable of accelerating 
quickly, as well as moving fast, and must possess the quality of reliability.
215 
Indeed, the jeep in actual combat conditions had become inseparable from American 
GIs, whose close bond with their mechanical horses had come to resemble those with 
“flesh and blood.” With the jeep, mobility as a combat strategy became associated 
with a mechanical medium. 
Conclusion 
The jeep resurrected through mechanical means the spirit of the horse and the 
cavalry. Even in a hierarchical setting such as the military, the implementation of a 
new technological mechanism required persuasive measures that could not be 
achieved by authoritarian mandates alone. The jeep came to represent the final effort 
of the cavalry to preserve its cultural and military heritage. In trying to maintain the 
integrity of its organization after years of warding off pressures to motorize, the 
cavalry found a way to continue through mechanical means what had been its 
foundation—the horse.  
Motorization framed in terms of equine sensibilities moved the motorcar in the 
1920s into a more central role in the 1930s. Polarization within the cavalry with regard 
to motorization began to dissolve as meanings associated with the horse gradually 
became represented in the motorcar. The striking accuracy of many cavalry officers’ 
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descriptions of a successful replacement for the horse attests to the conceptualization 
of the jeep as something driven by practice rather than by technical considerations 
alone. The practices of cavalry-style leading, attacks on the enemy, and raids—
essentially, the critical role of speed and mobility—drove discussions of an ideal car 
whose materialization came in the form of the jeep.  
The jeep came to serve as the iron warhorse that allowed the cavalry to 
preserve its combat strategy of speed and mobility and its identity as a protector of 
other combat arms.
216 The cavalry specifically “bred” a motorcar designed to mimic 
the horse. Tested and proven to work like a horse, the jeep rapidly diffused, assuming 
existing infrastructures and relations built around the horse. While the immediate 
diffusion of the jeep could be largely attributed to its “breeding,” the embeddedness of 
the jeep in the battlefield emerged seamlessly as users transferred practices from an 
animal into an iron form. 
While the first case study showed how manufacturers generated the need for a 
mechanical horse through advertisements, this second case study examined how users 
crafted a mechanical horse in an effort to preserve their military tactics and traditions 
in an increasingly modernizing world. In both cases, organizational survival was at 
stake. In the first case, manufacturers had to win over horsemen in order to breathe life 
into their nascent automotive industry. In the second case, the cavalry had to fight for 
its place in the military amidst an increasingly modernized world; as a result, it had to 
protect its combat strategies, which were built around the use of the horse.  
Thus, in both case studies, the horse was instrumental in the diffusion of the 
motorcar. For manufacturers, the animal horse was a means to an end. Manufacturers 
had to breed an automotive industry by stealing market share from the horse industry; 
thus, the concept of the horse was used to promote acceptance of the motorcar. For the 
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cavalryman, the horse was an end in itself—the use of a physical equivalent of the 
horse was used to preserve its concept. The cavalry had to breed a horselike machine 
to perpetuate its military heritage and identity. The motorcar in these two cases began 
at the periphery but eventually diffused at a rapid rate as a result of its association with 
the horse.  
After the war, the jeep as a WWII army surplus vehicle in the Philippines 
evolved into a custom-built, elaborately ornamented passenger vehicle that came to be 
called the jeepney. The jeepney eventually took over and expanded the Philippine 
transportation system, which originally relied upon the horse. The jeepney has 
provided cheap and convenient transport to the Philippines masses. The final case of 
this three-part study will examine the diffusion of the jeep in this new, localized form.  
211 
Chapter Four 
Case Three: Domesticating the Jeep: The Philippines 
The jeep was designed to allow the cavalry to maintain mobility and speed at 
the core of its combat strategy. The image of the cavalry persisted throughout WWII 
despite the dramatic decrease in the use of the horse; the jeep immortalized the cavalry 
through mechanical means. Even today, any highly mobile army unit that uses 
transport, such as light armor or helicopters, has been designated as “cavalry.” The 
social and military values of the cavalry shaped the form and functionality of the jeep.  
In this chapter, I will examine a similar phenomenon of the shaping of the jeep 
conducted in an entirely different setting, the Philippines after WWII. The jeep began 
as a peripheral object in the Philippines in two ways: first, it was a military object 
from a different country, and second, it was mechanical transport. Similar to the 
horseless carriage days at the turn of the century in the United States, the Philippines 
at the advent of WWII relied largely on muscle power. How did the jeep, an alien 
product in the eyes of the Filipinos, attain universal appeal in an environment so 
foreign to its origins?  
The domestication of the jeep in the Philippines constitutes a third case study 
in understanding the transition from muscle to motor power. In order to gain an 
understanding of the jeep as a foreign mechanical object that attained ubiquity, it is 
important to get a sense of the contrast between the artifact and its environment, and 
how they eventually fit together.  
I will use historical accounts from American expatriates to describe the context 
of the Philippines upon the arrival of the jeep. Many historical records were destroyed 
during the war, and thus accounts of everyday Filipino life tend to be documented by  
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foreigners.
1 While the perspectives of expatriates might be considered biased, the 
Americans arrived with informed eyes that had seen wars in other countries. Accounts 
of expatriates who had lived in the Philippines for many years express a fondness for 
the country, and their reminiscences sometimes sound like those of local residents.  
These perspectives allow for an account that simultaneously highlights the 
peculiarities and familiarities of the Philippines relative to the US; after all, the jeep is 
a product of the West. Photographs, paintings, and observations from these travelers 
capture nuances that a local person might take for granted. The extensive four-volume 
Philippine Commission Report in 1900–1901, with transcripts of interviews conducted 
by the American delegates with key local leaders, proved to be a useful primary source 
in gleaning a sense of the state of roads, infrastructure, culture, and practices prior to 
the arrival of American influence. 
Since the localized jeep known as the jeepney continues to be used today, I 
have also examined contemporary accounts and reflections of a local literary scholar, 
Emmanuel Torres, known for articulating the sentiments of the general public as well 
as those of some of the more marginal social groups in Philippine society. He 
specifically looked at the origins of the jeepney and discussed the mind-set of jeepney 
drivers during the vehicle’s heyday in the 1970s. I have supplemented this account 
with phone interviews conducted in the Ilocano and Tagalog (Filipino) dialects with 
fifteen jeepney drivers currently working in the Philippines. They have worked in 
Manila as well as in various rural areas in Luzon, the northern island group of the 
Philippines. These drivers provide insights into current thinking about the jeepney and 
its slow descent into obsolescence.  
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While conducting interviews on the phone may seem less effective than face-
to-face interviews, in this case, phone interviews had certain advantages. When 
jeepney drivers were approached with a tape recorder or a survey questionnaire, they 
tended to shy away.
2 Many of them were uncomfortable with having to read and write. 
Tape recorders were particularly unnerving because of the long history of suppression 
of freedom of speech during the thirty-year Marcos regime. The phone interview 
setting allowed drivers to be more at ease and also prevented the problem of onlookers 
flocking around an interview setting.  
Finally, I have traced the life stories of the pioneers and original manufacturers 
of the jeepney using accounts and interviews conducted by various Philippine 
magazine writers. The original manufacturers of the jeepney are deceased, and in the 
absence of books and other primary source materials on the topic, magazines provide 
an alternative resource. These magazines target middle class readers and, hence, 
provide a reasonable approximation of the types of issues and concerns that dominate 
mainstream thinking. Some of the articles were published transcripts of interviews.   
In this chapter, I will show how the jeep’s endurance can be attributed once 
again to its role as a mechanical surrogate for the horse. While the previous chapters 
discussed why the jeep assumed its particular form and functionality, this chapter 
focuses on how the jeep attained its universal appeal in the Philippines. The jeep 
evolved into a custom-built, elaborately ornamented passenger vehicle that continues 
to provide cheap and convenient transport to the Philippine masses today. I argue that 
the equine legacy of the Philippines in many ways paved the way for the ease with 
which a localized jeep was integrated into its socioeconomic setting.  
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Surplus Jeeps 
After the war, the jeep’s evolution took various interesting turns. The jeeps that 
had been used in Allied countries were prevented from being brought back to the 
United States. Various American manufacturers petitioned the US government to keep 
the market from being flooded with wartime surplus goods. Willys-Overland, the sole 
manufacturer of jeeps by 1945, argued that returning the jeeps to the US would hurt 
post-war businesses, making it difficult to generate jobs for returning GIs.
3 
Additionally, Willys testified before the US House of Representatives that jeeps were 
designed for battle and, thus, for safety reasons, would need to be professionally 
modified by the manufacturers for civilian use.  
Consequently, most wartime jeeps were kept from being brought back to the 
United States and from being sold to the US general public. What happened to the 
surplus jeeps left in Allied countries, however, was another matter. In the interest of 
developing markets outside the US for spare parts and other downstream supply 
businesses, jeeps were left behind. The supposed concern for civilian safety in using a 
military designed vehicle became a superfluous issue.  
The jeep in the Philippines became what the locals call a “jeepney”—a term 
perhaps derived from “jitney,” the five-cent fare auto that started in Los Angeles in 
1914,
4 although this association was not mentioned in any widely-cited literature on 
the jeepney. The jeepney replaced the calesa, the horse-drawn carriage used for public 
transport before the war. The stripped-down jeep was easily localized into an 
elaborately ornamented passenger vehicle used largely by the masses.  
The immediate adoption of the jeep could be argued to be a necessary result of 
postwar conditions when it began to displace the prewar role of the horse in public 
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transport. While the lack of transport could be argued to be a motivating factor in the 
rapidity of the diffusion of the Philippine jeepney, its look and feel could not be 
explained by necessity alone, particularly its strong association with the horse. 
The Horse Legacy 
A working Philippine cavalry appears to have existed as early as 1898. The 
Philippine cavalry put up strong resistance to the Americans as part of a four-year 
insurrection for independence
5 following the American seizure of the Philippines 
during the Spanish-American War. No US cavalry was assigned in the Philippines in 
1898, but on March 2, 1899, Congress ratified three additional cavalry units, two of 
which were organized in the Philippines: one squadron composed of Americans then 
in the Philippines and the other composed entirely of Filipinos.
6  
The Philippine cavalry unit under American supervision was perhaps 
organized as a countermeasure against resistance forces. On April 23, 1899, the 
American cavalry under Major James Franklin Bell suffered a major defeat and heavy 
casualties, including the death of Colonel John M. Stotsenberg, at the hands of 
Filipino hero General Gregorio del Pilar.
7 The preliminary report of the Philippine 
Commission to the President of the United States on November 2, 1899, expressed 
grave concern about the Filipino resistance: 
The insurgents were insolent to our guards and made persistent and continuous 
efforts to push them back and advance the insurgent lines farther into the city 
of Manila. It was a long and trying period of insult and abuse heaped upon our 
soldiers, with constant submission as the only means of avoiding an open 
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rupture. […] Rumors were always prevalent that our army will be attacked at 
once.
8  
When the former chief of the northern province of the Philippines, Senor 
Angel Lopez, testified before the committee earlier that year on May 8, his repeated 
assurances of holding no insurgents
9 in his area indicate the issue to be of vital 
concern to the colonizers.
10 The committee was composed of President Shurman (in 
the chair), Admiral Dewey, Colonel Denby, and Professor Worcester, commissioners, 
and Mr. John R. MacArthur, secretary. The following is an excerpt of the inquiry 
between Shurman and Lopez: 
Q. How do the people of Union and Ilocos [one of the nothern provinces in 
Luzon] stand at the present time; how are they affected toward the Americans 
and toward the insurrectos? 
 
A. In Vigan [capital city of Ilocos Sur] there is no insurrection; there are 
Philippine troops, but they are not insurgent troops. 
 
Q. Where do those troops come from?  
 
A. They are from Vigan itself; they are recruits, new troops, reserves.
11 
However, it was not just the troops that interested the committee. Worcester 
asked Lopez:  
Q. Is gold found in the sand or in the rocks?  
 
A. In the forests and in the mountains, in the rocks.  
 
Q. Are there wild people in the mountains?  
 
A. No.  
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Q. Can one travel on horseback through this province during those rains? 
 
A. Well, even in time of rain you can travel on horseback or in a calesa or a 
carriage. They have got good roads.
12  
Lopez’s testimony regarding the condition of Philippine roads in 1899 
indicates a well-developed infrastructure even in rural areas. Lopez mentioned that 
even when it rained for one week continuously, the roads were passable
13 (Figure 4.1). 
Horses were an integral part of Filipino daily life, such that efforts were made to 
create good roads purposely designed to withstand heavy monsoon rains. Horses were 
used to haul timber for building schools and houses
14 and to haul sheaves of rice.
15 
The major means of transport also used what looks like a local version of a horse 
buggy (see Figures 4.2–4.4). 
 
Figure 4.1. Flooded Manila Street. 
Source: Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, vol. 3  
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1901), Plate 16. 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 75. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1901), 
27. 
15 Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, vol. 3 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1901), 
40.  
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A   
B   
Figure 4.2. Horse-Drawn Carriages in the Philippines. 
(A) Source: Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, vol. 3  
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1901), Plate 45. 
(B) Source: Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, vol. 3 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1901), Plate 46.  
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A   
B   
Figure 4.3. Pony-Drawn Carts. 
(A) Source: Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, vol. 3  
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1901), Plate 44. 
(B) Source: Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, vol. 3 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1901), Plate 47.  
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A   
B   
Figure 4.4. Philippine Horses at Work. 
(A) Source: Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, vol. 3  
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1901), Plate 6. 
(B) Source: “Public Works and Edifices,” Paper No. 11,  
Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, vol. 4  
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1901), Plate 3.  
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The yearly horse shows in Manila prior to WWII were popular and well respected, 
even among American cavalry officers. The Philippine horse tradition permeated 
Filipino life such that Philippine folklore and legends featured a horse creature that 
haunts travelers.  
Tikbalang, a reverse-centaur with a horse head and a human body, dominates 
many Philippine folklore stories. He is known to sit and smoke a pipe on top of large 
trees, virtually unseen except for the smoke rising out of the trees. The tikbalang has 
the power to change shape and preys on travelers, especially at night, by giving false 
directions and getting them lost in the forest. Adults have been known to use tikbalang 
stories to frighten children from straying far from home and to ensure their return 
home by nightfall. Whereas horses have been known to find their way home, the 
tikbalang is the reverse of what the horse symbolizes in everyday life, a creature that 
disorients people and keeps them away from their homes. 
Indeed, horses were an entrenched part of everyday life when the Americans 
came to the Philippines. When WWII began, the Philippine transportation system still 
largely depended on horses. It is interesting, however, that although the jeep became a 
ubiquitous transport in the form of the jeepney, it was never adopted as a farm 
implement, just as horses were never adopted in the Philippines for farm use.  
Despite a largely agricultural economy, farm applications of the jeep never 
materialized. Filipinos used water buffaloes, not horses, to till the land. The pre-
existing practice of using horses largely for transport continued during the years prior 
to the arrival of the jeep. Thus one could argue that pre-existing practices associated 
with the use of horses for farm applications did not exist; hence the jeep, being a 
mechanical equivalent of the horse, was also not used in agriculture. At the same time, 
it is also likely that the high water level in rice paddies rendered the water buffalo a 
more effective farm animal than the horse.  
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WWII in Manila  
When James Bertram Reuter came to the Philippines as a Jesuit scholar in 
1938, he observed, “Manila was quiet. Caratellas: more caratellas than cars.”
16 
“Caratellas,” properly spelled in Spanish as “caretellas,” and “karitelas” in the 
vernacular language, is the local term for horse-drawn carriages. However, a more 
popular term currently used would be “calesa,” although carromata (Spanish version) 
or Karomata (local term) has been used, particularly in the Ilocano dialect in the 
northern provinces of the Philippines. Transportation in Manila, even in the late 1930s, 
had not changed much from 1901 (Figure 4.5); however, the peace and quiet Reuter 
noted in Manila along with its bucolic carriages soon changed as WWII ensued. 
 
Figure 4.5. Manila in 1900. 
Source: Report of the Philippine Commission to the President, 1900, vol. 3  
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1901), Plate 10. 
While the Philippines appeared to have had fairly robust roads by the turn of 
the century, the Japanese occupation destroyed much of the transportation 
                                                 
16 Joseph P. McCallus, American Exiles in the Philippines, 1941–1996 (Quezon City, Philippines: New 
Day Publishers, 1999), 42.  
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infrastructure. The Japanese halted virtually all economic activities in the Philippines. 
The number of work animals decreased significantly. The Japanese confiscated all 
horses, cars, trucks, and other means of transportation.
17 Toward the end of the war, 
highways and roads were virtually unusable. Edward Woolbright, an American 
entrepreneur, described the state of roads and highways in one of the cities in the 
southern islands of the Philippines in late October 1944: 
See the Army was there… hundreds and hundreds of trucks and all kinds of 
vehicles… tanks…bulldozers. All of them up and down the roads… The roads 
were just muck. You couldn’t even walk down the roads… [we had to go] in a 
jeep. Mudholes two or three feet deep in the town and all.
18 
When Manila, the capital of the Philippines, emerged from the war, mudholes 
were not the only problem. After massive bombing by American forces, burned bodies 
and large pieces of debris from buildings were strewn everywhere. Herbert Zipper, a 
Viennese composer and conductor who had arrived in the Philippines in 1939, 
described the remains of the war: 
We were in Manila when liberation came, when bombs and shells tore the city 
apart but again set it free. We saw Manila in flames. We walked through the 
miles of scorched earth, through districts where a few days before homes, 
schools, churches and hospitals stood. We saw the ugly grimaces of war: 
unsupported walls, marble stairs leading nowhere, bathtubs and toilets as if 
suspended in mid-air, trees and shrubs charred by fire. And we smelled the 
stench of war. No one knows how many thousands of Manila’s people perished 
in February 1945, their putrefied bodies unburied, strewn over dozens of 
square miles.
19 
Zipper went on to describe Manila as lacking in any “amenities of civilized life” after 
seeing the luxury and sophistication of a European-looking city destroyed.
20 There 
                                                 
17 Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, 400. 
18 McCallus, American Exiles in the Philippines, 1941–1996, 63. 
19 Trudl Dubsky Zipper and Herbert Zipper, Manila 1944–45: As Trudl Saw It (Santa Monica: 
Crossroads School, 1994), 11. 
20 Ibid.  
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was no water, food, electricity, gas, telephone, or transportation system. An American 
historian described how Japanese soldiers hid in Manila and burned most of the 
infrastructure: 
Perhaps the foe had thought to set one in Manila, for fires like those that ruined 
old Moscow in Napoleon’s day broke out everywhere, and in the older sections 
Japanese soldiers fought to the last from house to house and block to block, 
while on Corregidor our paratroopers had to burn and slaughter the adversary 
out of his hide-outs one by one. It was a bloody, ghastly business and took a 
long time, the greater part of February, to clean Manila.
21 
Paul D. Perrine, an American GI who stayed in the Philippines after the war, 
confirmed this account, and described the devastation in Manila not only in terms of 
destroyed buildings but also in terms of the desolation permeating the city.  
The Japanese burned several buildings and killed an estimated 100,000 
civilians. Many were also killed by the U.S. military and bombing, as the 
fighting took place in heavily populated residential neighborhoods. So it was a 
sad, deplorable sight that greeted us, as we were able to look around after it 
was liberated. The city was actually liberated; we were able to get in and look 
around. I believe General Eisenhower visited here shortly after the end of 
World War II, and he said that of all the cities that he had seen, he thought that 
this was the second most destroyed city, next to Warsaw.
22 
A picture that appeared in the Cavalry Journal in 1945 showed a glimpse of the 
devastation in Manila (Figure 4.6). 
                                                 
21 Walter Phelps Hall, Iron Out of Calvary: an Interpretative History of the Second World War (New 
York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1946), 352. 
22 McCallus, American Exiles in the Philippines, 1941–1996, 66.  
225 
 
Figure 4.6. Manila in 1945. 
Source: “Cavalrymen Re-enter Manila,” The Cavalry Journal 54, no. 2 
(March–April 1945), 44. 
When Lyle A. K. Little arrived in Manila in early 1945 as part of MacArthur’s 
staff, he also made the comparison to Warsaw. He specifically described the 
devastation of the roads and transportation system, but noted the ingenuity of the 
people who scraped to make what he describes as “marvelous things with nothing.” 
When I arrived in Manila it was in absolute shambles, second only to Warsaw 
as the most devastated city in World War II. All the government buildings 
were in ruins. There was no electricity… The streetcars were wreckage and 
piled one on top of the other. It was a very, very depressing sight…There were 
a few cars on the streets. Paved streets were nonexistent. They had turned to 
gravel and mud and dust. But there were a few civilian cars operating, some of 
them with the clumsy old charcoal burners mounted on the outside rear of the 
cars, which made them look very grotesque. They were burning charcoal 
seeking to convert it to gas—not a recommended way. They were quite 
ingenious these people. For all their gauntness and privation and their lack of 
everything, they were ingenious at improvising and did marvelous things with 
nothing.
23 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 66–67.  
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This genius for improvising came into full flower with the local adaptation of surplus 
jeeps left in various military depots. Willys’ interest in controlling US jeep market 
prices, coupled with the appetite of American businesses for foreign trade, conspired 
to bar wartime jeeps from being returned to the US. Citizens in many Allied countries, 
confronted with a glut of surplus jeeps, had to figure out on their own what to do with 
this “unsafe” military machinery.  
The Auto Calesa: The Persistence of Practices  
The devastation of roads and highways, together with the confiscation of 
virtually all means of transport by the Japanese during their occupation of the 
Philippines, made the durable all-terrain vehicle a ready solution to the bomb-pocked 
roads. The rugged US army jeep instantly became a status symbol after the car-less 
years of the Japanese occupation. Civilians invited to ride in one of these US army 
jeeps felt, according to a foreign expatriate, “elegant and superior” in the midst of the 
rubble.
24 Thus the use of converted jeeps as passenger vehicles at this time had 
practical as well as symbolic appeal, although its panache emerged more from the dire 
conditions of a war-torn country in desperate need of virtually everything.  
On March 10, 1945,
 25 almost immediately after the liberation of Manila, the 
wartime jeep was officially declared a “passenger automobile” by the Philippine 
Motor Vehicle law instituted under Executive Order No. 34 enacted by the Senate and 
House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress.
26 At this time, a motor vehicle 
registered to carry more than ten passengers was considered a “passenger truck” rather 
than a “passenger automobile.”
27 Thus the jeep, a “passenger truck,” out of sheer 
                                                 
24 Zipper and Zipper, Manila 1944–45: As Trudl Saw It, 70. 
25 The last Japanese stronghold in Manila was eliminated on March 4, 1945. See Zipper and Zipper, 
Manila 1944–45: As Trudl Saw It, 54. 
26 Motor Vehicle Law (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1955), 51. 
27 Ibid., 51.  
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necessity emerged as an immediate solution to the problem of transportation. How the 
jeep was used and how it evolved, however, were far more complex.  
Trudl Dubsky Zipper, an expatriate artist, described the existence of a jeep-like 
“baby bus” with an Austin Seven chassis that was presumably the same Austin from 
which the jeep originated.
28 The “baby bus,” also referred to as an auto calesa, or AC 
(literally “automated horse-drawn carriage” but the term also plays on the AC as air-
conditioner because of its open body windows), closely resembled the jeep. She 
painted a watercolor depicting an AC, shown in Figure 4.8.  
This particular vehicle was described by the artist as having appeared in the 
1930s, well before the jeep was designed. Some auto calesas, according to the artist, 
were hidden well enough to escape the eyes of the Japanese. After the war, they 
emerged from hiding and were put to immediate use. I argue, however, that the artist 
was perhaps mistaken about the date. If auto calesa refers to the earlier Austin Seven 
rather than the military jeep, this would mean that any strong horse connection would 
be irrelevant in establishing mass appeal since the Austin Seven was not specifically 
designed with the horse in mind.   
However, the watercolor was painted in 1945. Most likely the auto calesa was 
none other than a converted jeep, which would account for its functional resemblance 
to the early calesas. The vehicle’s appearance in the watercolor resembles not the 
elaborate pre-jeep Austin Seven of the 1930s, which seated four people, but rather the 
versatile jeep that had been known to pull as much as 52 tons of cargo.   
Examining the watercolor, one can see that the number of passengers the AC 
was carrying—although probably exaggerated by the artist—was nonetheless far 
beyond the capacity of the Austin Seven. In addition, the design of the AC, with its 
                                                 
28 Zipper and Zipper, Manila 1944–45: As Trudl Saw It, 56.  
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grill guard in the front, resembled the jeep more than the elaborate Austin Seven 
models.     
These auto calesas likely evolved from the early jeeps that arrived in the 
Philippines at the beginning of the war, that is, at the beginning of the 1940s rather 
than in the 1930s.
29 The 26
th US Cavalry, also called the Philippine Scouts, together 
with tanks and scout cars, was already training in the Philippines at this time, several 
months before the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The Cavalry trained “with the idea in 
mind that it was actually at war.”
30    
Indeed, as early as July 26, 1941, George Marshall, in a secret letter to General 
Douglas MacArthur, established the Philippines as the Headquarters of the United 
States Armed Forces in the Far East,
31 later known as the USAFFE. It was the 26
th 
Cavalry Division that first fought the Japanese invasion force that landed on the coast 
of the Philippines on December 10, 1941.
32 The auto calesa referred to by the 
watercolor artist most likely came from one of these early regiments. 
Furthermore, the auto calesa was described as seating eight to ten people 
(although the artist admitted that the eight-to-ten capacity meant, in practice, a 
minimum of eight to ten, as is evident in the illustration), the exact benchmark 
established by the Philippine Motor Law of 1945 that specifically mentioned the jeep 
as a passenger vehicle. Indeed, a Filipino art critic and poet used the term “auto 
calesa” to refer specifically to converted surplus jeeps from which the jeepney 
originated: 
                                                 
29 These early jeeps were most likely left behind by the US in 1942 when it withdrew from the 
Philippines as Japanese forces swept the nation. 
30 Major Arthur K. Whitehead, “With the 26
th Cavalry (P.S.) in the Philippines,” The Cavalry Journal 
53, no. 3 (May–June, 1944), 34. 
31 The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland, asst. ed. Sharon R. Ritenour, asst. ed. 
Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 577. 
32 Janusz Piekalkiewicz, The Cavalry of World War II (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1980), 
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In a sense the jeepney is nothing new. It is really a motorized version of that 
once King of the Road, the horse-drawn calesa. In fact, as if to establish the 
connection, the early handcrafted short-body jeepney which seats no more than 
10 (three or four on each side of the main cab section, plus two up front beside 
the driver) is called Auto Calesa, or AC.
33 
Even later accounts of the auto calesa recognized it as none other than a basic wartime 
jeep, with no significant modifications to its passenger-carrying capacity. A writer 
described the early models of the jeepney as equivalent to the auto calesa.  
Because its first models were nothing more than motorized versions of the 
horse-drawn calesa, the small jeepneys which sat three or four people on each 
side were called AC or Auto Calesa. (This is probably the reason why most 
jeepneys carry miniaturized chrome equestrian figures on their hoods—to 
remind us of the hardy animals they have displaced.)
34 
The auto calesa came from an equine tradition where its use, not just its look, 
signified many aspects of the heritage of horse-drawn carriages. “Auto calesa” means 
automated horse-drawn carriage, a concept in which the horse remains integral, in 
contrast to the term “horseless carriage,” where the horse has been literally replaced 
by a motor. Thus the Philippine concept of a motorized vehicle maintained its horse 
element despite the demise of the physical presence of the horse.  
Even in practice, people used the auto calesa in a manner similar to a horse-
drawn calesa. The style of communal use found in the horse-drawn calesa, as 
represented in the 1945 watercolor, was replicated in the spirit of the motorized auto 
calesa. Observe the similarity in riding practices of the calesa versus auto calesa 
passengers (Figure 4.7 versus Figure 4.8). Note that these watercolors were drawn 
from similar side views by an expatriate who captured the distinctive practice of 
shared riding.  
                                                 
33 Emmanuel Torres, Jeepney (Quezon City, Philippines: GCF Books, 1979), 16. 
34 Anjie Blardony Ureta, “The Jeepney is Still ‘King of the Road,’” Philippine Free Press, October 12, 
1991, 38.  
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Figure 4.7. Kalesa. 
Source: “The Carretela,” by Trudl Dubsky Zipper. From Trudl Dubsky Zipper and Herbert 
Zipper, Manila 1944–45: As Trudl Saw It (Santa Monica: Crossroads School, 1994), 77. 
Reprinted with permission from the Crossroads School. 
 
Figure 4.8. Auto Calesa. 
Source: “Auto Calesa,” by Trudl Dubsky Zipper. From Trudl Dubsky Zipper and Herbert 
Zipper, Manila 1944–45: As Trudl Saw It (Santa Monica: Crossroads School, 1994), 59. 
Reprinted with permission from the Crossroads School.  
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As the watercolors illustrate, the way passengers rode in the auto calesa closely 
parallels the manner in which the original calesa was used. The sardine-packed 
communal seating of the calesa was simply transferred to the AC. The method of 
payment also followed the honor system of the horse-drawn calesa, by which 
passengers ride first and pay after.
35 Jeepneys later continued the tradition. 
When the rear of the AC was extended to accommodate a greater number of 
passengers, the commercialization of what would become known as the jeepney 
began. The transformation of the auto calesa into the jeepney was described as 
follows:  
It [auto calesa] differs from its later development, the assembly-plant type with 
body extended to accommodate more passengers, from 14 to 18, including the 
two up front, known as the Public Utility Jeepney, or PUJ.
36  
According to this writer, passenger capacity seems to determine the difference 
between an AC and a jeepney. Nevertheless, the practice of cramming in as many 
people and as much luggage as possible remained in force regardless of the means of 
transport. 
The sheer lack of basic necessities in the aftermath of war made the wartime 
surplus jeeps an attractive, immediate solution to the problem of transportation. The 
motivation of American businesses to develop foreign trade also encouraged the use of 
US-made machinery and goods. Eddie Woolbright, an American entrepreneur who 
arrived in the Philippines in 1944, described his opening of a spare parts store in the 
southern part of the Philippines: “We could do anything the Filipinos could do: we 
could buy, sell, put up a business. So it was a great life.”
 37 Parity rights were instituted 
in 1946 by the US as a condition of Philippine independence: American citizens had 
                                                 
35 Jose C. Kwe, “How the LRT Holds Up to the Philippine Jeepney,” WHO (Manila), January 10, 1982, 
15. 
36 Torres, Jeepney, 16. 
37 McCallus, American Exiles in the Philippines, 1941–1996, 71–72.  
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the same rights as Filipino citizens; that is, they could live in the Philippines, do 
business, and exploit the country’s natural resources.
38 It was initially difficult for 
Filipinos to compete with Americans in the war-torn economy. 
The wartime jeep, with its ease of maintenance and ready availability of spare 
parts, increasingly offered a permanent solution to Philippine transportation problems. 
Furthermore, local adaptation made the jeep a part of the Philippine landscape. While 
the use of converted jeeps as a form of mechanized horse-drawn carriage may appear 
to have simply occurred, stories abound about who actually conceived the idea. As 
was the case with the story of the jeep in the US, the attribution of the jeepney’s 
origins to one individual will perhaps continue to be a matter of contention.  
The Jeepney Kings: The Legacy of the Horse 
Filipino scholars agree that the jeepney originated from the surplus wartime 
jeeps left behind by the US military.
39 However, similar to the origin of the jeep, many 
claims have been made about who first devised the concept. A group of Filipino 
inventors recognized Clodualdo (Clod) Delfino, a bandleader and composer of popular 
music, as the first person to come up with the idea.
40 He was out of work after the war 
and decided to convert one of the leftover wartime jeeps into a passenger vehicle. The 
jeep at that time had a canvas top. Delfino provided the initial sketches of the “first” 
jeepney (Figure 4.9), which for all practical purposes resembles Trudl’s auto calesa 
(Figure 4.8). 
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Figure 4.9. Sketch of the “First” Jeepney. 
Source: Emmanuel Torres, Jeepney (Quezon City, Philippines: GCF Books, 1979), 39. 
Delfino displayed the name “jeepney” on his windshield. Just as the name 
“jeep” became commonplace in the military because a sergeant supposedly painted the 
name on his vehicle,
41 the “jeepney” name also stuck throughout the following 
decades, reportedly as a result of Delfino’s initiative. Delfino quit after six months 
when the entertainment industry began to revive. He reestablished his band and sold 
his jeepney in 1946. By this time, numerous jeepneys offered similar transportation 
services.
42  
Whether Delfino indeed invented the jeepney concept requires far more 
convincing evidence than the personal testimonies of a handful of people. Certainly 
the use of auto calesas appears to have been well underway immediately after the 
war—and possibly even earlier. The commercialization of the jeepney, however, is a 
matter of less contention. It has consistently been attributed to two pioneers, both 
former carriage factory workers. Just as carriage craftsmen in the first decade of the 
century played a critical role in the US auto industry, these former carriage factory 
workers, soon to become manufacturers themselves, created sustained mass appeal for 
the jeep by bringing the flair and flamboyance of the calesa to the jeepney. 
                                                 
41 Ray Cowdery and Merrill Madsen, All-American Wonder: Information Regarding The History, 
Production, Features and the Restoration of Military Jeeps, 1941–1945 (Rogers, MN: Victory 
Publishing Limited, 1993), 43. 
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The local adaptation of wartime surplus jeeps in the Philippines occurred at the 
grassroots level. Anastacio Francisco was born to a poor farm family and went to 
Manila in search of a better life. He began as an apprentice painter and was hired to 
work at the Mata Carriage Factory, where he met Leonardo Sarao, the second jeepney 
pioneer.
43 Together at the carriage factory, Francisco and Sarao worked as a team: 
Sarao lathed the wooden and metal parts of the carriages, while Francisco painted 
them. This background in carriage building later influenced the many expressions of 
equine culture found in jeepneys, similar to the way in which early horseless carriages 
in the United States came to be transformed by the coach builders from their horse 
culture.  
The commercialization of the jeepney—namely, the building of assembly-type 
jeepneys as opposed to the conversion of wartime surplus jeeps—began around 1947 
when Francisco left the carriage factory to establish his own paint shop. A year later, 
most of the jeepneys and trucks roaming the streets of Manila were his “customers.”
44 
By this time, the jeepney began to evolve as a viable, permanent solution to the 
transportation needs of the city rather than a mere stopgap. Significant modifications 
to the short body of the jeep began. The rear portion of the wartime “passenger truck” 
was elongated to accommodate more passengers. The canvas top was replaced by an 
aluminum or iron roof to protect passengers from the elements. Although no two 
jeepneys were alike, a rough image of the transformation is shown in the following 
diagrams (Figure 4.10).  
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44 Ibid., 12.  
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Figure 4.10. Transformation of the Jeepney. 
Source: Emmanuel Torres, Jeepney (Quezon City, Philippines: GCF Books, 1979), 42. 
By 1951, Francisco began to expand his painting business, branching out into 
body building and repair. The popularity of the jeepney accelerated in the 1960s and 
1970s. Francisco by this time began manufacturing chassis frames and other metal 
components.
45 By 1983, there were 427,925 jeepneys, compared with only 16,714 
buses
46 and a practically nonexistent train system.
47 Francisco’s painting business 
helped transform a mass-produced vehicle into something unique and extravagant in 
the eyes of the masses.  
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Sarao, on the other hand, specialized in the technical and manufacturing 
aspects of the jeepney business. Sarao’s business also began in 1947 when he opened 
his own assembly shop, the same year that Francisco opened his paint shop. Sarao’s 
background revolved around the horse-drawn carriage. Following in his father’s 
footsteps, Sarao began work as a rig driver before becoming a lathe operator.
48 Similar 
to Francisco, Sarao did not obtain a formal education beyond grade school.
49 By 1958, 
he was mass-producing jeepneys,
50 having built his own assembly plant by that time.
51 
In the 1960s, jeepneys carrying the Sarao logo outnumbered all others seven to one.
52  
Francisco and Sarao dominated the jeepney business throughout the next 
several decades. Their commercialization efforts represented a fusion of the 
machinelike wartime jeep and the festive image of the horse-drawn carriage. A writer 
summarized Sarao’s and Francisco’s styles and backgrounds: 
Sarao’s conchero [driver of horse-drawn carriage] background, like 
Francisco’s, is readily recognizable in his jeepney designs. The horse motif is 
forever present. On the hood can be found three, six, even up to 14 stallion 
emblems, while horse tails and reins are painted on the sides.
53 
The tradition of decoration and flair in the calesa made its way into jeepney 
designs. Thus the use of the jeepney not only parallels the use of the calesa; its look 
and style also mimicked the embellishments found in Filipino horse-drawn carriages. 
The Philippine Institute of Hotel Administration described the manner in which the 
jeepneys were adorned like “decorated horse-drawn carriages prancing in the cobbled 
streets of old Manila.”
54 The horse emblems found in the jeep signified not only the 
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conchero background of the two pioneers but also, arguably, the pervasive role of the 
calesa itself in Philippine culture.  
Jeepney: The New King of the Road  
The horse emblem had become as indispensable an element of the jeepney as 
its mechanical parts. The iron sculpture of a standing horse on top of the hood, right 
above the grill guard, was the most popular chrome emblem after 1955.
55  
The hood, which is about a meter square, is the special repository of all the 
creativity of the jeepney decorator. Almost mandatory here is the chrome horse 
standing upright on the hood, which may perhaps signify an awareness of the 
vehicle’s “root,” the horsedrawn calesa.
56 
It is interesting that the local writer describing the “mandatory” horse emblem 
of the jeepneys attributes its origin not to the US military jeep but rather to the local 
horse transport it sought to replace. What he observed was the family resemblance 
between the current jeepney and the calesa, particularly in the way its technological 
form mimicked that of the horse. 
In the early days, the horses that pulled the calesa were embellished like kings, 
with little crowns on their heads.
57 Similarly, the hood of the jeep was embellished 
with chrome and décor that resembled the head of a calesa horse. This skeuomorphic 
practice, which George Basalla described as old elements persisting in new artifacts 
despite having no practical application, played a critical role in transforming the 
foreign artifact into a familiar object. Indeed, these horse emblems and 
embellishments were so important that an entire industry emerged devoted solely to 
the jeepney’s decorative regalia, paintings, upholstery, and all the additional elements 
that transformed a mass-produced frame into customized folk art on wheels.
58  
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These embellishments made each jeepney one of a kind: no two jeepneys were 
ever identical—a far cry from their stringently standardized jeep predecessors. 
However, the horse emblem consistently appeared in each of these variations. The 
design and structure of the jeepney could even be modified according to the buyer’s 
specifications.
59 Thus passenger capacity in jeeps ranged from 16 or 18 passengers
60 to 
as many as 22 to 30,
61 although this upper limit was more the exception than the rule. 
The horse emblem persists, however, throughout these customizations. 
The singularity of each embellished jeepney provided the means to distinguish 
it from the ordinary and common vehicles of the day. While the decorations and 
embellishments supposedly attracted more passengers, they had more to do with the 
driver’s desire for personal expression than with marketing or branding, given the lack 
of consistency across various vehicles. Dario Vega, a jeepney driver for nine years, 
spoke of the horse chrome decoration of his jeep as his way of having “porma,” or a 
sporty, dashing image.
62 Rupino Prestosa, a jeepney driver for fifteen years, likewise 
spoke of the horse chrome as “pang-arte,” or artistic flair, artistic expression.
63 The 
majority of the jeepney drivers interviewed, about ten out of fifteen, mentioned one or 
both of these factors in describing the purpose of the horse chrome.  
This need for personal expression also simultaneously corresponded to a 
shared universal value when the drivers spoke of seeing the horse chrome as an icon of 
the Philippines. Dario Vega described it as “simbolo ng Pilipinas,” a “symbol of the 
Philippines.” Still others described the horse as part of shared folk beliefs like the 
tikbalang, although in this case it is a good omen. Jojo Quines, who has been driving a 
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jeepney for twenty years, described the horse chrome as “swerte,” or a “good luck 
charm,” as well as “pamahiin,” or an “auspicious symbol, superstitious belief.”
64 
This paradoxical meaning of the particular and the universal is also expressed 
in the jeepney itself. No two jeepneys are alike, but commuters recognize jeepneys in 
general rather than a particular jeepney manned by a particular driver. Sarao and 
Francisco, however, branded many of the vehicles they produced, although one rarely 
sees their names these days because they have gone out of business. They are 
nevertheless still known as the “Jeepney Kings,” whose brand remains immediately 
recognized by present-day jeepney drivers. Each of the jeepney drivers interviewed 
knew the brand names Sarao and Francisco. 
Still, many refer to the jeepney as the new “King of the Road,” a title 
previously reserved for its predecessor, the calesa, which often displayed a big sign 
right above its roof proclaiming it “Hari sa Kalsada,” or “King of the Road.”
65 The 
jeepney drivers themselves came to embody this role when they spoke of their work as 
sovereign or self-governing. For instance, Alfredo Bodayong, 51 years old, has driven 
a nine-seater jeepney for twelve years and plans to continue driving jeepneys despite 
the low pay, because, he reasoned in the Ilocano dialect,
66 “Awan gamin iti 
agbabaon,” which translates as “because no one orders you around.”
67  
The sense of independence jeepney drivers relish has been further reinforced 
by the imagination. Abetted by various decorative representations that helped create a 
fantasy world, the jeepney driver added props to his vehicle that reminded him
68 of 
home and, at the same time, a place somewhere very much unlike his home. The horse 
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embellishment itself became the necessary prop for an imagined reality, a gateway 
from the grueling realities of long hours of work, the smog, dirt and heat of city life. A 
Filipino art critic and poet described the driver’s sentiment: 
With saddle and stirrups (both simulating tooled leather), the gleaming “silver” 
or “white” horse standing in readiness makes a splendid symbol. It stands for 
what every driver wants his runabout to be, fleet and rugged. This is no puny 
Batangas [name of a local province in the northern part of the Philippines] 
horse but the heroic, muscular, tall variety seen in John Wayne movies, or 
better yet, the Lone Ranger’s Silver. This symbol makes it so much easier for 
the aficionado of Western movies to indulge in a favorite fantasy where the 
reality of traffic outside his windshield is the Wild, Wild West, the machine he 
drives a white steed, and he—Jun Aristorenas or Fernando Poe, Jr. [local 
action heroes], in a local version of a cowboy movie, or a pancit palabok [local 
noodle dish which connotes a mixture of things] Western.
69 
Indeed, Rupino Prestosa described the horse chrome, propped up typically with a 
spring, as a galloping horse, particularly evident when the jeepney starts moving. 
“Kasla agtartaray kin aglagtolagto nga kabalyo,” or “It’s like a running and jumping 
horse.”
 70  
If the jeep jamborees in the US were a means of escape from urban anxiety in 
the 1970s, the jeepney in the Philippines provided the same method of retreat for its 
driver, but to a different destination. Rather than having his jeepney take him 
somewhere far away, a jeepney driver had to rely upon an imagined escape fueled by 
his vehicle’s various embellishments. In many ways, the jeepney drives like its 
military jeep predecessor, but the experience is similar to riding a horse. Jojo Quines, 
who had driven a calesa as a young lad and jeepneys for twenty years, observed that 
both the calesa and the jeepney lack shock absorption and ride roughly but that 
driving a calesa is easier because the horse has intelligence (“mautak,” or literally, 
“smarts”). “You pull the reins and it runs! But one cannot do that with a jeepney.”
71 
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Many of the jeepney drivers who had driven cars, trucks, and even calesas generally 
agreed that driving a jeepney was the hardest.  
“Trucks are easier,” mentioned Manny Manalastas, “because they have power-
steering.”
72 Roland Hernando, who has been driving a jeepney for ten years, 
mentioned the tight-shifting gears of the jeep, and how the car was far easier to 
drive.
73 Rolando Caoagas found the heat and exposure to the elements, such as the 
wind, particularly tiring and difficult.
74 Nevertheless, they continue to drive the 
jeepney because it provides them the freedom to work for themselves. One writer 
noted that the evolution of the jeepney was similar to that of comic strips in the 
Philippines; both started after WWII, and both provided some form of escape:
75 in this 
case, escape from an oppressive economic structure as well as escape toward an 
imagined reality. The driver was the king of a moving domain in a country marked by 
poverty.  
Indeed, the jeepney driver works for no one; he either owns his own jeepney or 
pays what in jeepney culture is called a “boundary,” the daily minimum amount the 
driver needs to make to break even, the same concept as a rental fee. Once the driver 
“crosses” this boundary, the general allocation of earnings tends to follow a 40–60% 
rule; the driver keeps 40% of the total earnings while 60% goes to the owner of the 
jeepney. Apart from this informal financial arrangement, there has never been an 
overall governance structure that regulates jeepneys, just as the calesas were 
unregulated. Each driver was basically a free agent and hence king of his own jeepney 
domain. 
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The self-determination of jeepney drivers allowed them to conduct business as 
if, some would say, they owned the streets. Similar to the calesas, jeepneys would stop 
anywhere to pick up or drop off passengers. A prospective passenger would simply 
stand by the side of the road and flag down a jeepney. Getting off the jeepney would 
simply require one to say “Para,” meaning “stop,” a word used only in the context of a 
moving vehicle.  
While some areas in Manila began to prohibit the frequent stopping and 
starting of vehicles along their roads, the majority of jeepneys still follow this calesa 
style of doing business. A Filipino writer stated, “Jeepney drivers stop every few 
meters, even in the middle of the road, or in corners, with no warning to, or 
consideration for, others.”
76 Jeepney drivers do not like following rules, and many 
even stopped driving their vehicles in areas where traffic rules were starting to be 
enforced. Rolando Caoagas, for instance, drove jeepneys for twenty-six years in the 
busy profitable areas of Manila, but moved to an upcountry province in the last six 
years because in the rural areas, he said, “Awan agtiltiliw,” or nobody catches you 
[literally, no enforcers].
77  
However, this aggressive driving contrasts with the religious elements found 
inside the jeep. Many observers have noted the “homey” look of the jeepney’s interior, 
which often includes an altar propped up on the dashboard.
78 Michael Manalastas 
described having curtains, buying fresh flowers, and polishing the “God Bless Our 
Street” sign in his jeepney.
79 Thus, while the exterior was a manifestation of the 
festive flair of the calesa, the interior of the jeepney provided the passengers a feeling 
of being a guest in the driver’s home.  
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Conversion of Institutions: From Machinelike to Homelike Effect, Filipino Style 
The jeepney represents various aspects of Filipino life.
80 One aspect often 
noted by many tourists is Filipino hospitality.
 81 When someone visits a home, family 
members always provide some type of refreshment, even if it means sending someone 
off to the store through the back door. If someone arrives while the family is eating at 
the table, an extra place is immediately laid, and everyone adjusts their rice and fish 
intake to provide for the guest. This habit of accommodating guests in one’s home 
extends to the habit of jeepney drivers accommodating anyone who flags them down, 
even if their vehicle is full.
 For instance, a six-passenger vehicle would be stretched to 
fit seven or eight, just as a Filipino family would accommodate guests regardless of its 
limitations. 
While one could argue that the driver is economically motivated to pack in as 
many passengers as possible, what is interesting in this phenomenon is the tolerance of 
passengers for such practices. Having ridden jeepneys for almost twenty years, I have 
never heard anyone complain about being packed in like sardines. It seems to be an 
accepted and understood practice to accommodate anyone out in the street trying to 
reach a destination, particularly at night. Many writers characterize this practice of 
trying to fit everyone into a vehicle as consistent with Filipino family values.
 82  
Indeed, home and church are the two institutions that dominate a Filipino’s 
life, and both are clearly evident in the embellishments to the jeepney. These are 
highly personalized. “The driver thinks of his jeepney, not as a simple vehicle with 
which he makes a living, but as an extension of his home, his church, his pride, his 
fears, his very self.”
83 The names of his individual family members and relatives—and 
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sometimes the driver’s entire genealogy—are often painted all over the jeepney.
84 
Every effort is made to provide the vehicle with as homelike an atmosphere as 
possible, particularly since the driver spends most of his day driving his vehicle along 
various routes for as many as ten to fifteen hours per day.  
The addition of homelike touches, such as curtains along the windows of the 
jeepney and various knickknacks along the dashboard, gives the effect of being in 
someone’s living room. Various Christian religious icons and images occupy the 
dashboard alongside the curios. It is common to find altars in many Filipino homes. 
Just as at home, many jeepney drivers dutifully buy fresh garlands of flowers to adorn 
the altar they have propped by their dashboard.
85 The religious icons were believed to 
provide protection from traffic and in this sense, Christian figures became 
intermingled with animistic practices and beliefs. Filipino syncretic religiosity has 
been described by many observers as one of the dominant themes in many jeepney 
decorations.
86  
Thus, unlike in the United States where the shift from machinelike to coachlike 
effect involved passenger comfort, luxury, and convenience, the shift in the Philippine 
case was more a matter of incorporating into the jeepney the various institutions that 
comprise Filipino life. Riding in the jeepney was akin to being inside a home—albeit a 
modest home. Jeepney displays were often criticized by the middle-class as gaudy and 
vulgar, in other words, bakya, which literally means “wooden clogs,” the type of shoes 
associated with the lower class.
87  
While the garishness of the heyday of the decorated jeeps has recently been 
tempered with more subdued decorations, the horse emblem persists, despite the 
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demise of other decorations. A famous art critic, in a conversation with a well-known 
Filipino painter, observed the decline of the festive air of the jeepney:  
In conversation Legaspi [a famous Filipino painter] agrees with the growing 
perception that, despite its exotic appeal to foreign tourists and local 
connoisseurs of nostalgia, this “motorized version of the calesa” is a sad 
reminder of our country’s economic plight, which continues to get worse.
88 
Jeepneys appear to have been decreasing in significant numbers over the past 
several years. Sarao and Francisco went out of business many years ago and were not 
replaced by any new entrants. The names Sarao and Franscisco, once prominently 
displayed on many jeepney creations, are now rarely seen. Nevertheless, one continues 
to see garishly decorated jeepneys, although they are a dying breed. While Sarao and 
Francisco manufactured locally made jeeps with engines imported from Japan, 
jeepneys began to be replaced by surplus air-conditioned vans from Korea and Japan. 
Thus, while the initial push for the use of wartime jeeps was largely dominated 
by various foreign and local economic forces, the eventual commercialization of what 
would become known as the jeepney began at the grassroots level. The auto calesa that 
led to the jeepney became embodied in the chrome horse, which continues to take 
center stage on the hood of the jeepney, even after other decorations have waned in 
popularity.  
However, when the last horse chrome falls, there is less motivation to replace 
it. Roger Abalos, a jeepney driver for fifteen years, did not bother to maintain the 
upkeep of his decorations when the last horse chrome fell off.
89 Similarly, when the 
horse chrome on John Corpuz’s jeepney came off, he did not bother replacing it.
90 
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Diosdado Manalastas, who has driven a jeepney for eight years, scoffs at the entire 
idea of horse chrome and other jeep decorations.
91  
Although Diosdado Manalastas is the exception among the fifteen drivers 
interviewed, his view nonetheless represents the weakened influence of horse-drawn 
carriages in modern transport. Calesas still meader along some street areas in Manila 
as well as in a few rural areas, but like the jeepney, they are a dying breed. The 
jeepney, a mass-produced yet customized public vehicle which came to represent the 
fusion of the machinelike wartime jeep with the force of local calesa tradition, also 
appears to be facing its twilight years.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the significant role the horse tradition played in 
ushering the use of jeeps into Philippine society. When the jeep arrived, the 
Philippines was a country desolate and devastated by war. Yet the discarded surplus 
army vehicle rose to become a custom-built, elaborately ornamented passenger vehicle 
called the jeepney. The jeepney represented the effort of the Filipino people not only 
to localize but to practically “ingest” a technology whose resemblance to its origins 
became just a remote suggestion. The jeep became the mechanical equivalent of the 
ubiquitous calesa in spirit, look, and feel. Pre-existing practices of communal riding, 
method of payment, and extravagant regal decorations of the calesa days transformed 
the military artifact into a popular mainstream transport of everyday life.  
The legacy of the calesa practices persists in the form of a horse emblem 
situated on top of the hood. The horse emblem embodied the many threads that 
connected the past horse culture with its present symbolic mechanized form. The 
strength of the horse tradition permeated the jeep in many respects. From the driver’s 
standpoint, the jeepney replicated the socioeconomic structure of the calesa and 
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allowed freedom of self-expression through an automotive medium. At the same time, 
the calesa brought a sense of belonging to the driver, whose movable dominion 
represented many of the symbols associated with local traditions.  
From the passenger’s standpoint, the same sardine-packed communal riding 
and payment system from the calesa days persisted. The honor system of payment and 
the practice of passing fares from one passenger to the next until they reach the driver 
continue today. The same hospitality practiced in Filipino homes came to be expected 
in the riding experience. The driver finds a way to accommodate everyone. The 
homelike interior décor of the jeep turned the passenger into a guest rather than a 
customer.   
In the case of the Philippines, the notion of comfort in automotive design did 
not originate with women, as some gender analysts have argued to be the case in the 
US setting. Historically, virtually all jeepney drivers have been men; they conceived 
the idea of transforming the jeepney into an extension of their homes. Automotive 
comfort, as Scharff argues, is a universally appreciated value, although in the case of 
the Philippines, it does not seem to have been motivated specifically by gender factors.   
From an artifactual perspective, the regal décor of the calesa was simply 
transferred to the jeepney. The calesa background of the jeepney pioneers came into 
play in the transformation of the jeep’s technological form and spirit. The jeepney thus 
was purposely designed to exhibit a forced likeness with the calesa, just as early US 
automotive pioneers tried to do with horseless carriages. However, there was a more 
seamless transfer of user practices from the calesa to the jeepney, perhaps because the 
concept of a self-propelled vehicle was not as controversial by that time, although it 
was nevertheless a novel phenomenon for a horse-driven society. What seemed to 
remain unchanged, however, was the machinelike driving experience associated with 
the old military jeep, which only the driver directly experienced.  
248 
The complexity of the jeepney represented the convergence of Filipino 
institutions that transformed a foreign artifact into a usable representation of the 
calesa. This convergence, partly motivated by manufacturers and drivers, facilitated 
the acceptance of a foreign device into the everyday life of the Philippines. The case 
of the jeepney shows that persistence in practices permeated the form and 
functionality of the jeep, allowing a peripheral military object to be transformed into a 
mainstream yet sublime device of everyday life.   249
Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
In each of the three cases in this study, pre-existing equine culture provided 
conceptual and material resources for those who sought to transform the motorcar into 
a mainstream means of transport. The motorcar began as an unknown and, in two 
cases, a threatening new device. The first case study shows that when the motorcar 
began to appear in US public streets at the turn of the twentieth century, its most 
noticeable feature—its lack of a horse—collided with the prevailing concept of motion 
as a product of muscle power. The newfangled machinery’s most conspicuous 
feature—the fact that it went without a horse—was also its chief liability.  
In the second case study, the motorcar was an unknown as a result of its 
unproven capabilities on the battlefield. The civilian origins of the motorcar prior to 
WWII stood at odds with the military’s requirements for speed, light weight, and 
cross-country mobility. Mounted attacks were central to the US cavalry’s concept of 
military combat. Forced motorization demanded by high-ranking military officers 
during the interwar years meant the obsolescence of the horse, and ultimately, the 
cavalry way of life, prompting fierce objections to its adoption.  
In the third case study, the motorcar was not as threatening as in the first two 
cases. The military jeep was, after all, associated with the liberation of the Philippines 
from Japanese control. Nevertheless, having arrived from a different land, the jeep was 
exotic, and similar to the American motorcar in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, it was a novelty. It went without a horse in a land largely dependent upon 
animal power.     250
The features that distinguish the motorcar in each case—the horselessness of 
carriages in the first decade of the twentieth century, the unsuitability of commercial 
cars for military purposes during the interwar years, and the vehicle’s association with 
foreign military arms in the Philippines—had to be subdued in order for the motorcar 
to gain entry into mainstream society. In the first case study, automobile 
manufacturers effectively leveraged the concepts, practices, and even the horse’s 
reputation in order to facilitate the diffusion of the motorcar.  
Asserting a likeness with the horse allowed manufacturers to speak to a 
skeptical public about the motorcar’s practical uses (although this likeness was 
sometimes forced, as in the case of the steering wheel touted to work like a pair of 
reins)
1 by simply pointing to the vehicle’s “horselike” qualities. Early manufacturers 
of the automobile, despite users’ resistance to its novelty, transformed the newfangled 
machinery into a familiar sight. Despite their significantly different operational 
controls and their lack of equine power and “intelligence,” motorcars came to pose as 
horse carriages through the public articulations of magazines and advertisements.  
In the second case study, it was the purposeful effort of the United States 
Cavalry to preserve equine practices that led to resistance and, ultimately, to the 
materialization of a new technological form, the jeep. While the first case study 
addresses the successful transfer of equine practices as a means to the financial ends of 
early automobile manufacturers, the second case study shows how the efforts to 
protect the horse and the practices associated with it motivated technological change. 
Deeply hostile to the motorcar, the cavalry saw the passing of the horse as a threat to 
its cohesion as a combat arm. Diffusion occurred after the animal horse was 
resurrected in an iron form.  
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As the wartime jeep successfully assumed horse-related functions, such as 
supporting raids and other combat maneuvers, a transfer to the vehicle of the physical 
and social infrastructure built around the horse occurred more smoothly—a transition 
that had not been achieved through direct mandates from high-level military 
commanders. Because its technical specifications were user-driven, the jeep carried 
out tasks usually performed by the animal horse; its versatility won the loyalty of the 
US soldier, whose close bond with his jeep came to resemble the cavalryman’s bond 
with “flesh and blood.”  
After WWII, the jeep as an army surplus vehicle was domesticated and 
restored to civilian use. Its adaptability in the Philippines was facilitated, as in the first 
two cases, by its role as a mechanical surrogate for the horse. In the third case study, 
pre-existing equine practices spontaneously effected a new automotive hybrid, the 
jeepney. Elements from the calesa legacy transferred even more seamlessly to a new 
automotive medium. Although the lack of alternative transport may have motivated 
the adoption of the jeep, its local transformation came about as a result of the personal 
and institutional expressions of Philippine manufacturers and users.   
In all three cases, because it was positioned to work and, to some extent, look 
like a horse-drawn carriage, the automobile did not need to directly challenge 
entrenched work and socio-cultural structures in order to find its way into people’s 
lives; it merely had to supplant the horse. In each case, the compulsion to negate the 
motorcar’s novelty—to make a new thing “old”—promoted technological change. In 
the case of the cavalry, the motorcar eventually diffused throughout the military when 
the conceptualization of an ideal iron horse materialized in the form of the jeep. The 
jeep provided the military with the means to replicate the horse’s capabilities.  
In the Philippine case, parallelism with the horse came in the form of a 
localized jeep, the jeepney; its appearance and use mimicked that of the local horse-  252
drawn carriage, the calesa. The transfer of decorative motifs, symbolic icons, and user 
practices provided longevity to abandoned military jeeps in the post-war Philippines. 
In all three cases, it was the attempt to make the motorcar “common” like the horse 
that made it “invisible,” and eventually, ubiquitous. 
Significance of the Study  
This study found that the transition from muscle to motor power in all three 
cases required the transfer of elements from the old to the new. Elements from the 
existing horse culture were incorporated to aid the diffusion of the new motorcar: 
terminologies, nomenclature, material designs, functionality, and infrastructure 
associated with the horse in each case were employed to legitimize the emerging 
motor-powered vehicle. While historical and sociological studies of technological 
innovation tend to place a new technology at center stage, this study shows that the 
new depended upon the old in order to become widely accepted. 
Historians such as Berger and Flink have emphasized in particular the 
automobile’s technical and economic advantages over the horse as motivations for 
adoption. Berger argues for the motorcar’s greater power, performance, and 
efficiency,
2 while Flink points to its superior qualities of cleanliness, safety, and 
reliability.
3 Kline and Pinch state that “the advantages of the car became all too clear-
cut.”
4  
However, what technology studies have not addressed is the use of horse 
culture to create readily understandable concepts for the newly emerging and thus 
unfamiliar motorcar. Not only did its innovative features—its ability to haul far 
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heavier loads and run for longer periods of time—facilitate the motorcar’s adoption; 
so did its association with the conventional horse. Established interpretations of an old 
artifact in this case facilitated the comprehension and eventual diffusion of a new 
device.  
The skeuomorphic elements that Basalla considers irrelevant in new artifacts 
may, in fact, serve a crucial purpose—to ensure their use by defusing the threatening 
effects of their novelty. The jeepney’s horse chromes, in this sense, were as intrinsic to 
its functionality as its mechanical parts. Their presence helped evoke a certain 
sentiment that facilitated use.   
Indeed, Schivelbush admitted that, to his knowledge, in Europe “there were no 
attempts to create a passenger car that would be compatible in its form with the 
modern technology of the railroad—i.e., one that would no longer have anything to do 
with the coach-driven compartment.”
5 The legacy of the horse-drawn carriage 
persisted despite the change in locomotion. Why, then, did designs from the horse-
drawn carriage continue to be used, if such designs were an anachronism in the 
modern technology of the railroad? Schivelbush did not address this issue. 
This study also found evidence that gasoline car advertisements directed at 
women began to appear as early as 1902, contrary to Scharff’s claim that early 
automobile manufacturers initially marketed gasoline cars largely to men.
6 In fact, 
from the automobile industry’s earliest stages, manufacturers sold cars to anyone who 
could afford them. Reminiscences of early manufacturers evidence a determined effort 
to market to all potential mainstream users, including women.  
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Scharff’s assumption that manufacturers were influential enough to delay the 
diffusion of the gasoline car as a result of their mistaken, gendered worldview accords 
them too much control over the consumer market. After all, a rising but still uncertain 
automotive industry made manufacturers vulnerable to and dependent upon their 
customers. As part of a gendered worldview argument, Scharff also posits that comfort 
in terms of ease of use was a universally appreciated value but was initially required 
by women. In the Philippines, automotive comfort was initiated by an all-male group 
of manufacturers and drivers. Thus what may be considered feminine in one culture 
may not be considered so in another culture. Associating values, devices, and things 
with a certain gender appears to be a function of context.  
Limitations of the Study 
This study was limited by the scarcity of primary sources in the Philippine 
case. The third case could be improved by interviews with people who lived through 
WWII and observed the proliferation of the jeepney. While the focus of the chapter 
was jeepney drivers, interviews with passengers might have provided another 
perspective. The absence of user perspective is a limitation that the third case shares 
with the first case study.  
Similar to the Philippine case, the first case study focused intensively on 
manufacturers and their opinions regarding the consumer market as expressed through 
advertisements. The addition of user narratives on the transfer from muscle to motor 
power would have provided a check on the accuracy of manufacturers’ readings and 
their assumptions regarding the emerging automotive market. Data regarding suppliers 
and distributors who sold both horse and automotive transports might have provided 
insights into the buying and selling practices of the transportation industry as 
motorcars replaced the horse.   255
In addition, the case study on early motorcars did not fully explore the details 
of US horse culture prior to the introduction of the horseless carriage. It would be 
interesting to see how horse-drawn carriages were advertised, what buying and selling 
practices were employed, and how horses were used for private and public use. The 
first case study is limited by the absence of these types of baseline comparison, which 
were available in the second and third cases.  
Finally, the second case study would be enhanced by a comparative analysis of 
how motorization experience differed across various combat arms. A study of the 
motorized arm of the infantry and its experiences with the use of horses might provide 
a contrast to the experiences of the cavalry. In addition, the absence of primary 
sources that directly link the designs of the jeep with the physical attributes of the 
horse limited the generalizability of this case.  
Suggestions for Future Research  
It would be interesting to apply the thesis of this study—new technology 
appropriating elements from old technology for legitimation purposes—to analyze the 
diffusion of other ubiquitous technologies, such as computers, refrigerators, 
televisions, and cellular phones, to mention a few. The organizing concepts of the 
computer and of email software—for example, files, folders, inbox and outbox—
replicate the desk of a secretary in the days of the typewriter and carbon copies. The 
physical office has been transferred to an electronic medium.   
It would also be interesting to specifically examine why the modern computer 
keyboard retains the layout of the original 1870s typewriter.
7 This keyboard layout has 
remained virtually unchanged for more than one hundred thirty years despite radical 
                                                 
7 For the story of QWERTY, see Paul David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” American 
Economic Review 75, no. 2 (1985): 332–337. Also, see Paul David, “Understanding the Economics of 
QWERTY: The Necessity of History,” in Economic History and the Modern Economist, ed. W. N. 
Parker (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986).   256
revolutions in office technology such as the rise of personal computing. The original 
keyboard layout persists despite its inefficiencies—the letter “A,” one of the most 
frequently used letters, is located under the relatively weak left pinky, while the rarely 
used letter “J” is located under the strong right index finger.  
Typewriter keys were purposely positioned to slow down fast typing in order 
to minimize their jamming together as they hit the typewriter ribbon. While such 
problems do not exist in an electronic environment, typists are stuck with the same 
awkward keyboard layout. Why does such inefficiency persist in a system such as the 
personal computer, whose survival and success seem to depend largely upon a culture 
of speed and efficiency?   
It would also be interesting to investigate how practices from other industries 
may be co-opted by a nascent technological device. For instance, unlike in the United 
States, consumers in the Philippines generally do not buy in large quantities—there 
one can buy a single cup of rice, a single cigarette, or even three tablespoons of oil. It 
is interesting to find the same incremental buying practices used in the purchase of 
fairly sophisticated commodities, such as cellular phone minutes.  
Whereas in the United States users generally belong to some form of calling 
plan, with a fixed limit of calling minutes per month, consumers in the Philippines can 
purchase cellular phone minutes for as little as forty cents (twenty Philippine pesos)
8 
and send a text message for around two cents (one Philippine peso). The selling 
practices of the cell phone industry in the Philippines perpetuate the selling practices 
associated with cheap, perishable consumer goods.  
Exploring the characteristics of practices and technological forms that are 
carried over to new technologies, as well as those that are not, would provide 
interesting insights into the tension between stasis and dynamism. Mapping the 
                                                 
8 Exchange rates for one US dollar equaled fifty-two to fifty-five pesos in early 2006.   257
elements of a newly emerging system to its predecessor—a one-to-one 
correspondence analysis on the systemic level—would complement the largely 
individual-level analysis found in this study.  
In the first case study, for instance, it would be helpful to profile the horse 
culture and industry in greater detail, tracing which elements were transferred to the 
automobile industry, which elements were not, and which of the former persist today. 
Some elements may have served transitional purposes only; for example, we no longer 
refer to an automobile as obedient to the will of its driver, although we may refer to its 
“handling.” Some elements from the horse legacy remain today, such as the practice of 
quantifying the power performance of engines in terms of horsepower. 
Finally, this study principally focused on the process of the transition from 
muscle to motor power and the critical role pre-existing practices played in inhibiting 
and facilitating this transition. A future area of study would be to identify and trace the 
origins of preeminent practices, namely, specific actions and movements that continue 
from one technological form to another, and to determine the qualities that make these 
practices enduring, particularly as they relate to the notion of habitus put forth by 
Pierre Bourdieu. 
Bourdieu argues that people have ingrained predispositions to “cope with 
unforeseen and ever-changing situations.”
9 Habitus represents a form of internal 
volition that serves as a mechanism for managing change. It also includes collective 
practices and pathways (infrastructure) placed in a social world. It would be 
interesting to examine how such elements manifest themselves during the transitional 
phase of large-scale technological change and how they eventually inhabit the use of 
new devices. 
                                                 
9 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), 72.   258
Concluding Remarks 
In each case study, there was a fervent disposition to maintain the horse 
culture. The use of pre-existing practices as an explanatory device provides a 
perspective that insists upon continuity as a condition for change. Examining pre-
existing practices provides insights into how mass adoption for the motorcar occurred. 
Manufacturers of the newfangled machinery effectively appropriated the vocabulary, 
physical infrastructure, functionality, and work routines built around the horse. This 
strategy provided the newfangled machinery readily available concepts that were 
immediately understood in an environment entrenched in horse culture.  
When early American automobile manufacturers recast the motorcar as a 
mechanical horse, they did so in an effort to convert a skeptical public from spectators 
to consumers. Through advertisements, manufacturers appropriated the goodwill 
earned by the popular horse to recast the notorious, hair-raising “devil wagon” as a 
sensible, safe form of transport.  
In the case of the military, it was the physical translation of the horse into an 
iron form that eventually ushered in a successful motorization campaign. The jeep, 
also referred as the “blitz buggy,” became the military’s new warhorse in modernized 
warfare. Similarly, the AC or Auto Calesa of the Philippines, a localized version of the 
jeep, provided for the continuity of the legacy of the horse-drawn calesa in an 
“automated” mechanical form.  
In a context dominated by the use of the horse, the staging of the motorcar as 
its operational and functional equivalent opened the doors for an alternative. 
Appropriating equine transport practices and capabilities provided the means for the 
emerging motorcar to compete with the seemingly indispensable horse. The motorcar 
came to dominate by virtue of its association with what it sought to replace.   259
Focusing on how controversial technologies present themselves as variations 
on the old may thus provide necessary insights into how enrollment is achieved. The 
strategy of appropriating the physical forms, practices, and infrastructures of the 
proven work horse helped to mitigate the liabilities posed by the motorcar’s novelty. 
Such appropriations may be particularly effective for those devices for which 
reassurances of predictability and familiarity are critical to acceptance. 
What provided admission for the motorcar in all three cases was its taming, or 
in Silverstone’s parlance, its “invisibility.”
10 This “invisibility” required the motorcar 
to appear to be as mundane and sensible as the ubiquitous horse by making visible in 
the new artifact what was invisible in the old—the safety, reliability, and ease of 
operation of the horse-drawn carriage; the ruggedness and cross-country capability of 
the war horse; and the flair and flamboyance of the calesa—all taken-for-granted 
features found in the ubiquitous horse transport.  
Thus this study found that the transition from muscle to motor power was a 
matter of connecting old ways with new things, a reversal of what most user studies 
tend to emphasize: the finding of new uses in old things. A successful campaign for 
technological change may well require presenting the new as something familiar. A 
1902 illustration from The Automobile (Figure 5.1) perhaps foresaw how the motorcar 
would evolve during the next decade: omnia mutantur, “the more things change, the 
more they stay the same.” Indeed, such was the case. 
                                                 
10 Roger Silverstone, Television and Everyday Life (London: Routledge, 1994), 98.   260
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. “The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same.” 
Source: The Automobile, (edited by Angus Sinclair), July 1902, 587.  
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